# JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
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*Journal of Contemporary International Relations and Diplomacy* is a university-based academic and peer-reviewed journal domiciled in the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, College of Social and Management Sciences, Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria. The Journal welcomes rigorously-researched original articles that are theoretical, empirical/policy-oriented in diverse areas of international relations and diplomacy as well as cognate disciplines. Submission of articles to JCIRD implies that the work has not been published previously and is not under consideration in any other journal. JCIRD is published on a bi-annual basis.

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# FRIENDS OR FRENEMIES? ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO NIGERIA'S QUEST FOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUPPORT

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## Abstract

Notwithstanding decades-long strains and stresses in their relations, Nigeria is one of the foremost African partners of the United States and a major recipient of American aid in Africa. Both countries have traditionally maintained very robust bilateral relations since the former's political independence in 1960, especially given their economic ties. Until recently, their economic ties have been very robust, thanks to Nigeria's sweet crude that the United States largely needed for decades. However, this study examines how the generally cordial bilateral relations between the two countries have not necessarily translated to effective security and anti-terrorism cooperation. Nigeria has consistently focused on the United States for anti-terrorism support, albeit with limited responses from the latter. In this regard, the study utilised both primary and secondary sources to investigate the puzzling inconsistencies in the anti-terrorism cooperation between these supposed allies. Thus, the study revealed that since both countries have a common interest in combating terrorism, a conventional realist approach can help us put in the proper perspective some understandable strategic reasons for their somewhat difficult anti-terrorism cooperation.  The study concludes that as much as Nigeria desires American support, the dynamics of their anti-terrorism cooperation will not likely change for as long as the United States does not consider combating terrorism in Nigeria to be strategic to its Homeland Security.

**Keywords:** Anti-terrorism, Bilateral Cooperation; Nigeria; terrorism; United States.

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## Introduction

Nigerian history had been punctuated with myriads of political violence, civil war, ethnoreligious conflicts, military dictatorships, and terrorism. While terrorism only became a monumental national security concern in 2009, it is important to note that different political actors, including the state itself, have used violence to pursue their goals in the past. For instance, the military rule largely involved brute force and violence, such as the 1995 extrajudicial killings of the Niger-Delta environmentalists. Thus, for a complex mix of reasons, including governance deficits, corruption, and predatory elite rule, several non-state actors have sprung up with violent activities, including Boko Haram terrorism. Boko Haram had reportedly caused over 40,000 deaths between May 29, 2011, and April 12, 2021 (Campbell, 2021a). Terrorism has caused unprecedented 2.5 million internal displacements and led 7 million citizens into existential threats and humanitarian crises (Humanitarian Country Team, 2018). The deadliness of Boko Haram has since made it the world's most dangerous terror group and made Nigeria the third most terrorised country globally for many years (Institute for Peace & Economics, 2019; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, pp. 18-28).

Given that Nigerian defence and security forces were originally configured for conventional national security challenges (Nigerian Army Colonel, personal communication, October 22, 2019), there has been poor handling of terrorism. However, the country had developed series of legal and operational frameworks for its anti-terrorism efforts, such as the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013), National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016), and Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in 2017, in addition to several military operations from 2009 to date. In late 2015, the Nigerian authorities claimed to have 'technically defeated' the terror group. In contrast, the terrorism trajectory had continued to grow in terms of the terror groups' operational prowess, organisational basing, political ties, and armed hostilities (Owojori et al., 2020, pp.6-10).

However, Nigeria's focus on the United States (U.S.) in seeking foreign assistance is what this study investigates. Thus, the study uses both primary sources (semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources to explain the dynamics of this cooperation. Theoretically, the realist approach is adopted to analyse why the expected cooperation between the two states has not materialized, arising from state interests, strategic and military interests, power politics, and self-interest. Otherwise, how could we understand the policy of a country known globally as the 'Czar' of the global war on terrorism not to put the full weight of its anti-terrorism prowess behind Nigeria?

The rest of this article is divided into five sections. The first section discusses Nigeria's anti-terrorism efforts, while the second section evaluates the methodology of Nigeria's quest for foreign assistance that has largely focused on the U.S. The third section examines the dynamics and trajectories of American responses to Nigeria's request for anti-terrorism cooperation, while the fourth section evaluates the realist-influenced American anti-terrorism support for Nigeria. Lastly, the fifth section evaluates the implications of Nigeria-US anti-terrorism relations.

## Nigeria's Domestic Anti-Terrorism Situation: Issues and Challenges

Nigeria has struggled for over a decade to combat violent extremism and terrorism orchestrated by the dreaded Boko Haram group and its break-away faction that has come to be known as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Nigeria's anti-terrorism activities had largely involved military operations and, to a limited extent, some soft approaches such as the de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration programmes, the high point of Operation Safe Corridor. However, by default, Nigeria's CT frameworks and programmes have been complicated and mostly ineffective because of poor organisational and operational structure (Onapajo, 2017). Since 2009, when Boko Haram resurfaced with fiercer deadliness,

Nigeria has launched five large-scale military operations against the terrorists: Operation Flush (2009), Operations Restore Order (2011), Operation BOYONA (May 2013), Operation Zamani Lafiya (August 2013), and Operation Lafiya Dole (2015) (Owojori et al., 2020, pp.3-6).

The militaristic anti-terrorism operations in Nigeria have equally involved two unconventional practices. First is the enlistment of local volunteers, the famous Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), into the anti-terrorism operations. Second is the engagement of the South African private defence forces- Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP). The CJTF was reputed for deterring terrorist attacks in the Northeast, given their internal communal mechanism (Dulin & Patino, 2019, p. 4) and serving as de-facto intelligence apparatus in the operations (Kazir, 2017, p. 2). Also, the STTEP reportedly facilitated the dislodgement of the terrorists from the large swaths of territories in the North-East in early 2015, which was the only significant and undeniable strategic anti-terrorism achievement of Nigeria (M. Page, personal communication, October 29, 2019). Nigeria has also formed an alliance with its West and Central African neighbours of Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). As Brechenmacher (2019) noted, notwithstanding the lingering challenges with the MNJTF arrangement, its operations have recorded gains and security improvement in parts of north-eastern Nigeria.

Nigeria's soft approach had included dialogue and transitional justice efforts, which began in August 2011 when the government inaugurated a Presidential Committee, while another Dialogue Committee was inaugurated on April 24, 2013 (Agwu, 2016, p. 309). Also, the transitional justice efforts had manifested in the country's de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration programmes meant for civilising repentant Boko Haram terrorists. The most significant of these programmes is the Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), an integral part of Operation Lafiya Dole.

Effectively, hundreds of former combatants have passed through the programmes, and roughly 2000 are currently undergoing courses (Lawal & Adam, 2020). Unfortunately, many Nigerians see OPSC as a safe landing for the terrorists and would rather want justice done before forgiving the terrorists (Adibe, 2020). Nigeria had also attempted to address the underlying socio-economic problems in the northeast region, leading to the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) in 2017 (Keigbe, 2018). NEDC, however, is a culmination of many other previous programmes such as the 2015 Presidential Initiative, the 2016 Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI), the Victims Support Fund (VSF), all of which championed humanitarian programmes in the terrorism affected communities of Nigeria (Gado & Sanusi, 2019; Tukur, 2019; Victims Support Fund, 2019).

However, the underlining anti-terrorism pitfalls in Nigeria include the country's poorly modernised military, corruption, sabotage within the military, the politicisation of terrorism issues, and lack of national unity (Agwu, 2016, pp. 489,501, 930; Owojori et al., 2020b). The poor standing of the Nigerian military is such that "the country began counter-Boko Haram military operations by deploying the same materiel it used during the peacekeeping operations in Liberia" (Nigerian Army Colonel, personal communication, October 20, 2019). The poor force configuration could similarly be seen in the early 2020 lamentation of Major-General Segun Adeniyi, former Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, who announced to the nation that there were shortfalls in Nigeria's military capacity as against the superior firepower of the terrorists (Haruna, 2020). The incapacitation was so much that as Nigerian forces continued to lack critically needed materiel, the terrorists owned mortar bombs, RPGs, Gun Trucks, etc. (Ibid). These are obvious indications that Nigerian anti-terrorism efforts have been unsuccessful in approaches and outcomes, explaining the country's obsession with foreign assistance-seeking.

## The Foreign Anti-Terrorism Assistance Requests: Why Has Nigeria Focused on the United States?

Arising from anti-terrorism pitfalls exemplified by the continued growth in terrorism trajectories in Nigeria since 2009, Nigeria has consistently looked outward and sought foreign supports, particularly from the U.S. The question is: Why has Nigeria particularly focused on the U.S. for its foreign anti-terrorism cooperation quest? Perhaps the answer lies in their generally cordial relationship. Foremost in their bilateral relations is the robustness of their economic relations, in which Nigeria has been a country with which the U.S. has maintained the most significant ties in Africa, the largest African trading partner, and third-largest recipient of American foreign direct investment in Africa (Blanchard, 2014, p. 16). Similarly, Nigeria enjoys a preferential trade benefit under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the U.S. (U.S. Department of State, 2018). And thanks to its crude oil supplies to the U.S., Nigeria has mostly had a favourable balance of payment in its trade relations with the U.S. In 2018, the U.S. goods and services trade with Nigeria was estimated at USD 11.3 billion, with exports of USD 5.1 billion and imports of USD 6.1 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with Nigeria stood at USD 1.0 billion (U.S. Trade Representative, 2018). However, their trade relations, especially crude oil supplies, had declined since 2012, following the U.S. local crude oil production occasioned by the Shale oil production. (Blanchard & Husted, 2019, p. 18).

The robustness of Nigeria-US bilateral relations has sometimes made the Americans consider Nigeria as their congenial African partner and a diplomatic and security ally to be relied upon for furtherance of the U.S. policy on African regional challenges where the U.S. would not or could not take responsibility (Burchard & Burgess, 2019, pp. 13-16). The high point of Nigeria-US relations was demonstrated in 2010 when both countries signed a Bi-National Commission Agreement for addressing issues of mutual concerns, including security matters. While the above points signify the nature

and character of Nigeria-US relations, they provide an understanding of how Nigeria has excessively focused on the latter in its search for assistance and, at the same time, raise a puzzle about their bilateral anti-terrorism relations. After all, the U.S. is not the only world power with which Nigeria has relations.

Nigeria's quest for anti-terrorism cooperation with the U.S. emanated from the recommendations of a 2012 Presidential Committee that Nigeria sought intelligence gathering, equipment supplies from the latter (Agwu, 2013, p. 423). Thus, when former President Jonathan met former U.S. President Obama in September 2013 and played host to former U.S. Secretary of State Clinton, they essentially deliberated on how the U.S. could help Nigeria combat the scourge of terrorism (Owojori, 2021, p. 194). Also, President Jonathan reportedly wrote letters to President Obama and many other world leaders seeking assistance (Jonathan, 2018, p. 35). Moreover, since 2015, President Buhari has met two U.S. Presidents (Obama and Trump). His administration has played host to two former U.S. Secretaries of State (Kerry and Tillerson), and such meetings largely centred on Nigeria's anti-terrorism needs. Also, requesting anti-terrorism assistance from the U.S. is generally acceptable to Nigeria's military hierarchy.

For instance, a former General Officer Commanding, Nigerian Army 1 Mechanised Division, agrees that Nigeria needs the Americans for timely information and intelligence on Sambisa Forest and inside Nigeria, to be aided by the U.S. drone operations from Niger Republic (Channels Television, 2016). In 2015, as a further push for the needed anti-terrorism support, President Buhari accused the U.S. of unwittingly aiding and abetting the terrorists for denying the country access to appropriate strategic material and equipment (Nossiter, 2015). Similarly, former President Jonathan re-emphasised the desired role of the U.S. in helping Nigeria reverse terrorism trajectory when he addressed a Sub-Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 2017 and called on the Trump administration to help Nigeria (Premium Times, 2017). Therefore, the positions of

the Nigerian leaders above suggest that notwithstanding Nigeria's close ties to other countries such as Russia and China, there is a favourable disposition toward the U.S.

## The United States' Responses to Challenges of Terrorism in Nigeria

After a period of reluctance, the U.S first counter-Boko Haram action was the 'foreign terrorist' designation of the group in 2012 (Agwu, 2013, p. 424). Subsequently, it began anti-terrorism assistance to Nigeria by training Nigerian troops and providing capacity-building efforts for the country's armed forces, security services, and other agencies. Assistance to Nigeria has been championed by both the Pentagon (Defence Department) and the State Department through American overseas regional and global cooperation arrangements such as the West Africa Regional Security Initiative (WARSI), Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), and other platforms (U.S. Department of State; Blanchard, 2014, p. 12). Similarly, the Pentagon has provided funds and carried out some anti-terrorism support programmes for capacity building and training for Nigeria (Blanchard, 2014, p. 12).

According to a Nigerian Air Force commander in the northeast operations, Nigerian troops have been trained at tactical-level, field training, military formation courses up to staff courses, and strategic level course at Defence College and so on (NAF Commodore, personal communication, January 13, 2019). Essentially, Nigeria's defence and security forces have been to elite U.S. military institutions (U.S. States Department & Defence Department, 2018). All such training have aided policy formation, troops' combat readiness and is instrumental to the country's development of the legal and operational frameworks such as the TPA (2013), NACTEST (2016), and PCVE (2017) (O. Ismail, personal communication, March 7, 2019). After all, most of the troops deployed for anti-terrorism operations and Nigerians who drafted policy frameworks for the

country were largely drawn from the pool of many personnel trained through the U.S. programmes (Ibid.).

Nigeria and the U.S. struck an intelligence-sharing agreement in May 2014, which has not produced any significant outcomes due to their operational challenges and political disagreement (Blanchard, 2014, p. 13). However, an observer had hinted that the U.S. refusal to divulge intelligence to the Nigerian military hierarchy is not unconnected to the sabotage within Nigeria's defence and security forces (Agwu, 2016, pp. 930-933). Additionally, personnel from associated agencies involved in anti-terrorism for technical issues were also trained for capacity building by the U.S., such as the Nigerian Police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (F. Onuoha, personal communication, January 9, 2019). More so, the U.S. Department of Defence budgeted more than US$16 million for Nigeria in the Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 for Train-and-Equip programmes (Blanchard & Husted, 2019, p. 22), even though the direct U.S. assistance to Nigeria is the least provided to any Lake Chad Basin country. However, the most topical issues have been the U.S. decision to either filibuster or outrightly block the supplies from the American Corporations or by frustrating supplies through third-party arrangements such as the decision of Israel to help Nigeria with supplies of decommissioned Cobra Helicopters (Agwu, 2016, p. 906). The U.S. had chosen to block the Jonathan administration from accessing air platforms by invoking the American Human Rights Law known as Leahy Vetting Law that prohibits the U.S. from providing defence assistance to countries whose security services have committed egregious human rights violations (Burchard & Burgess, 2019, pp. 1-2).

However, the U.S. authorities shifted grounds after the 2015 regime change in Nigeria and provided the country with more than twenty Mine Resistant Armoured Personnel Carriers (MRAPs) in 2016 as part of excess defence articles drawdown (DefenceWeb, 2019). Also, in 2016, following the emergence of President Buhari,

found to be more tolerated by the Obama administration, the U.S. activated the process for supplying Nigeria 12 Super Tucano A-29 air platforms with associated weaponry and ammunition. While a mistaken Air Force bombing of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in January 2017 stalled the process (Blanchard & Husted, 2019, p. 21), the Trump administration re-authorised the supplies in December 2017 in a deal worth over half a billion USD ($593 million) and slated for staggered delivery from 2021 to 2024 (Ibid., p. 19). Thus, to say that Nigeria-US anti-terrorism is disturbing is, perhaps, an understatement. For why would two countries, known to be partners and grossly affected by the scourge of terrorism, fail to cooperate toward addressing common threats?

## The Realist Influenced Inconsistencies in the United States Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with Nigeria

This study examines the puzzle in Nigeria-US anti-terrorism relations, which a realist perspective helps to understand. The realist framework informs us about states' positional character that makes them prefer relative gains in partnership to advantage partners. At the same time, their willingness to cooperate is often constrained by their concerns about relative gains (Grieco, 1988). This important systemic limitation of inter-state cooperation identified by the realist framework contributes to our understanding of Nigeria-US anti-terrorism cooperation because the U.S. has given security assistance to Nigeria strictly as its interests permitted. The U.S. commitment to human rights is fluid and based on its security needs and interests since the allegation of violations against Nigeria involves politics and vested interest. For instance, and as Burchard and Burgess (2019, pp. 16-24) observed, although Nigeria has had less than stellar human rights records, the U.S. chose to punish the country at a time that American interests (global war on terror) were also at stake, only because the U.S. had reliable alternative such as the Niger Republic.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., former President George W. Bush announced the famous global war on terror with a doctrine of pre-emptive strike to neutralise terrorists

in their hideouts worldwide aggressively. As a sign of the U.S. world leadership in combating terrorism, President Bush announced that "… America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it (terrorism) …But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will (Dowd, 2008). By 2002, President Bush sought approval from the U.S. Congress to supply Nigeria defence articles and services and military education and training worth US$4 million to address an unforeseen emergency (Thomas, 2018, p. 98). These developments were obvious efforts to coopt Nigeria into the U.S. network of allies in the global war on terror and a classical example of the U.S. realist disposition.

Similarly, the Bush administration in 2007/2008 established a new combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM). However, Nigeria championed other African countries' skepticism and suspicion about the U.S. intentions, forcing the U.S. to station AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, eventually (Mboup & Mihalka, 2010). It is, thus, instructive to note that Nigeria's inaction and antagonism against AFRICOM could have been part of the reasons that the U.S. has chosen to pay back. However, Nigeria appears to be dancing to the American tune already, given the country's recent (April 2021) invitation to the U.S. to bring back AFRICOM, ostensibly to mitigate the security situations in Nigeria and West Africa that appear to be getting out of control (Campbell, 2021b).

As discussed in the prevision section, the U.S. has helped Nigeria somehow but has failed in arms supplies, and intelligence supports, which have negated all the training and capacity-building supports provided to Nigeria. It is, thus, puzzling that a famous Czar of global war had found it difficult to give Nigeria full support but instead chose to antagonise and abandon it. In other words, how the U.S. that as far away as 2001, chose to support Nigeria for terrorism prevention could turn against the country in the 2010s points to the fact that helping Nigeria is not necessarily a priority. After all, the U.S. is more interested in fighting jihadists in many theatres worldwide: in Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Philippines,

and other places. It is less bothered about Nigeria for as long as the country's military can draw Boko Haram to a stalemate (J. Zenn, personal communication, July 23, 2020). After all, the northeast region of Nigeria, where terrorism is rife, is not strategic to American interests compared to Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta.

Moreover, if the allegation of norm violations against Nigeria is put to critical analysis, it also depicts double standards and inconsistencies in the U.S. human rights crusade. Indeed, the U.S. has a history of courting regimes with poor democratic and human rights credentials during the Cold War, as well as its current support for Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and other countries (Owen IV & Poznansky, 2014, pp. 1073-1075; Lang et al., 2017). Furthermore, despite the allegations against Saudi Arabia for aiding and abetting war crimes in Yemen and being responsible for killing Jamal Khashoggi, the U.S. has continued to supply that country with defence equipment (Ward, 2021). Perhaps the most instructive example is how the U.S. has consistently cooperated with Malaysia on anti-terrorism matters despite their complicated relations and antagonistic worldviews, and wider foreign policy questions (Parameswaran, 2019). Yet, the U.S. has been inconsistent in cooperating with Nigeria, with which it maintains more cordial relations, which suggests interest and politics as argued by the realists.

Arising from the foregoing, therefore, the nature and character of Nigeria-US anti-terrorism remains a puzzle, but a realist theory helps our understanding of a situation in which both countries claim to be partners but yet their cordial relationships have not been leveraged for effective anti-terrorism cooperation and outcomes. But the important point to note is that the U.S. decision to deny Nigeria critical intelligence and arms supplies has only allowed the trajectory of terrorism to grow in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. But having said that, it is imperative to give blow-by-blow implications of the anti-terrorism relations of the two countries.

## The Outcomes and Implications of Nigeria-United States Anti-Terrorism Relations

The intractability of terrorism in Nigeria has resulted from a mix of internal issues and external factors. While it is the responsibility of Nigeria to fix the terrorism challenges, bilateral and multilateral cooperation are also important because terrorism had proven to be unamenable to unilateral actions of any single country. But if international cooperation is anything to go by, then the appropriate conclusion that can be drawn is that Nigeria-US anti-terrorism cooperation has been an utter failure in approach and outcomes. And since the success of any strategy to combat terrorism can only be measured by how the terrorist violence is curtailed, then what can be said of Nigeria is that terrorism has continually grown in trajectories, and the U.S. is largely implicated in all these. To draw this conclusion correctly, it is important to analyse how the U.S. actions and inactions have allowed terrorism to grow in trajectory using four yardsticks: terrorist group's operational capacity, territorial control, foreign links, and violent attacks.

## Operational Capacity of Boko Haram and Its Break-away Factions

By operational capacity, mention could be made of the Nigerian terror groups' means of funding, terror tactics, combat readiness, and possession of military equipment. Thus, there is a significant implication of the lukewarm U.S. counter-Boko Haram policy and strategy for how the terrorists have continued to enjoy unhindered funding that has served as oxygen for them. The poorly coordinated and inconsistent anti-terrorism ties between Nigeria and the U.S. have only been to the advantage of the terror groups who have succeeded in avoiding funding sources being detected. The same can be said of how the terrorists have continued to advance in their mastery and deployments of superior armament and operational tactics (Adesoji, 2019, pp. 10-11; Gilbert, 2014, pp. 150-156). The worst scenario of the terrorists' growth in trajectory in terms

of capacity was proven by the former Nigerian Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole (General Adeniyi) in early 2020 about the group's possession of superior firepower (Haruna, 2020).

## Terrorists' Territorial Control

The availability of ungoverned spaces naturally provides a safe haven for the terrorists, which is why Bruce Hoffman, as the famous Doyen of terrorism studies scholarship, has called on the international community to properly address such in their anti-terrorism struggles (Hoffman, 2017). The trajectory of terrorism has, thus, grown in Nigeria because terrorists have consistently maintained territorial control, capturing a large swarth of land area in Northeast Nigeria and declaring an Islamic caliphate headquartered in Gwoza in 2014 (Ogbogu, 2015, p. 17). Even though Nigeria liberated these territories through the help of South African mercenaries in early 2015 (Campbell, 2015), things have begun to fall apart again since 2018, which is a pointer to the resilience of the terrorists' territorial control capacity.  For instance, even though it is a controlled base of the regional MJTF forces, Nigeria's military facility in Baga was captured and temporarily by terrorists of ISWAP extraction in November and December 2018, leading to the deaths of scores of troops (Aljazeera, 2019). Core Boko Haram terrorists, however, still have Sambisa Forest as their sanctuary and have reconquered villages and towns where the military once sacked them (Mbah, 2018; Zenn, 2020, pp. 6-8).

## Foreign Links of Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP)

One undeniable fact in the terrorism dynamics in Nigeria is how lack of cooperation from the international community, especially the U.S., denied the country necessary intelligence. This the terrorists have taken advantage of in establishing alliances with dreaded al-Qaeda and ISIS. As Nigeria was abandoned to its fate, terrorists in the country gained capacity-building support from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Zenn, 2018, pp. 89-122). A break-

away faction later got affiliated to ISIS, which bred today's ISWAP (Ibid.). In this regard, a question that begs the answer is, what has the U.S. as a Czar of the global war on terror benefitted in allowing terrorists have the leeway to enjoy external connections that made them grow in capability? As rhetorical as the above question may sound, it is an important one because given the American interest to get rid of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda elements, the U.S. worked with Pakistan using drones in thinning the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in that country to the extent of fracturing their external links (Mir, 2018, p. 70). But in the Nigerian experience, Boko Haram and ISWAP have been empowered by AQIM, ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Azumah, 2015, p. 12), all of which got the group sophisticated.

## Boko Haram and ISWAP's Violent Attacks

From mere rioting in 2009, there have been terrorist violence in Nigeria that has made the country almost a shadow of itself. From drive-by shootings to bombings, mass kidnapping, and beheading, terrorists in Nigeria have continued to wreak havoc while Nigerian security forces appear incapable of reversing the trends. In all these, there is an implication of the U.S. arms embargo on Nigeria.  As the most dangerous terror group in the world, according to the Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram (together with ISWAP) has caused more deaths than Islamic State did in both Iraq and Syria (Bicknell, 2020). To this end, and even though he has been critical of his predecessor, President Buhari realised the link between the terrorists' attainment of superior firepower and the uncooperative U.S. policy and strategy on Nigeria, which made him criticised the U.S. (Nossiter, 2015).

## Conclusion

While international cooperation is an inevitable mechanism for addressing terrorism, it remains a puzzle that despite their generally friendly relations, cooperation between Nigeria and the U.S. has not necessarily reversed the trajectory of terrorism in Nigeria. And despite

Nigeria being regarded as one of the major U.S. partners in Africa, the U.S. has failed to put its full military and technological might behind this West African country, which has inadvertently aided the terrorists. A situation whereby concerns for human rights informed such American counter-Boko Haram policies and strategies for so long points to challenges of inter-states cooperation that the realist school of thought makes clear. Or how could it be understood that terror groups (ISIS and al-Qaeda) worked with Boko Haram and ISWAP, but a state known as the Czar of the global war on terror has been reluctant to cooperate meaningfully with a less endowed state? It, therefore, appears to be an irony that terror groups are cooperating than nation-states, which reveals that international cooperation could be marred by politicisation and vested interests, as the realists suggest. However, notwithstanding the challenges highlighted in Nigeria-US anti-terrorism relations, the way forward lies in Nigeria deploying its diplomatic mechanisms effectively. Moreover, the U.S. would have to revitalise its anti-terrorism policy and strategies to aid Nigeria and not the terrorists, especially in the light of the demise of former Chadian President Debby and given the concerns raised by Nigeria's President Buhari about the likelihood of West and Central Africa regions getting plunged into total instability.

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# 2020 UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL POLL AND CAPITOL HILL ASSAULT: TUMBLE FROM A DEMOCRATIC MORAL HIGH GROUND

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## Abstract

Over 150 million Americans voted in their 3rd November 2020 presidential election. The poll recorded the highest number of voters since the creation of the United States of America (USA) over two centuries ago. The defeated GOP candidate and incumbent President Trump broke from the long-established tradition to concede. He instituted over sixty legal challenges of results of the poll without success. After multiple legal failures, he birthed conspiracy theories that end with a single message: 'his mandate was stolen.' This message instigated his supporters' assault on Capitol Hill by insurrectionists on 6th January 2021. That singular decision liquidated cherished traditions of conceding to the will of the people, peaceful transfer of power, and faith in the American electoral system. A confluence of those events denied the Americans the moral strength to preach liberal democratic ideals at the global stage -- a mission they have been leading along with its allies since 1945, even long before then. This study was guided by the theory of American Exceptionalism that is traceable to the nation's founding philosophy. The study relied on secondary sources of data from periodicals, journals, statements from political actors, and think tank reports. Conclusions and suggestions stemmed from facts encountered in various data consulted and analyzed.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Elections, Conceding, Legal, Morality, Peaceful Transfer

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## Introduction

On 3rd November 2020, over one hundred and fifty-nine million (159 million) Americans embarked on its every-four-year electoral tradition of electing their commander-in-chief. Lindsay (2020) posited that: That's the largest total voter turnout in U.S. history and the first time more than 140 million people voted. Voter turnout in 2020 was the highest in 120 years when measured as a percentage of the voting-eligible population: 66.7 per cent. You have to go back to 1900 to find a higher percentage turnout (73.7 per cent). The 2020 exercise was staged in all the fifty states of the country and administered territories viz: American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands (Davis, O'Shea, Grimes, 2020). Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and the election infrastructure sector Coordinating executive committee released a joint statement on the credibility or fairness of the poll on 12th November 2020, in the following manner:

> The November election was the most secure in American history...there is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised...When states have close elections, many will recount ballots. All of the states with close results in the 2020 presidential race have paper records of each vote, allowing the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary. This is an added benefit for security and resilience.

Government institutions headed by Mr Trump's appointees, and independent observer organisations gave judgments that had unanimous conclusions: "the process was credible and fully reflected the express wish of the majority of Americans that participated in the keenly contested presidential" (Tucker and Bajak, 2020). Despite the electoral institutional conclusions, President Donald J. Trump rejected the outcome of the 3rd November 2020 presidential poll. On 7th November 2020, Trump stated that the "election is far from over" and backed his stance with threats of a legal challenge. He further stated that Joe Biden has not been certified as the winner of any states, let alone any of the highly contested states headed for mandatory recounts, or states where their campaign has valid and

legitimate legal challenges that could determine the ultimate victor.

In addition to his multiple legal challenges in key battleground states, Trump set in motion a wave of conspiracy theories that marketed the big lie that his mandate was stolen to millions of his followers. The big lie was told with Goebbelian sagacity thereby successfully shove it down their political throats. This notion was backed by Senator Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority leader, on the floor of the House after Capitol Hill was invaded by Trump's mob on 6th January 2021 (Pericon and Cathey, 2020). Trump's refusal to concede, unrealistic legal battles, hyper propaganda, and incitement climaxed with an insurrection by his mob that attacked the Capitol with the sole aim of stopping a joint session of Congress that its business of the day was certifying states results of the electoral college. The insurrection killed a Capitol police officer, injured scores, damaged property and stole items while staging the unfortunate event. NBC News of 7th January 2021 report titled *"Capitol Police Officer Dies from Injuries After Clashing with Pro-Trump Mob"* gave a full narration of the saga.

The riotous mob succeeded in truncating the joint session of the Congress for some hours. The Congress dramatically emerged from their hiding dungeons, reconvened and completed their constitutional schedule of delegates certification. The chairman *of the Joint Session and Vice President Mike Spence said:" To those who wreaked havoc in our Capitol today, you did not win. Violence never wins. Freedom wins. And this is still the people's House."* Similarly, the former Majority Leader of the Senate, Mitch, Chairman of the Joint Session, former vice president Mike Pence, gave a condemning speech. McConnell (R-Ken) oozed bombastic words like: "failed insurrection had only clarified Congress's purpose. They tried to disrupt our democracy. They failed." (Fandos and Cothrane, 2021).

The Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi (D-California) a figure targeted for assassination by the insurrectionists gave a powerful speech condemning the act that desecrated the U.S. holy temple of democracy and peoples house. The most quintessential part of her 6th January 2021 speech goes this way:

To those who strove to tear from our responsibility, you have failed. To those who engaged in the gleeful desecration of this, our temple of democracy, American democracy, justice will be done. Today, January 6th is the feast of the epiphany. On this day of revelation, let us pray that this instigation of violence will provide an epiphany for our country to heal. In that spirit of healing, I evoke the song of Saint Francis. I usually do. St. Francis is the patron Saint of my city of San Francisco, and the song of St. Francis is our Anthem. "Lord, make me a channel of thy peace. Where there is darkness, may you bring light. Where there is hatred, let us bring love. Where there is despair, let us bring hope.

The Senate Minority Leader, now Senate Leader, Chuck Schumer, also had strong rebuke for the protesters and their presumed instigator; President Trump:

This will be a stain on our country not so easily washed away: the final, terrible, indelible legacy of the 45th President of the United States...the mob was in good part President Trump's doing, incited by his words, his lies, his violence. His responsibility. His everlasting shame.

Events that started a few minutes after midnight of 3rd November 2020 instigated by former President Trump via a tweet rejecting mail-in and absentee votes dripping-in already tallied election day result peaked with the disgraceful assault on Capitol by Trump's mobilised and instigated mob. While the drama and melodrama were unfolding, the whole world watched with rapt attention because the promoter of democratic values and peaceful transfer of power has recorded an unfortunate incident that has dented its image in the comity of nations.

**Theoretical Framework**

This research adopted the theory of American exceptionalism as its tool of analysis and guide. The major thrust of this dictum is; America is a country founded on a philosophy. The theory postulated that all other nations emerged out of either conquest or some sort of historical evolution that lacked ideals of freedom and liberty. America is the only country that emerged out of love for freedom, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Ceaser (2012) cited in Rammattan

and Szenberg (2017) opined that American exceptionalism is essentially advancing the assertion that: there is something unique with America, there is something spectacular with America, and America has certain unprecedented qualities that cannot be found in the state before its creation. Those unique and distinct features and qualities birthed the political philosophy of exceptionalism.

Shafer (1999) traced the history of the dictum of exceptionalism to John Winthrop of Massachusetts who stated that their new country shall be a shining city on the hill. After Windrop's pioneer declaration, succeeding politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Bush popularised or reminded their fellow Americans and the world of their status of exceptionalism. In his farewell address to the nation in 1989, President Reagan reminded them that America is a shining city upon a hill. Americans used this notion of exceptionalism to anchor their foreign policies during the Cold War and beyond. However, Alexis de Tocqueville was the scholar that popularised the theory of exceptionalism in the academic circle. The theory has gotten more attention from politicians than academics.

## Reasons for Rejecting the Poll

Several reasons could have informed the incumbent president's refusal to accept the verdict of the sovereign that was unambiguously expressed. Almost all the reasons he advanced were baseless and without synergy with common sense, extant legislations and electoral traditions. He merely moulded whimsical and capricious matters and exhibited them as raison d'état for rejecting the verdict of the people. Former President Trump accused states of changing their electoral laws that accepted 100% mail-in, absentees and early voting. He postulated that the not-so-new process that was traceable to the Second World War, specifically designed to permit Democrats to dump millions of illegal votes for his Democratic challenger and eventual victor, former Vice President, Mr Joseph R. Biden. He succeeded in veering off the attention of his millions of teeming supporters from the historical antecedence mail-in or absentee balloting. President Trump also refused to accept fate because of the

time frame that the mail-in or absentee votes were considered valid voted by states election managers.

Laws of many states piqued those votes postmarked before or on polling day and arrived two or three days, should be added in the tally. These laws were enacted in tandem with electoral culture and did not contradict extant federal laws. Disgruntled elements in some states challenged the laws in states supreme courts and verdicts were given long before the general voting date of 3rd December 2020. A case bordering this was challenged up at the Supreme Court of the country. The Supreme Court did not find merits in their legal challenges and denied granting them their prayers (Hal, 2020). More on this President Trump alleged that his election observers were illegally granted access to halls where election tallying was taking place in Pennsylvania and other key battleground states of Georgia, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Arizona.

Later events established the fact that only a transparent glass separated his so-called observers and election managers, counting and tallying the votes. Moreover, within the hall, agents of the two parties the Democratic Party and General Opposition Party (GOP) were right inside the hall. Another sacred fact Trump wish people do not know is, elections are being managed in a bi-partisan manner in the entire country (Quinn, 2020). The former President also alleged that foreigners manipulated Dominion voting machines used in 28 states of the federation. He alleged that the software deleted millions of Trumps votes. The most absurd dimension of this point came from his legal team: they accused Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Moduro of the manipulation through their proxies—owners of Dominion company—who are U.S. citizens of Venezuelan origin (Alexander, 2020). Owners of Dominion have instituted two billion suits against Giuliani and his fellow legal teammate that levelled baseless and laughable allegations against their reputable company. Corasaniti's report of 25th January 2021, in The New York Times, gave an in-depth analogy of the legal action taken by Dominion Company against a team of unserious legal experts Trump engaged to reclaim his 'stolen' mandate.

Reasons advanced by the 45th President of the U.S. for rejecting the election were rejected by the court of public opinion and in the courts of law. Waxman (2020) summed up his assessment like this: "Judges in at least eight states have rejected the litany of unproven claims---that maintain ballots were improperly sent out, that ballots were counted wrongly, that poll observers were not given proper access to the votes count, and that foreign powers hacked into and manipulated voting machines". Judge Stephanos Bibas—of federal appeal court of Philadelphia- a judge appointed by Trump nailed it down by ruling that: "Free and fair elections are the lifeblood of our democracy---charges of unfairness are serious. But calling an election unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither here."

All attempts to make President Trump and his ardent followers understand that laws were amended because of the Covid-19 pandemic were unsuccessful. Curiously, lawmakers who are mostly his Republican party-men and supporters (elected) amended electoral laws in their states because they believe that the new laws of mail-in and early voting will increase participation and insulate people from exposure to the Covid-19 virus. Most of the laws permit people above 60 years – a cream most vulnerable to Covid-19 to exercise their civic duties without risk to life. They reasoned that choosing between election and life should not be contemplated by citizens of the free world and the oldest democracy and constitutional government in the contemporary world.

One reality that rendered President Trump claim of electoral fraud absurd and comical was, majority of election managers in key battleground states of Georgia, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin are Republicans and his never-say-die or unrepentant supporters and advocates. They campaigned for him and contributed money to his presidential mission in 2016, supported his controversial policies, and contributed money to the election in focus. Most of them were early believers and supporters of his "Make America Great Again" mission the year he announced his presidential bid. Because they have unshakable faith in the electoral

system and other democratic institutions, they stood with the popular will that favoured options of people mailing-in ballots, early voting and absentee balloting.

Waxman (2020) published a feature in Times of 29th September 2020 that gave a historical analogy of America's laudable and attractive tradition of absentee votes that commenced during America's Civil War. That phase was followed by that of the First World War and subsequent phases that made citizens vote via mail-in, early voting, or absentee votes. This method of voting started with the American military serving outside their states of origin or the country and citizens living outside their states. Before the 2020 poll, almost all the states were practicing one form of mail-in or absentee voting system or the other.

## Unethical Actions

The preceding segment of this discourse enumerated sundry reasons advanced by the 45th president of the U.S. and placed them on moral, ethical and legal scales. After rigorous perusal, none of the reasons he paraded in the court of law and public opinion succeeded in getting a legal verdict or gained the acceptability of the majority of the citizens of the country. While milling and simultaneously showcasing his strange reasons, he exhibited unethical actions unknown to American's longstanding democratic and electoral traditions. First, was his blatant refusal to accept the verdict of the people that was unambiguously expressed through popular votes and the electoral college system. His inability to resist that inordinate temptation of rebelling against the decision of the sovereign that every observer and government institution affirmed was credible introduced an unethical and strange dimension into America's electoral and political behaviours.

Refusal of the 45th president to accept decisions of judges from the lower to the highest court in the land was another unethical action unexpectedly introduced. It is incumbent in all democratic political settings that disgruntled parties in an election(s) seek legal

redress. But it is a settled matter that, after exhausting legal channels, candidates do surrender to the decision of courts or tribunals. It is absurdly strange that a United State president will have difficulties accepting this realism that is engraved in their electoral culture. Worse, he expressed disappointment that judges he appointed into the temple of justice refused to circumvent the laws to favour him. Feinberg (2020) opinion titled "Trump Wonders Why the Supreme Court Justices He Appointed Won't Support him. He Shouldn't," published in *Independent Voices*, of 11th December 2020, succinctly captured his frustration with a horde of conservative judges and justices he appointed into various courts.

Trump's call to the Georgian Secretary of state to change the result was another unethical action recorded. During an hour-long conversation that ended with threats, former President Trump said all he wants is, that the Secretary should find over eleven thousand votes to enable him to overturn Biden's victory in the state. The Secretary resisted his request. Today, the state of Georgia has launched a criminal investigation into his action (Morris, 2021). Still, this is quite unexpected because even a leader of a less developed country cannot make such a request to an election manager with a straight face and loud voice the way he made. Trump is not alone in this charade of making unethical calls to election managers of states. His strongest ally in Capitol Hill, Senator Lindsay Graham of North Carolina, made controversial calls to the Secretary of State of Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia. Georgian Secretary of State on CNN Politics as reported in USA Today, of 20th November 2020, summed up Graham's mission like this: "It was just an implication of, "Look hard and see how many ballots you could throw out". This is another unethical venture from a lawmaker whose party prided to be a party of law and order.

Mobilising thousands of followers to storm Capitol Hill on the 6th January 2021, using the *"stop the steal"* was another exhibition of the unethical manner by Trump. He practically fed the mob with assorted lies and finally gave them a marching order to the Capitol, while delivering his speech to them in Washington. While his mob

was destroying peoples' houses and stealing items, he watched them from a situation room in the White House. Some of his aides were seen dancing to admiration of their actions that killed people and wounded scores. One month after his inglorious exit, Trump still reiterated his defiance in a Conservative Pac called CPAC on 28th February 2021. While delivering his speech he said "this election was rigged and the supreme court and other courts didn't want to do anything about it"(Wall Street Journal Editorial, 28th February 2021). He is the only candidate that made talking of his unambiguous and universally affirmed defeat a post-tenure mission. Others talked of their legacies and challenges and try to unite the country but not former President Trump.

## Effects on American's Image

A confluence of unprecedented and unethical events enumerated and discussed hereinbefore, which climaxed with the destructive invasion of the Capitol by insurrectionists dented the image of America on the global stage. The status of the moral compass of liberalism and democracy boomeranged on the image of the country. The principle of American exceptionalism and Reaganian imagination of shining city on a hill surreptitiously liquidated. The unfortunate event allowed rivals like Russia and the People's Republic of China to air views on American internal affairs and used that to justify their dictatorial handling of voices of dissents. The Chinese government used the opportunity to compare the American government's reaction to Hong Kong's protests to Capitol riots. They used Peakee Nancy Pelosi's "Beautiful Sight" tweet as their launching pad. A foreign affairs spokesman Hua Chunying piqued in Global Times- an official communists' government tabloid. And blamed American media of double standard in the classification of rioters in Hong Kong and the U.S.  Russian Federation also issued mocking statements, they called American democracy a "Limping Democracy". Times of India, of 7th January 2021, paraded Russian reaction thus:

American democracy is obviously limping on both feet...This is actually the bottom. I say this without a show of loathing...America no longer charts a course and therefore has lost all rights to set it and even more so to impose it on others...The electoral system in the United States is archaic, it does not meet modern democratic standards.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that has been having multifaceted diplomatic spats with the U.S. since establishing its theocratic system in late 1979, reacted to the riots. Iran reaction did not single out America alone but aimed at the entire liberal democracy. Hassan Rouhani stated his government's position this way: "What we saw in the United States yesterday evening and today shows above all how fragile and vulnerable Western democracy is... We saw that unfortunately, the ground is fertile for populism, despite advances in science and industry."

Emmerson Nnangagwa of Zimbabwe, whose country has suffered many sanctions because of conducting elections that America feels do not measure up with the standard of liberal democracy also reacted to the event. He concluded that "America has no moral right to punish other nations under the guise of democracy". The Venezuelan government also used the occasion to pay back the pressure the successive U.S. government has been mounting on them because of reelection and human rights-related matters. They capitalised on to show that the U.S. has lost its innocence and lacks the moral strength to comment on its internal affairs. Part of the statement reads: "with this regrettable episode, the United States suffers the same thing that it has generated in other countries with its previous policies of aggression." The British Prime Minister, a close ally of Donald John Trump, could not hide his frustration and resisted the urge to be diplomatic in his reaction to the Capitol assaults. Johnson said: "The United States stands for democracy around the world and it is now vital that there should be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power". His labour opposition counterpart simply ruled that what happened was a "direct attack on democracy."

The U.S. has prosecuted deadly wars in near and far territories just to establish democracy. Its entire Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and the second invasion that ousted the Baathist government of Saddam Hussein was justified on the need to plant democracy in Iraq. Invasion of Panama and capturing of General Noriega was anchored on the need to institutionalised democracy on the island. In addition to the aforementioned, their over fifty years' sanctions on Cuba, the bloody Vietnamese and Korean wars were all for democracy. Their support for Arab Springs, which collapsed some of the most chronic dictators in the contemporary world, was on the premise of promoting a government decided by the people. Their constant head-on with Russia and China has been on democracy and the need for the leaders in those countries to put in place credible electoral and political systems that the will of the people will determine who should be their leader, how to terminate or renew their social contracts.

## Conclusion

The assault on the Capitol is a confirmation that the U.S. has indeed tumbled from the moral high ground. Their vocal moral voice and visible actions will encounter similar reactions because of that singular act of insurrection by thousands of disgruntled elements that were fed with the big lie by former President Trump and his handlers. However, the country's new leadership must embark on massive, decisive, and aggressive diplomatic moves that will assure allies and foes that the country is ready to take its rightful place in promoting democracy across the globe and living by its original principle of American Exceptionalism. One factor that may abet their quick recovery at the global stage is the unshakable trust many leaders have in their new President Biden is known globally and has impeccable attributes of a man whose words and actions are trusted. America is a crucial player that we world need to succeed in promoting democratic values and ethos across the globe. It is the only actor with the capacity to peacefully or otherwise promote or enforce democratic principles in almost all the corners of the globe.

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# THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC: LESSONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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## Abstract

This study examines the socio-economic and political foundations of Nigeria's foreign policy during the Second Republic and their lessons in charting a new path in the 21st Century. It explores how neo-colonialism, within the context of an international capitalist economy, intensified class antagonism, socio-economic and political contradictions, which impinged negatively on the foreign policy initiatives and postures of Nigeria between 1979 and 1983. Drawing insights from the Marxist political economy approach, this fresh study departs from the common orientation of economic determinism by focusing on the complex interplay between the political, economic and social subsystems through the historical materialist approach to which little attention has hitherto been paid. The study made use of primary data through the conduct of interviews and also relied on secondary sources. The study found that the distorted and peripheral role of dependent neo-colonial Nigeria in the world capitalist economy, its sole reliance on oil and the neglect of agriculture generated socio-political and economic crises that constrained it from pursuing viable foreign policy goals during the period under study. The paper concluded that the pursuit of bold and impactful foreign policy goals by Nigeria depends on its ability to reactivate the non-oil sector of its economy, particularly the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

**Keywords:** Foreign Policy, Second Republic, Neo-Colonialism, Dependency, Capitalism, Oil, Agriculture.

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## Introduction

The dominant themes in the political economy of Nigeria, particularly issues relating to its economic history and foreign policy behaviour are seen as intimately connected with capitalism and neo-colonialism. The latter is a product of the former, as colonialism has its roots in monopoly capitalism defined in terms of how over-production, surplus capital and under-consumption in industrialised countries stimulated a policy of imperial expansion. The partition of Africa and the subsequent establishment of direct political control over Nigeria towards the close of the nineteenth century were series of capitalist-imperialist ventures. Economic imperialism was, however, preceded by a pre-monopolist orientation in which free trade predominated in the pre-colonial era (Uzoigwe, 1985). During this period, trade relation between Africa and Europe was carried out on mutually beneficial terms. As such, the process of development and state formation were progressing steadily among the various independent political entities north and south of the Niger River until the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade in the middle of the fifteenth century.

The introduction of the obnoxious triangular trade marked the beginning of Nigeria's entry into an unequal and exploitative trade relationship with Europe, which expectedly arrested its progress and development so much so that the socio-economic and political development it recorded in the previous seven hundred years before the traffic in Africans began suffered irreparable reverses. Rodney (1982) has pointed out the adverse impact of the asymmetrical relationship that underlined the Atlantic slave trade. According to him:

> When two societies of different sorts came into prolonged and effective contact, the rate and character of change taking place in both are seriously affected to the extent that entirely new patterns are created. The weaker of the two societies (the one with less economic capacity) is bound to be adversely affected, and the bigger the gap between the two societies concerned the more detrimental are the consequences

This submission points to the disparity in the level of development between Europe and Africa in the mid-fifteenth century. At this historical epoch, Europe was already a fledgling capitalist society characterised by a disposition to scientific and technological innovation that set it along the path of steady transformation of its mode of production from an agricultural to an industrial one. This spirit of invention gave Europe a slight edge over Africa that was still emerging from communalism. Indeed, nothing attests to the validity of Rodney's thesis more than the highly inhuman and exploitative pattern which the Atlantic slave trade took and its deleterious effects on the peoples of Africa, in particular West Africa. In like manner, the so-called "legitimate trade" that replaced the slave trade incorporated Nigeria into the international capitalist system in a manner that ensured the dependence and underdevelopment of the country. The peripheral participation of Nigeria in the world economy at this point clearly showed in the international division of labour whereby Nigeria produced agricultural cash crops and palm oil products and exported them at cheap prices while the advanced countries of Western Europe and the United States sold finished products to the country at exorbitant prices.

The introduction of formal British colonial rule from 1900 superimposed new political and social structures on Nigeria as well as new production relations meant to facilitate the economic exploitation of the colony. Colonial economy, like the economic innovations that followed the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, restricted Nigeria to the production of primary agricultural goods for export and kept her dependent mainly upon Britain for manufactures. This orientation of the local economy to meet the needs of the metropole has continued in post-colonial Nigeria. The domination, exploitation, and expropriation of Nigeria's resources have remained in place even after the attainment of political independence. Because the departing colonial masters had devised the strategy of neo-colonialism before handing over power to the Nigerian elite. This petty-bourgeois class has largely continued to maintain and enhance the traditional economic influence and control of the metropolitan power. In return, the ruling elites depend on dominant countries to

consolidate their hegemonic status and to ensure unfettered access to foreign capital.

The foregoing formed the premise for the analysis of the socio-economic and political foundations of Nigeria's foreign policy during the Second Republic, which will be based on the Marxist political economy approach. This theory stresses the primacy of the material conditions of life in determining the behaviour of social groups and those economic factors constitute the primary focus of analysis. The theory pays particular attention to the modes of production in the society, the class structure of society, and how these sub-structural factors determine the superstructure. Other assumptions underlining the Marxist political economy framework include historical materialism that touches on the dynamic nature of social life and dialectical materialism as its method of analysis (Asobie, 1990). This methodological tool provides a holistic framework for understanding the extent to which the domestic economy and socio-political dynamics influence and shape foreign policy. Specifically, the theory helps in explicating the linkages between economics and politics, modes and relations of production, class struggles, and the roots of contradictions within the international division of labour, and how these affect and shape Nigeria's foreign policy between 1979 and 1983.

Using this theoretical framework, the paper, therefore, analyses from the historical materialist perspective how the neo-colonial economic systems within the context of an international capitalist economy, intensified class antagonism, political, social, and economic contradictions during the administration of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), which negatively impinged on its foreign policy initiatives and choices. It also focuses on the subservient character of the Shagari administration, its protection of the interests of western capitalist countries, its dependence solely on the sale of oil and collection of oil rents, all of which have serious implications for the contents and options of Nigeria's foreign policy in the period under survey. Further, it proffers strategies that could end the dependent and mono-cultural nature of Nigeria's economy, intending to place

it at a vantage position of formulating and implementing feasible and bold foreign policy goals rather than rhetoric that cannot be backed with actions and credible material resources.

## Britain's Colonial Economic Policy in Nigeria

The direct political interference in Nigeria, starting from the middle of the nineteenth century, can be traced to the "gunboat diplomacy" of Britain through which the then-existing traditional authorities were supplanted by British consular power and subsequently the Crown Colony administration (Ikime, 1977). By 1900, Britain had formally taken over the administration of Nigeria. The imposition of British formal rule on Nigeria was meant to facilitate the economic domination and exploitation of the country's rich resources, and as such the colonial economic policy revolved around this objective. The production of cocoa, oil palm products, groundnuts, cotton, and rubber in Nigeria, for example, was oriented almost exclusively to British and Western markets, and this became the bedrock of the economy. To Rodney (1985), the deliberate policy of compelling indigenous farmers to produce these export crops led to disequilibrium in terms of shortages of food crops which laid the foundation of food importation in post-independence Nigeria.

There are other elements of the colonial economic policy that are associated with this disarticulation. One of them is the haphazard development of infrastructure in the country as demonstrated by the construction of roads and rail lines to facilitate the transportation of raw agricultural products to the coast, while other areas were neglected. Also, the British colonial authorities did not develop the local manufacturing sector as raw materials were processed into finished products overseas. The other policy is the tight monopoly control of Nigeria's economy by Britain that cut across the mining industry, foreign trade, monetary system, banking as well as insurance business line. This was adopted by Britain to intensify its primitive accumulation of wealth, and this bred contradictions that later became the albatross of foreign policy decision-makers in post-independence Nigeria.

# Socio-Economic and Political Contradictions of Nigeria's Foreign Policy (1979-1983)

Developments in the international oil market with regard to the oil glut of the late 1980s and the subsequent decline in Nigeria's oil revenues and foreign reserves made the Shagari administration depend on foreign loans, with all the stringent conditions of the International Monetary Fund. As a result, the government became highly vulnerable to foreign domination and manipulation, acting carefully at all times in order not to step on the toes of Western countries. Meanwhile, the external debts of the country continued to pile up and by the third quarter of 1983, its foreign debts had increased to N16 billion, while the then nineteen-state governments had also incurred external debts of N13.3 billion (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1988).

These huge foreign debts seemed to have impinged negatively on the autonomy of the Shagari regime to make bold and assertive foreign policies. An official of the ministry of petroleum resources opined that Nigeria's oil and gas resource has not in any way promoted the welfare of the people as it has not brought any improvement to the average income of the Nigerian people. As he disclosed, it has further distorted the economy of the nation by inflicting Nigeria with the "Dutch disease" in terms of crowding out the traditional agricultural export sector. According to him, the existence of a vibrant non-oil export sector in Nigeria is necessary as it would always compensate for the drop in oil revenues each time a glut occurs in the world oil market, noting that the failure of the country to devote sustained attention to the agricultural sector was the reason for the huge external debts that characterised the Shagari government.

Very central to the viewpoints of this respondent is the leadership crisis that Nigeria has contended with since it attained flag independence. The successive political leaders have largely failed to wrest the country from the parasitic chokehold of Western capitalist countries and they appear unable to manage well and invest the oil rents they have been collecting over the years. As economic resources

available to the political class rapidly declined, competition ensued among them to corner the remaining small oil money. This animosity within the bourgeois class manifested in the form of a virulent power struggle by the six political parties in existence during the Second Republic. These political parties, which included the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP), the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), the Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP), and the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), worked at cross purposes on many burning national issues and articulated divergent foreign policy programmes.

A retired official of the ministry of foreign affairs observed that there was nothing bad in the existence of different foreign policy objectives of the six political parties but it was incumbent on the NPN, which was the ruling party at the centre to implement its foreign policy goals. He noted that the NPN was seriously constrained from implementing some of its foreign policy objectives, particularly the continuation of the struggle against the apartheid system in South Africa due to the financial difficulty that confronted it (Interview, April 10, 2021). Closely connected with this was the alleged exploitation of the 1979 constitutional provisions by political opponents to obstruct foreign policy actions of the Shagari regime. As revealed by a current member of the Nigeria House of Representatives, the 1979 constitution did not give President Shagari exclusive powers over foreign policy decision-making, rather the president shared that power with the National Assembly. Since Shagari did not enjoy the overwhelming support of members of the National Assembly in the Second Republic, the constitutional provisions on Nigeria's external relations were often employed to frustrate his foreign policy activities (Interview, April 5, 2021).

The limitations imposed by the 1979 Constitution on foreign policies under the Shagari presidency cannot, however, be extricated from over generalisation and reductionism. Section 12 of the 1979 Constitution empowered the National Assembly to determine the making of treaties by Nigeria with other foreign countries and to

approve those nominated by the President for ambassadorial posts just as Section 14 provided that the conduct of foreign policy is the responsibility of both the President and the Legislature. But the executive organ of government had, and still has, some institutional advantages over the National Assembly in the actual conduct of foreign policy. Again, foreign policies were initiated and formulated by the executive branch of government and this arm had both human and material resources at its disposal that could be deployed to achieve the approval of its foreign policies by the National Assembly, an institution that lacked the type of large bureaucracy and financial power of the executive. It, therefore, appears that the apparent lacklustre foreign policy behaviour of the Shagari regime had little or nothing to do with the exploitation of the 1979 constitutional provisions by its opponents.

In the context of the political limitations of foreign policy objectives of the Shagari government, the real problem appeared to be the sub-structural arrangement rather than the super-structural architecture of the country. In other words, the dependent nature of Nigeria's economy badly affected its political structure and governance under Shehu Shagari. This peripheral position of Nigeria in the capitalist world economy informed the categorisation of Nigeria's government between 1979 and 1983 as a "factional democracy." (Ojameruaye, 2004). In like manner, the social unrest and disharmony that characterised the Second Republic limited the foreign policy options of the Shagari regime. The poor state of the economy intensified the contradictions between workers and the bourgeois class. Added to the labour unrest that culminated in the nationwide strike of 1981 were the Maitatsine religious riots in Kano in 1980 as well as in Kaduna and Maiduguri in 1982. With runaway inflation, unemployment and widespread corrupt practices among government officials, which, according to (Sinclair, 1983), precipitated the massive flight of capital estimated at US$14 billion between 1979 and 1983, the Nigeria people became more frustrated and aggrieved.

## Foreign Policy Initiatives of the Shagari Administration

The foreign policy initiatives of President Shagari concentrated on the African continent, West Africa, and the world at large. With regard to Africa as the declared centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence and which continued under Shagari, the first move was the N10 million grant made by the president to the then newly independent Southern African country of Zimbabwe. Shagari gave financial assistance to Zimbabwe for Nigeria to be seen as friendly to liberated countries in Africa. But the National Assembly heavily criticised him for not seeking its approval before giving out the money, given the poor state of the Nigerian economy (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1988). Furthermore, Nigeria's handling of its border problems with Cameroun also left much to be desired. In May 1981, some Camerounian security personnel (Gendarmes) ambushed and killed five Nigerian soldiers at Ikang, a border town near Cross River State (Ate, 1992). Nigerians at home protested this unprovoked aggression and they called for retaliation but Nigeria failed to take any military action against Cameroun. As noted further by Ate ( 1992), Cameroun was heavily backed by France, its former colonial master and Nigeria's dependence on advanced countries of the West made it tone down its aggressiveness to Cameroun on account of the involvement of France.

It seems that Nigeria under Shagari did not in any way fare better on the issue of Western Sahara. The Saharawi Democratic Republic (SADR), a nationalist movement wanted independence but Morocco was bent on controlling the territory. The response of the Shagari government was uninspiring as it refused to recognise the SADR (Gambari, 1987). Underlining the foreign policy choice of Nigeria on the Western Sahara matter was Nigeria's weak position in relation to Western powers and its abiding desire not to antagonise the interests and views of these colonial and neo-colonial masters. With regard to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, Shagari's contribution appears marginal. As a result of its declining revenues, according to Falola and Ihonvbere (1988), the regime of Shagari could not sustain the financial assistance of its predecessors

to the liberation movement in South Africa, though it retained the economic sanctions imposed by previous regimes on South Africa. However, these sanctions, as further documented by Falola and Ihonvbere (1988), were ineffective as South Africa got Nigeria's oil through third parties.

Concerning its foreign policies in the West African sub-region, the performances of the Shagari government appear uninspiring. In Liberia, the then Master Sergeant Samuel Doe took over power through the barrels of the gun, while another military officer, J.J. Rawlings also struck in Ghana. Though Nigeria condemned these undemocratic changes of government in these two West African states, it failed to take any concrete measure against these usurpers (Akinterinwa, 2012). The economic and military impotence of Nigeria under Shagari glaringly showed in her handling of the crisis in Chad following the emergence of Hussein Habre and Goukouni Waddeye as factional leaders in that country. While the OAU peace-keeping forces in Chad, led by Nigerian troops, were defeated by the factional fighters, Nigeria's feeble response to the imbroglio was revealed by the decisive action taken by the late Libyan leader, Moammar Gaddafi. The troops of Libya intervened militarily on the side of Waddeye in June 1980 and they wasted no time in dusting the forces of Habre (Vogt, 1992). The military capability demonstrated by Libya in this case correlated with her relative economic prosperity while the weak nature of Nigeria's economy prevented her to take any decisive action in Chad.

The declining revenues, impoverishment of the non-bourgeois forces as exemplified by labour unrest, rising unemployment, and the decay of social amenities in urban centres forced the Shagari government to crackdown on "illegal aliens" in the country, leading to the expulsions of an estimated two million "foreigners", mostly from Ghana, in January/February 1983 (Aluko, 1990). This diplomatic move was a big blow to Nigeria's image given the leading role it played in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Adedeji, 2004). On the world stage, the foreign policy thrust of Shagari was anchored on the promotion of world peace

and the protection of the dignity of the black race anywhere in the world (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1988). It is, therefore, not difficult to aver that Nigeria's global foreign policy statements during the Shagari era were mere propaganda, rhetoric, and utopian goals that could never be achieved given the country's weak and dependent economy as well as the reactionary and conservative nature of the ruling elite.

Beyond the issues of the weak nature and dependence of the Shagari administration, it is important to note that the country during the Second Republic had not garnered enough experience in foreign policy decision-making under a democratic government. From 1966 to 1979, the country was under military rule with its command system and dictatorial tendency. As a result, the making of decisions based on consensus was somewhat strange to politicians of the Second Republic and this adversely affected the foreign policy posture of the Shagari administration.

## Lessons and Alternative Path for Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

What then are the lessons which this reconstruction of Nigeria's economic history and its foreign policy postures during the Second Republic has taught us? Perhaps, the most important lesson of history is the danger of relying on a mono-cultural economy and the neglect of the traditional export commodities such as cocoa, palm produce, cotton, groundnuts, and other products. The projection of domestic and external policies of Nigeria solely on oil revenues is an invitation to social, political, and economic crises of immense proportions given the instability in oil production and oil prices at the world market. History has also enlightened us about the need to invest in oil windfall, whenever it comes as no state receives such revenue at all times, given the volatility and exhaustibility of crude oil. The economic difficulty which militated against the pursuit of dynamic foreign policy objectives by the Shagari regime was, indeed, a carryover of the failure of previous administrations to invest excess earnings from the oil sector in productive ventures.

History has similarly taught us that the resort to borrowing from the international financial markets to compensate for the decline in oil revenues will further compound Nigeria's problem as exampled by the huge external debts incurred during the Second Republic, which intensified socio-economic and political tensions in the polity and incapacitated the government from pursuing respectable foreign policy goals.

In the 21st century when issues relating to globalisation and regional economic integration decisively shape the foreign policy aims of states, a new perspective on the economy and policy decision-making must be put in place. One of the policies that have the potentiality of steering Nigeria away from poverty is the reactivation of the non-oil export sector, which was crowded out following the arrival of oil wealth. In this regard, the country must embrace scientific agriculture to start reaping a bumper harvest of food and cash crops that are comparable to those of advanced countries. Intimately connected with this is the need to industrialise Nigeria and engage the greater percentage of its working population in industrial activities so that the substantial part of their wealth would be realised from factories and industries as China has successfully done. The iron and steel industry as well as the production of electrical power must be encouraged and empowered so that they can be capable of manufacturing machinery needed by other industrial and agricultural establishments. Before Nigeria can effectively break the vicious circle of dependence, under-development, and exploitation associated with imperialism, it must give a premium to heavy industry, scientific agriculture, and sufficient food production.

The other measures that would take Nigeria away from its past and present lacklustre approach to development include the re-introduction of the commodity Marketing Boards to coordinate the exportation of traditional agricultural commodities; the promotion of research on these non-oil export products; serious commitment of the government to the provision of infrastructure-roads, railways, and ports- as well as the adoption of a more pragmatic way of curtailing the multidimensional security challenges currently rocking

the country such as terrorism, kidnapping for ransom, banditry, trafficking of people, drugs, small arms and light weapons and, lately, raping and killing of young girls. The taming of these security threats is important because Nigeria, or any developing country for that matter, can never experience development in an atmosphere of fear and widespread insecurity.

## Conclusion

Attempts have been made in this paper to examine the impact which the unequal and exploitative incorporation of Nigeria into the international capitalist economy has exerted on its foreign policy in the Second Republic. The asymmetric trade relationship between Nigeria and Europe started with the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade and from that period onward, the international division of labour foisted on Nigeria has ensured that the country continues to depend on the West for trade, technology, and capital. This strategy of control outlived colonialism and the petty bourgeoisie that took over political power in post-colonial Nigeria have been collaborating with the imperialists to consolidate their positions as agents of the international capitalists. As such, the local elite has been most unwilling to put in place policies that would wrest Nigeria from the strangulating grip of industrialised countries.

This has generated economic, social and political contradictions of immense proportions in Nigeria and these crises had already become deep enough between 1979 and 1983 to limit the foreign policy options and maneuverings available to the Shagari administration. An alternative path has been laid out to end the dependent nature of Nigeria's economy that would empower it to pursue assertive foreign policy goals and catapult it to a respectable position among the comity of nations. Nigeria's foreign policy in the 21st Century must be assertive enough to portray the country as a credible player not only in Africa but the world as a whole.

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# CHINA'S MARKET EXPANSION AND IMPACTS ON NIGERIA'S TEXTILE INDUSTRY

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## Abstract

This study analyses the various ways in which China's market expansion impacts Nigeria's textile industry. Two major surviving textile firms in Nigeria were studied: Sunflag Textile Manufacturing Company and the United Nigerian Textile Manufacturing Company. The study made use of documentary research and a qualitative case study, where an interview was employed as the research tool. Global economic integration/trade liberalization formed the theoretical basis for analysis. Findings reveal that China's market expansion driven by globalisation impacts significantly on Nigeria's textile industry. For instance, the influx of Chinese cheap textiles (80 per cent of textiles in the Nigerian market today are imported from China) and the re-export of textiles imported from China by neighbouring states such as the Benin Republic to Nigeria through smuggling has led to an almost total collapse of Nigeria's textile industry. China has also taken advantage of the country's huge infrastructure deficit and government neglect of the textile sector to replicate Nigerian unique Wax print known as Ankara, thereby displacing local producers. Thus, the once-thriving manufacturing textile sector has become moribund as Chinese textiles take over the Nigerian market. The study recommends that the Nigerian government should support (financially) the distressed/collapsed firms and also upgrade the country's infrastructure particularly the power sector for the remaining textile firms to survive and compete successfully in a globalised world.

**Keywords:** China, Market, Expansion, Impacts, Nigeria, Textile, Industry

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## Introduction

TThe economic expansion of South-South countries remains one of the significant features of the observed shift in the global economy, "from North to South" (Kappel, 2011: 10). At the end of the Cold War, new economic powers such as China emerged in the international arena. For instance, the Chinese economy grew at a rate of almost 10 per cent annually at the turn of the 21st century (Woo, 2012: 4). With its economic transformation, China that once ran a closed economy began to go global (or what China called zou chu qu). It has been transcending beyond borders to seek resources, markets, and investment partnerships to sustain rapid economic growth.

Following the death of Mao Tse Tung (Chinese leader when the Communist Party ascended into power in 1949) in 1976, the succeeding leader, Deng Xiaoping began economic reform in 1978. When Deng assumed leadership, the Chinese economy was in a bad shape. China's role in the world market was insignificant; its share of world trade was barely half of 1 per cent, much lower than in the 1920s, or even in the 1950s, and ranked 30th in the league table of exporters (cited in Cable and Ferdinand, 1994). However, over the past several decades, China's [world] trade has expanded at a breakneck pace (ChinaPower, 2019). In 1995, for instance, the value of China's imports and exports of goods totalled $280.9 billion or 3 per cent of global trade; by 2018, its total trade in goods had jumped to $4.6 trillion or 12.4 per cent of global trade (ChinaPower, 2019). Unlike the Maoist era, when China's trade policies served its leaders' political goals, they now aim at access to markets as part of China's larger domestic development strategy (Eisenman, 2012). Scholarly attention has been paid to China's growing influence in Africa (Osondu-Oti, 2016; Osondu-Oti, 2018; Osondu-Oti, 2020a; Mitchell, 2011; Naidu, 2010; Alden, 2009; Brautigam, 2009; Lauren, 2008).

Often referred to as the "Asian Driver" of global economic change (Development Centre Studies, 2006: 2), China has been pointed

as playing the leading role in Africa and its growing footprint on the continent is perceived as "transforming Africa's international relations in a significant way" (Cheru and Obi, 2010). Since 2000, China became Africa's largest trade partner, and Chinese investment and finance flows to Africa grew significantly (ICTSD, 2018). From 2003 to 2018, the number of China's foreign direct investment (FDI) annual flows to Africa surged from US$75 million in 2003 to US$5.4 billion in 2018 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2020). Chinese enterprises have made a significant investment in Africa and have also established trade links/channels of trade between China and Africa. Natural resources feature prominently in Africa's economic ties and exports to China and trade in manufactured goods dominates China's exports to Africa.

In 2018, the largest African exporter to China was Angola, [export was dominated by oil, accounting for 50 per cent] (China Africa Research Initiative, 2018), followed by Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. China's industrial energy consumption accounts for about 70% of the total energy consumption, making the industry the biggest consumer of energy in China (Dadi, 2006), which also brought China closer to African oil producers. Africa became the major destination for China's crude oil quest due to increasing instability in the Middle East. While resources have underpinned China's foray into Africa, [a shift has occurred] no longer planned by the government in Beijing but shaped by the market (Davies, 2015). Economic links between China and Africa have increased dramatically over the past 20 years (Chen and Nord, 2018). Trade has risen more than 40-fold since the mid-1990s, and China is now Sub-Saharan Africa's largest trading partner. Currently, China's exports to Africa rose to 7.9 per cent to US$113.2 billion as Beijing seeks new markets to offset the impact of the trade war with the United States (Nyabiage, 2020).

Nigeria, for instance, has become a top destination for Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014). Over 110 Chinese companies

have invested in Nigeria, covering various sectors such as trade, project contracting, agricultural development, manufacturing, food processing, and fishery (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014). Bilateral trade between Nigeria and China totalled US$ 10.78 billion, exceeding US$10 billion for the first time in 2011 (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Nigeria, 2014). In 2012, bilateral trade stood at US$10.57 billion, accounting for 5.3% of China's total trade with Africa (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014). In 2018, the Nigeria-China trade volume hits $85billion US dollars (Echono, 2018). China is Nigeria's largest source of imports and the second-largest trading partner (Popoola, 2019). China's increasing incursion into the Nigerian market means that businesses have to contend with a new competitor. China is challenging both Africa's traditional partners and locally-owned businesses and firms in Nigeria. In the past 15 years [and counting], the rapid and pervasive entry of Chinese capital and companies into Africa has had a big impact on the continent (Davies, 2015).

The literature on China-Africa relations has expanded focusing on areas such as China's investment (Feng and Pilling, 2020; Herrero, 2020; Sow, 2018, French, 2010) and credit to Africa (Osondu-Oti, 2020b; Brennan, 2020; Xu, 2020, Acker, 2020; Osondu-Oti, 2015; Brautigam, 2009; Wang, 2007). Its increasing exports to Africa (China Africa Research Initiative, 2020; Pigato and Tang, 2015; Nowak, 2016; Ighobor, 2013; Gamache et al, 2013; Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, 2010) are noteworthy. For example, among China's main exports to Africa such as cotton fabrics, footwear, motorcycles, machinery and electronics, textile and apparel, hi-tech products, electric motors, and generators (Broadman, 2007), the impacts of China's textile exports on Africa's textile industry are of great concern.

While African countries are mainly producers of primary products and importers of finished goods, the case of the textile industry is

different. It is a well-established manufacturing sector in Africa as of the 1960s. For example, in Nigeria, the textile industry was one of the booming manufacturing sectors in the 1980s and the second largest employer of labour in the country before the 1990s. Today, China's market expansion is believed to be leading to de-industrialisation (Osondu-Oti, 2014). No doubt, the Nigerian textile industry has been faced with various challenges attributed to various factors such as lack of financial support by the government (Yahaya, 2019; Muhammad et al, 2018), unfavourable business environment (the United States International Trade Commission, 2009) and of course international free trade (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008) advocated by the West at the end of the Cold War, and captured by China.

Thus, there is a need to examine the impacts of China's market expansion on Nigeria's textile industry. This study, with a particular focus on two major textile firms in Nigeria, analyses the various forms/manner China's market expansion impacts Nigeria's textile industry. The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. Section II contains the research methodology. Section III explains China's market expansion using the interlinked theory of global economic integration/trade liberalisation. Section IV gives an overview of Nigeria's textile industry from the time of the country's independence up to (and beyond) the 1990s when trade liberalisation and China's market expansion became pronounced. Section V analyses China's market expansion and the forms/manner in which it impacts Nigeria's textile firms. Section VI is the conclusion and recommendations.

## Research Methodology

This study uses a qualitative case study and documentary research approaches. A qualitative case study is a research methodology that helps in the exploration of a phenomenon within some particular context through various data sources to reveal multiple facets of the phenomenon (Baxter and Jack 2008). Two textile firms in Nigeria were used as case studies: Sunflag Textile manufacturing Company and the United Nigeria Textile Company. Both are two major surviving firms and are situated in the country's major commercial

city, Lagos. While a qualitative case study method involves a range of empirical data collection tools used to answer the research question (s), the main tool employed in this study is the interview. The researcher sought the views of the textile companies' senior staff. It also sought the views of economic experts and staff/representatives of textile/trade-related associations such as the Association of Textile Manufacturers in Nigeria, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, National Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, and Nigeria-China Chamber of Commerce. The interview questions used to collect data were drafted in line with the main topic. For example, the following questions were asked: Is China's market expansion in Africa a threat to Nigeria's textile industry? In what forms/manners do China's market expansion impacts (have impacted) on the textile manufacturing firms? Is China's market expansion the only and major challenge facing the textile firms? Data obtained from various sources were content analyzed. Respondents' views and accounts were taken into consideration and literature was used to move back and forth for interpretation of collected empirical materials. Documentary research is also used to consolidate the primary data and to create a larger narrative using multiple documents on China's market expansion and textile firms in Africa. Documentary research relates to content analysis research, which involves the systematic reading and analysis of the body of relevant texts.

## Theoretical Framework

China's market expansion is situated within the theory of global economic integration and free-market principles of trade liberalisation which are discussed below.

## Global Economic Integration/Trade Liberalisation

Global integration is intertwined with the concept of globalisation (Osondu-Oti, 2020a) and trade liberalisation. The word "globalization" has been used to describe the phenomenally rapid expansion of many sorts of global interaction (cited in Osondu-

Oti, 2020a) including economic, social, cultural, and technological linkages. Global integration is not a new phenomenon although the pace of economic globalization was particularly rapid during the past century (Mussa, 2000). Social scientists and historians have proposed many different starting points for the history of globalization (Northrup, 2009). Practitioners of some academic disciplines, economists, in particular, are inclined to shorter timeframes, whereas historians are likely to describe a much longer process, and sometimes the starting point reflects ideological debates over Marxism or cultural wars over Eurocentrism (Northrup, 2009). Scholars have also pointed out how discussions of globalization connect to or mirror earlier debates about modernization, underdevelopment, and the rise of the West (Northrup, 2009).

However, [large extent] of global integration [and trade liberalisation] came sharply into focus with the collapse of communism in 1989 (Sachs and Warner, 1995), and the reign of capitalism thereafter. With the rise of capitalism, the gospel of integration, interdependency, and trade liberalisation was constantly preached for all countries to embrace. Both the United States (the winner of the Cold War) and the United Kingdom (major ally) championed global integration and freer trade (Osondu-Oti, 2020a) globally. Globalisation then became linked to the spread of capitalism (Ibrahim, 2013) and free trade. Before the Cold War, two close observers of the capitalist revolution in Western Europe, Marx and Engels predicted that because of superior economic efficiency, capitalism would eventually sweep through the entire world, compelling other societies to restructure along the lines of Western Europe (cited in Sachs and Warner, 1995). With the United States (leading power bloc at the end of the Second World War) winning the Cold War, "capitalism no doubt spread to nearly the entire world" (Sachs and Warner, 1995).

Globalization is ideologically and fundamentally old because it appeals to relentless competition in the pursuit of profit (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2003), which has guided economic relations among states since ancient times. Conceptually, it is new because it is primarily driven by new information and communication technology (Arifalo

and Ogen, 2003), which have helped economies to become greatly integrated/connected. Economies have become more interdependent with the greater movement of labour and capital in a globalised world. As Tandon (1998) pointed out, globalization seeks to remove all national barriers to the free movement of international capital, [which is the main aim of trade liberalisation - removing barriers to trade between different countries and encouraging free trade].

Although there are many aspects of globalisation, most analyses of recent globalization concentrate on economic factors for understandable reasons (Northrup, 2009). First, the great importance of the free flow of goods and currencies in promoting and sustaining global integration is beyond dispute (Northrup, 2009). Second, the increasing use of global economic integration to describe globalisation and other interrelated concepts such as trade liberalisation and capitalism. Economic globalisation reflects the continuing expansion and integration of market frontiers, the spread of business, trade, and investment across national borders, and the unification of national markets and individual economies to form one big global economy within the international market. It is also called economic internationalism, which is the opposite of localization/economic nationalism. In defining economic globalisation, the emphasis is placed on economic internationalism, which is associated also with terms such as capitalism, laissez-faire, economic liberalism, and free trade (Osondu-Oti, 2020a). The premise of economic internationalism is to promote international free economic interchange promoted by trade liberalisation.

Since the end of the Cold War, countries have increasingly adopted free trade by opening markets, reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. For instance, in the last two decades, China has consistently and vigorously pursued free-market principles as ably espoused in the prevailing global economic strategy (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). After the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947, the world trading system benefited from eight rounds of multilateral trade liberalization and unilateral and regional liberalization. Indeed, the last of these eight rounds (the so-called

"Uruguay Round" completed in 1994) led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to help administer the growing body of multilateral trade agreements (IMF Staff, 2001). Many countries of the world including once economically isolated countries (such as China) joined the World Trade Organisation- the train of trade liberalisation. As noted by Banton (2019), the outcome of trade liberalization and the resulting integration among countries is also called globalization. Countries today are sharing the proceeds/ benefits of trade liberalisation, although gains are uneven. While countries like China and India have become successful because they embraced market liberalisation and other market-oriented reforms, progress has been less rapid for many other countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East (IMF Staff, 2001).

In other words, trade liberalisation has its advantages and disadvantages and has not benefitted countries equally. While trade liberalisation allows countries to specialise in producing the goods and services where they have a comparative advantage (produce at the lowest opportunity cost), thereby enabling a net gain in economic welfare, it has also been damaging for some developing economies that cannot compete with developed economies. It is agreed that if a country liberalises its trade, it will make the country more attractive for inward investment, and also foreign multinationals who can produce and sell closer to these new emerging markets, but in times of trade liberalisation, some industries could decline, instead of growing when faced with internal challenges such as lack of adequate infrastructure. Such a decline could result in structural unemployment. Also, when industries and workers suffer from the decline due to the inability to compete, it could be difficult to compensate workers who lose out to the international competition.

Trade liberalization could pose a threat to developing nations or economies because they are forced to compete in the same market as stronger economies or nations. This challenge can stifle established local industries or the failure of newly developed industries (Banton, 2019). While many developing countries have liberalised trade in the hope that greater international exposure will improve the

performance of local firms, gains from trade liberalisation are far from uniform within countries (Sanfilippo and Sundaram, 2018) and sectors. As China builds its economy and expands its market to gain from open trade, Africa firms have been hard-pressed and are struggling to survive the international competition. That is why trade protectionists are in favour of infant industry protection instead of liberalisation of all sectors because protection would help developing economies protect new/infant industries. Critics believe that trade liberalization costs jobs and depresses wages, and proponents believe it spurs competition and growth. China's economic expansion is no doubt driven by post-Cold War trade liberalisation principles and the adoption of market reforms as well as integration into the global economy (particularly seen in its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001). Has trade liberalisation been beneficial or detrimental to Nigeria's textile industry, especially in times of market expansion of China? This would be analysed in subsequent sections.

## Overview of Nigeria's Textile Sector: 1960s to Date

Nigerian textile industry existed before Western incursion and colonialism in Africa. As noted by Murtala et al (2017), the communities in the upper and lower Niger River were famous for the production of a variety of textiles that embodied artistry and aesthetic appeal. With the advent of colonialism, "pre-colonial commerce were truncated, and as a result, stifled much textile industrial growth destroying the regional trade and markets for textiles and other manufactured goods" (Murtala et al, 2017). However, the Kano trading company developed the first textile mills in 1952. In 1956, Kaduna Textiles Mills was established and it was the first modern textile firm to be established in Nigeria (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). With the end of colonial rule, the country saw the establishment of more textile industries in both the northern and southern parts of the country. The establishment of the textile industry was "viewed as part of the Federal [government] policy of promoting Import-Substitution Industrialisation from the 1960s to the 1970s" (Murtala et al, 2017). In 1964, for example, United Nigerian Textile Limited was established. Towards the end of the

1960s, other Companies like Afprint, Enpee, Asaba Textiles, and Aswani Textiles came into existence. As of the mid-1980s, over 175 textile companies were operating in the country (Olanrewaju, 2019), and toward the end of the 1980s, the Nigerian textile industry could boast of 200 textile industries (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008).

The [Nigerian textile] industry was once the largest employer of labour after the Federal Government (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008) and served a large domestic market as well as export markets within the region and to the EU (the United States International Trade Commission, 2009). Indeed, the industry [in the 1970s and 1980s] was the second largest textile industry in Africa, second only to that of Egypt (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). At the time, the industry was protected by the Federal Government who introduced a ban on imported textile products (Oseghale, 2019). As a result, the industry between 1985 and 1991 recorded an annual growth of 67 per cent (Oseghale, 2019). Also, following strict government policies in the mid-80s, sourcing of local raw materials for the production of textiles maintained a steady growth from 52 per cent in 1987 to 57 per cent in 1988 to 64 per cent in 1991 (Oseghale, 2019). Synthetic textiles alone accounted for about 80 per cent of the recorded growth (Oseghale, 2019).

From the mid-1990s, the industry began to gradually collapse and by the year 2000, it contracted significantly. For example, in 1996, the industry employed about 137,000 workers, but by 2000, the workforce had shrunk to 83,000 and further declined to 24,000 in 2008 (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 2009). The general decline of the textile industry is attributed to many factors including China's market expansion after the final phase-out of quotas for the major textile markets. For example, with the end of the Multi Fibre Agreement/Arrangement (MFA) in 2005, competing textile products from world-leading manufacturers such as China as well as smuggling of products from neighbouring countries threaten local products. The MFA was a framework for bilateral agreements or unilateral actions that established quotas limiting imports into countries whose domestic industries were

facing serious damage from rapidly increasing imports.

According to Muhammad et al (2018) textile industry's decline also reflects internal challenges and the failure to provide supportive policy measures and critical infrastructure for the growth of the sector. Epileptic power and water supply problems resulting in high costs of diesel for production also contributed to the decline of the sector. According to the United States International Trade Commission (2009) report, textile manufacturers in Nigeria face high electricity costs, unreliable supply, or power outages. Diesel used for backup generators is very expensive just as the fuel oil used for steam generation. In a survey of business environment obstacles faced by enterprises in Nigeria, 76 per cent of firms identified electricity as a major constraint (United States International Trade Commission, 2009) and it has impacted greatly on their strength to compete successfully with products from other countries. In a recent September 2020 release by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, Nigerian manufacturers spend 38 per cent of operating costs on electricity.

Also, industry sources indicate that it has become difficult to be cost-competitive in the production of yarn, fabric, and finished apparel compared with large Asian suppliers, such as China, India, and Bangladesh, particularly following an increase in Asia's exports to Africa after the phase-out of quotas in the United States and European Union markets in 2005 (United States International Trade Commission). At present, Nigeria spends about N170 billion yearly, to import textiles and readymade clothing (Oseghale, 2019). In a nutshell, the remaining textile industry in Nigeria is currently struggling to survive. In what forms or manners have China's market expansion contributed to the decline of the textile sector in Nigeria? This is examined below.

## Discussion

The major questions this study addressed are: Is China market expansion a threat to Nigeria's textile industry? In what forms/manners is China's market expansion impacting (or have impacted)

Nigeria's textile industry? Is China's market expansion the only and major challenge facing the textile firms? To critically analyse these questions, secondary materials were consulted and two major textile firms were studied where the author interacted with senior staff of these firms. The author also interacted with representatives of trade-related associations such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, Nigerian Association of textile manufacturers, Nigeria-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, etc. The findings of the research are analysed/discussed based on the research questions but in no particular order. However, all questions were captured and addressed in the discussion below.

## China's Market Expansion and Impacts on Nigeria's Textile Industry: Research Findings

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China had a highly concentrated planned economic system, but starting from 1978, China engaged in fundamental reform of its economy (Osondu, 2014). It migrated from a planned economy into a market-oriented economy, which China called the Second Revolution. ††Before the reform and opening, China was in a closed or semi-closed state with little economic interaction with the international community (Bei and Gang, 2010). Its reform was followed by positive economic growth, opening up of its economy to the world, and greater expansion of its markets beyond its borders. In the early 1990s, China emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and by mid-2000, it became the second-largest economy in the world surpassing Germany, France, and Japan.

With the transformation in China's economy, China adopted the first African Policy paper (also called the White Paper) in 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2006) and the second Policy paper in 2015 (China, 2015) as strategies to aid

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†† The First Revolution is the Ascension of China's Communist Party (CCP) into Power in 1949.

the pursuit of its economic activities and to consolidate its interests in Africa. China sets out its new policy for Africa, incorporating all aspects of relations with Africa, ranging from economic, political, social-cultural, military et cetera. The White Papers pointed out the new direction of China's relations with Africa in the 21st century, with much emphasis on economic cooperation. No doubt, economic relations between China and Africa have grown exponentially in trade and investments, often driven by China. Earlier in the year 2000, China established the first-ever Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), where it declared its renewed interests in Africa. Today, China meets with African leaders on a triennial basis under the umbrella of FOCAC, with ministerial meetings held at various times in a year. With an economy that grew at almost 10 per cent in early 2000, China overtook Africa's traditional partners in Europe and America to emerge as Africa's largest trading partner. Being the second-largest continent after Asia, Africa is of great attraction to China because of its large market.

For a country like Nigeria that has the largest market in Africa, China's market expansion has become visible. The growth in China's economy resulted in a sharp growth in trade with Nigeria where trade rose from $12 billion in 2002 to nearly $40 billion in 2006 (Mawdsley, 2007). Today, there is a triple increase in China-Nigeria's trade, dominated by China's exports to Nigeria (Osondu, 2014). In 2011 for instance, Nigeria imported 1 trillion naira worth of goods from China (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Nigeria's imports from China in the second and third quarter of 2019 stood at N2.2 trillion (Okon, 2019) and has continued to increase yearly, even though China is not on the list of the top 10 countries Nigeria exports its products. According to the United Nations COMTRADE (2018) database on international trade, Nigeria's exports to China were US$1.04 Billion in 2018 (cited in Trading Economics, 2018).

The dramatic growth in the relationship between Africa and China is also part of the profound transformation taking place in the global political economy in the twenty-first century (Murtala et al, 2017). China's accession into the World Trade Organisation (WTO)

contributed immensely to the increase in China's exports to Nigeria. In 2001, China became a member of WTO. The main goal of WTO remains trade liberalization among its member countries. Nigeria has been a member of WTO since 1995. Thus, with China's accession to WTO in 2001 and Nigeria being a member, China now enjoys the most favoured nation benefits. The advent of globalization/ trade liberalisation saw Asian countries particularly China exporting textile fabrics to Nigeria without hindrance (Akinrinade and Oge, 2008). In Africa, [and Nigeria to be specific], the economic impact of globalisation is seen in the expanding predominance of Chinese manufactured goods in local markets (Murtala et al, 2017).

More Chinese goods are now seen in the Nigerian market ranging from electronics, footwear, textiles, generators, mobile phones, motorcycles, lightings, and fixtures, etc. China has become the manufacturing factory of the world and this is contributing to its quest for new markets, not only in Africa but all over the world. Most goods sold abroad today are manufactured both in quantity and quality in China (Ke and Jun, 2004). Nigeria currently imports from China more than any other country in the world (Osondu, 2014) and is only behind South Africa in the importation of Chinese goods in Africa. Nigerian textile market has been witnessing a significant incursion of Chinese textiles. Available evidence shows that China's growing global competitiveness and its offensives in the Nigerian textile market have damaging impacts on the Nigerian economy (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). In what forms or ways then is China's market expansion damaging, impacting (or have impacted) Nigeria's textile industry?

First, one of the ways in which China's market expansion impacted (and still impacts) Nigeria's textile firms is through China's invasion of Nigeria's market by its products brought either by the Chinese or imported by Nigerian businessmen. The increase in the Chinese-Nigerian textile trade became physically evident in Nigeria in the late 1990s, with Chinese textile companies setting up offices in Lagos and Kano, and Nigerian traders and businessmen setting up offices in Guangzhou, China (Renne, 2015). However, compared to Chinese-

owned firms manufacturing in the country, Nigeria witnesses increased shipments of Chinese manufactured textile from China by Chinese company representatives, brokers, and traders, as well as by Nigerian traders and businessmen (both in Nigeria and China) to meet consumer demands (Personal Conversation with Emechetta, 2014). China's quest for a new market in Nigeria is evident in the establishment of China Town in Lagos, Nigeria in 2005, where 70 per cent of products sold in the Town are textiles imported from China (Osondu, 2014). With the emergence of China Town, it is not the only influx of Chinese goods that Nigeria is witnessing but growing numbers of Chinese immigrants' workers who now settle, trade, and conduct their businesses in Nigeria. Some have also entered into agreements with Nigeria's state governments to establish free trade zones, as seen in Lagos (where a new textile mill is being constructed), Ogun, and Calabar (Personal Conversation with Emechetta, 2014).

According to Corkin (2006), China is suffering from industrial overproduction and market saturation in many sectors, [including textile]. As a result, China needs external markets to sell the goods being churned out by its industry. China is also the largest producer of textiles in the world and since the early 1990s has been the largest exporter of textiles in the world (Ke and Jun, 2004). A fairly, large part of China's manufacturing capacity is producing goods for the international end consumer markets (Dadi, 2006). Textile materials from China now account for more than 80% of the textiles in the Nigerian market (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008), and increased imports of Chinese textiles are linked to the decline of the Nigerian textile manufacturing industry (Renne, 2015). These imports have considerably weakened the sector and consequently forced it to regress (Murtala et al, 2017). In an interview with the Director-General Nigerian Textile and Garment Industries Association, he noted that the capacity of Nigerian textile companies was up to 1.5 billion linear meters in the 1980s but today it is only producing 250 million linear meters with 80 per cent of the market taking over by foreign fabrics, mainly from China (Personal Communication, Olarenwaju, 2014). According to Adebayo, the Human Resource

Manager of the United Nigerian Textile Company, in an interaction with the author, it was gathered that in the 1980s, the United Nigerian Textile company has about 80 per cent production but currently, it has gone down to only 30 per cent. Capacity utilization of the general textile industry is estimated at less than 20% with companies employing barely 18,000 workers less than the 250,000 previously employed (Murtala et al, 2017).

It was also gathered that Nigeria is not the only country suffering from the influx of Chinese textiles. In an interaction with the President Nigeria-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Mr Emechetta noted that China's large exports of textile goods are felt all over the world including Europe and North America. The developed economies are complaining of over flooding of markets with Chinese textile and apparel. For instance, in 2006, six hundred thousand people were retrenched in textile industries in Europe due to lack of demand for their products following the influx of cheap Chinese textiles (Emechetta, 2013). Also, China exports over $70 billion worth of apparel to the United States (US) every year (Emechetta, 2014). The current trade war between China and the United States stems primarily from the threat China's market expansion poses to US domestic industries.

Many lost their jobs in South Africa and some textile industries were shut down due to the influx of Chinese textiles (Osondu, 2014). In 2006, for example, there was a huge protest in Zambia against the flooding of local markets with 'made in China' goods which threatened the local, small-scale industries as well as retailers (Modi and Shekhawat, 2009:34). The Zambia opposition candidate, Michael Sata in the 2006 Presidential election campaigned on an anti-Chinese platform (Modi and Shekhawat, 2009:34). The Democratic Republic of Congo also witnessed the expulsion of about 600 Chinese and the closure of their industrial units (Modi and Shekhawat, 2009: 34), due to the inability of local industries to withstand competition from Chinese products. The influx of Chinese products into the Nigerian market is seriously undermining the competitiveness of the nation's already distressed textile manufacturing sector that

lacks adequate support from the government. According to Mr Endurance, Research Economist with Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, the influx of Chinese textile goods has led to the loss of more than 50,000 jobs in the textile sector and the eventual closure of almost all textile industries in Nigeria (Personal Communication, March 5, 2014). In his words, "manufacturers have had it rough and tough following the influx of Chinese goods" (Endurance, 2014). Endurance (2014) noted that the multiplier effect of the influx of Chinese products on local industries ranges from low-capacity utilization (average of 40 per cent); low and declining contribution to national output (an average of 4 per cent), negative real growth rates, and low-value addition due to high imports dependence.

Second, the increasing patronage of Chinese textile by Nigerians due to the cheap nature of its products (Olanrewaju, 2014), has caused the displacement of local products. China has one of the cheapest labour in the world although it is changing because according to Plekhanov (2017) hourly manufacturing wages in China in 2016 exceeded those in every major Latin American economy except Chile and were at around 70 per cent of the level in weaker Eurozone countries, such as Portugal. However, it was China's cheap labor that was considered the main factor behind the Chinese economic miracle, propelling the country to the status of the world's factory and shifting global supply chains (Plekhanov, 2017). Standing in the way of Nigeria's benefit from free trade is a widespread infrastructural dearth, which has also impacted the cost of production and market sales.

Good infrastructural services are closely related to economic growth (see Oyejide, 2000), and these are lacking in Nigeria. According to World Bank (2007), delays in obtaining necessary connections to electricity in West Africa can average up to 80 days, and electricity outages occur on average 91 days per year, leading to loss of output due to outages (see Kanang, 2014). For example, energy consumption in West African countries such as Nigeria is the lowest in the world with only 20% of urban households and 6% of rural households having access to electricity (Elliot, 2011 cited in Osondu-

Oti, 2020c). Inadequate power supply in Nigeria results in higher costs of producing Nigerian textiles as power supply accounts for 45 per cent of the production costs (Oseghale, 2019). Good roads and rail networks are also absent. The adequacy, efficiency, and costs of key infrastructural services, such as transport, communication, and energy have major implications for the ease or difficulty with which the country can successfully benefit from global economic integration. Basic physical infrastructure deficit severely compromises Nigeria's prospects for economic development in a globalised world. According to the Executive Secretary Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), Umar Gambo Jibrin, $3 trillion is needed to solve Nigeria's infrastructure deficit and engender development in the next 30 years (cited in Ajimotokan and Orizu, 2019). At present, Nigeria spends about N170 billion yearly, to import textiles and readymade clothing (Oseghale, 2019), and China is the destination market.

China's advanced or high-rated infrastructure provided a good business environment for its manufacturers when compared to Nigeria. China's sustained high economic growth and increased competitiveness in manufacturing have been underpinned by a massive development of physical infrastructure (Sahoo et al, 2010). Infrastructure development and economic growth are mutually pursued. Infrastructure development in China has rapidly upgraded within the last five years (the Tenth Five-Year Plan) (Chuan, 2008). From the late 1990s to 2005, 100 million Chinese benefited from power and telecommunications upgrades (Chen et al, 2013). Between 2001 and 2004, investment in rural roads grew by a massive 51 per cent annually (Chen et al, 2013). In recent years, the Chinese government has used substantial infrastructure spending to hedge against flagging economic growth (Chen et al, 2013). Thus, China has taken advantage of Nigeria's inadequate infrastructure and the attendant high cost of production and supply to displace Nigeria's local manufactures with its cheap textiles. Local producers are not only contending with the influx of Chinese textiles but with cheaper products that consumers [particularly middle and low-income earners] are eager to patronize, to the disadvantage of local

textiles that are unable to compete successfully. Poor infrastructure and lack of competitiveness have also prevented the Nigerian textile industry from taking advantage of the United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act that came into place in the year 2000 and has been extended to the year 2025. China has grabbed that opportunity by the opening of its firms in African countries such as Lesotho and exporting to the United States, and taking over markets to the chagrin of Nigerian firms.

Nigeria's "Sunflag" Textile Manufacturing Company established in 1961 used to be one of the largest textile companies in the whole of West Africa with world-class manufacturing facilities but the company has become a shadow of itself today. In an interaction with Mr Adesina, the Marketing Manager of Sunflag Textile Company, he narrated the industry's ordeal since the increasing arrival of Chinse textile in the 1990s:

> When the Chinese started coming into the Nigerian market, Chinese businessmen would sell a container for 2 million Naira that a Nigerian importer usually sells at 10 million Naira. This became a very big disadvantage for textile manufacturers in Nigeria because Nigerian textile marketers/retailers/consumers now prefer Chinese cheap goods. Sunflag's production that was initially put at 1 million linear meters went down to 300 thousand and has continued to decline (Personal Communication, 2014)

As of the mid-1980s, there were over 170 members of the Association of Nigerian Textile Manufacturers but today there are less than 20 (with only 10 textile manufacturing firms and the remaining manufacturing accessories such as sewing threads, linings, etc.) (Personal Communication Olanrewaju, December 18, 2019). In a country like Nigeria that emerged as the poverty capital of the world, citizens would prefer cheaper products as they struggle to survive the "harsh" economic situation (Olanrewaju, 2019). In an earlier interview with the Director-General, National Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA), Dr John Isemede, pointed out that:

> Products that could not be afforded a few years ago by the majority of Nigerians now come at a very cheaper rate from China for Nigerian consumers. With the low per-capita income of the Nigerian population, Chinese cheap goods remain acceptable to many, and Nigerians prefer to go for them (Isemede, 2011)

Textile firms in Nigeria are facing serious marketing problems as a result of low consumer demand emanating from declining real incomes and weak purchasing power. The demand of the international market for China's cheap and good-quality products has driven the sustained growth of Chinese exports (Dadi, 2006). According to Corkin (2006), products and services that Chinese companies offer are considerably less expensive than those of European Corporations (Corkin, 2006), and the same applies to African products. The intricacies involved in globalisation trends, which encourage the pursuit of profit regardless of consequences have proved to be harmful to the textile manufacturing sector in Nigeria (Murtala et al, 2017).

Third, the smuggling of second-hand/used clothing textiles from neighbouring states is impacting negatively the textile sector in Nigeria. Global integration is no doubt an avenue for firms/businesses to expand and penetrate external markets, but sometimes neighbouring states and "closer markets" that have regional trade liberalisation schemes can take advantage of non-border restrictions to smuggle foreign-made fabrics. For example, taking advantage of Nigeria's larger population, economy, and natural resource wealth and [ECOWAS liberalisation scheme], "Benin adopted a strategy centered on being "entrepôt state," that is, serving as a trading hub, importing goods, and re-exporting them legally but most often illegally to Nigeria" (Golub et al, 2019).

Re-exporting involves importing goods and subsequently shipping them to other countries with no additional processing or packaging, except for transport services (Golub, 2012 cited in Osondu-Oti, 2020). Informal trade activities are flourishing in West Africa and Nigeria's large market is a target for its neighbours. Informal

trade activities involve three types of flows- smuggling of imports from other continents, usually entering through the port without being recorded, exports and imports of locally produced products within the region, and unofficial re-exports of legally imported products (Golub, 2012). Although Nigeria prohibits imports of ethnic printed fabric and used clothing, these items are allegedly smuggled into the country in large quantities (Murtala et al, 2017) either by the Chinese or African counterparts. In 2015, Premium Times Nigeria reported that the Nigeria Customs Service Anti-smuggling Taskforce in Kano arrested three Chinese nationals for illegally importing printed textile materials worth billions of Naira to Nigeria (Premium Times, 2015). According to Mudashir (2015), N315 billion worth of textile materials were allegedly smuggled into the country by Chinese nationals.

In Nigeria, smuggling is aided by the country's porous borders used for unofficial re-exports of Chinese textiles from ECOWAS member countries. At the moment, the Nigeria Customs Service is battling to end a $1.2 billion smuggled textile industry and as noted by Oseghale (2019), it is a war the Custom Service is most certainly not winning with the numerous creeks and pathways into the country. Nigeria is awash with contraband. Chatham House, a British think-tank, reckons that at least 70% of trade between Africa's biggest economy and its neighbours goes unrecorded (see The Economist, 2016). In 2010, the World Bank estimated that 2 billion worth of textiles is squirreled into Nigeria every year (The Economist, 2016). Widespread smuggling of textiles into Nigeria has certainly not helped matters as Benin, specializes as a gateway for contraband goods to the rest of the African continent (Emmanuel, 2015). Benin's economic activity is the transshipment of contraband (Oseghale, 2019). At the Benin ports, the counterfeit consignments are loaded onto trucks and either driven straight over the land border between Benin and western Nigeria or up through Niger and round to the border post with its taciturn chief (Oseghale, 2019). The trade is estimated to be worth about $2bn a year, equivalent to about a fifth of all annual recorded imports of textiles, clothing, fabric, and yarn into the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (Oseghale, 2019). Benin's

economy is heavily reliant on the informal re-export and transit trade with Nigeria, which accounts for about 20% of its GDP, or national income (Landry and Colette, 2019 cited in Osondu-Oti, 2020), and this poses a great threat to the textile industry in Nigeria.

Less than a decade after the adoption of full-blown neo-liberal economic reforms by the Nigerian government, the textile sector has become largely moribund (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). The argument that opening up economies to the global economy is essential in enabling many developing countries to develop competitive advantages in the manufacture of certain products (IMF Staff, 2001), has proved the opposite for Nigeria's textile sector. According to the Director-General of the Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC), Professor Hussaini D. Ibrahim, smuggling/dumping is the largest threat to the existing textile manufacturers, noting that the practice is flourishing because of the permissiveness of Nigeria's immediate neighbours and the laxity of the country's border control which gives smugglers and their agents a thoroughfare into the country (cited in Yahaya, 2019).

Fourth, another way that China's market expansion impacts Nigeria's textile firms are through the displacement of its products in the international market. When the Multifibre agreement ended in 2005, quotas placed on developing countries were removed, and China had the opportunity to export its textile to the developed world market without restriction. As a result, China took over European markets and African markets, which were major markets of exports by Nigerian firms. The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was an international trade agreement on textiles and clothing that was in place from 1974 to 2004. Under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), the United States and the European Union (EU) restricted imports from developing countries to protect their domestic textile industries. Each developing country signatory was assigned quotas (numerically limited quantities) on the amount of clothing and textile exports that could be exported to the U.S. and EU (Kenton, 2019). Although China ranked first in the exports of textile since 1980, the MFA restricted its exports, thereby creating an opportunity for other

countries in Africa, but with the end of the MFA in 2005, Nigerian textile firms faced a herculean task of penetrating the market of their traditional partners in Europe and Africa. Nigerian textile exports once focused on the EU market (United States International Trade Commission, 2009) and the African market but it has been taken over by China. Also, Nigeria's textile firms have not benefitted from the United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) due to internal external factors such as the taking over of its market by China both within the country and in the United States (Emechetta, 2014). However, the current trade war between China and the United States could be a blessing to the remaining textile firms in Nigeria if other earlier issues discussed such as infrastructure deficits and financial support are tackled by the Nigerian government.

Fifth, China's replication of Nigerian brand products called African Print/Wax print is also a big challenge to Nigerian textile firms. African print is the most commonly used textile in the language of dress across West and Central Africa (Warritay, 2017). In Nigeria, African print is known as "Ankara" and has been manufactured locally since the 1960s (Warritay, 2017) but as world textiles manufacturing centers moved to China, India, and Korea, cheaper varieties of African print begin to circulate (Warritay, 2017), threatening the local production. In a recent feature documentary on Wax Print by British-Nigerian filmmaker and fashion designer Aiwan Obinyan, Chinese companies began making inroads into the wax-print market in the 1970s, but the materials they produced at the time were inferior but by the 1990s they improved their technique by poaching designers from the big companies and resorting to other tactics (cited in Nwoye, 2018). Today, emerging Chinese manufacturers like Hi-Target and Supreme are wax print companies in their own right with distinct designs produced at a very high standard and sold cheaply (Nwoye, 2018).

According to Emmanuel (2015), the Chinese have successfully copied garments in the local style, to the chagrin of Nigerian producers who simply cannot compete. Although seen as Chinese fabric, they are believed to be counterfeited trademarked African prints (United

States International Trade Commission, 2009), which China has reproduced causing strong distress to the Nigerian local producers. The Deputy Human Resource Manager, United Nigerian Textile Plc, Mr. Adebayo in an interaction with the author stated that although its Company has survived since 1971, the production of the company has reduced drastically and the number of staff has reduced too. He maintained that copying of locally made Ankara that is unique to Africa by the Chinese has caused the firm greater loss (Adebayo, 2019). According to Nwoye (2018), Ankara is a fabric that represents African authenticity and helps people in other far-flung corners of the world connect with the continent but the fate of the fabric today poses even more challenges to its African identity. China's incursion into the wax print trade-from counterfeiting to establishing legitimate wax print factories threatens the Africanness of the fabric, especially as local manufacturers struggle to produce and claim ownership of a material whose main consumers are Africans (Nwoye, 2018). However, the casualties of China's encroachment into the Ankara business extend beyond manufacturers, as famous wax print distributors known as Mama Benzes (or Nana Benzes) are going out of business (Nwoye, 2018) because of the rise of cheap but quality wax prints from China.

Sixth, Nigeria's textile firms' inability to meet up technological advancement in the era of trade liberalisation and lifting of import bans. When Nigeria joined WTO in 1995, it became glaring that it would not be able to compete with countries like China that have advanced technologically (Emechetta, 2014). In Nigeria, textile and apparel inputs are still produced on some outdated machinery (the United States International Trade Commission, 2009), resulting in low-quality outputs. The country also faces cotton quality issues in the international market (United States International Trade Commission, 2009). The inability of Nigeria to keep up with technological advancements in textile production was further worsened when Nigeria abolished import policies that had previously protected its textile industry from external competition in the 1980s. Thus, with the import restriction policy lifted, cheaper textile imports, majorly from Asia such as China, Indonesia, India,

Malaysia, Japan, and Singapore flooded the Nigerian market (Oseghale, 2019), with China taking the lead (Osondu, 2014). Although Nigeria was once the largest cotton producer in Sub-Saharan Africa (United States International Trade Commission, 2009), its production has contracted significantly. Available evidence reveals that China's market expansion is a major factor that led to the demise of many textile industries in Nigeria. China impacts Nigeria's textile in significant ways although poor infrastructure and government neglect of the sector contribute to China taking over Nigeria's textile market and the eventual decline of the industry.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

At the beginning of the 1990s, China emerged as an economic force in the international arena and expanded beyond its borders significantly in the area of trade. Having emerged as the manufacturing centre of the world, China's export tripled in Africa. China has the advantage of exporting cheap manufactured goods, and as result, African businessmen made China its destination market for imports of manufactured goods. For instance, China is the largest source of import market for Nigeria. With the increasing penetration of Chinese goods such as textiles into Nigeria's market, the country's textile industry began to collapse. An industry that once boasted of 200 firms can hardly boast of 20 today. Data gathered revealed that there are various ways China's market expansion have impacted and still impacts Nigeria's textile industry such as smuggling from neighbouring states; the influx of textile materials from China due to trade liberalisation and its accession into WTO; cheaper Chinese goods when compared with Nigerian manufactured textiles; China's replication of Nigeria's known brands such as Ankara and the displacement of Nigeria's products in African and European markets. While China is a major threat to Nigeria's textile industry, other hindrances to growth cannot be attributed to the Chinese such as unsteady power supply which has caused manufacturers to close down their businesses because of the high cost of operating with diesel or fuel and lack of government support of the sector. It is

therefore recommended that Nigeria upgrades its infrastructure and supports the textile sector to avoid total collapse and to help revive the collapsed firms.

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# THE ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY NEXUS IN WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL REGION

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## Abstract

West Africa and the Sahel region are grappling with several security challenges in the post-colonial era. The geopolitical architecture vis-à-vis the ecological characteristics of these regions has in no small way contributed to precipitating insecurity. This paper, therefore, is an attempt to analyse the nexus between environment and security with a view to bringing to bear the modern understanding of security. It is secondary research and it adopts Homer-Dixon's theory of resource scarcity. It is the position of this paper that environmental variability in West African and the Sahel has given rise to the manifestation of conflicts and insecurities. The farmers-herders conflict, banditry, Niger Delta conflict, trans-border crimes, insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, etc are instances of environmentally induced crises. It recommends, among other things, the need for countries in West Africa and the Sahel to put in place early warning systems and strategies to check environmental degradation.

**Keywords:** West Africa, the Sahel, security challenges, transborder crimes, Early warning systems, environmental degradation

## Introduction

The ecosystems reflect a complex interdependent web of living organisms and natural resources, play a critical role in supporting human wellbeing and driving economic growth through the valuable services they provide such as food, water for drinking and

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irrigation, pollination, and climate regulation. Yet human society has systematically undermined these natural allies, treating forests, arable land, and rivers as though they are inexhaustible (UNEP, 2013). Refocusing security thinking on the factors that render humans insecure in specific places means taking the geographical dimensions of insecurity seriously. While the local disruptions in particular places remain the focus of much analysis, in light of the discussions of resource wars and globalization, now the distant consequences of both resource extractions and subsequent pollution and consequent atmospheric change also have to be included. An ecological approach is now essential in which human activities are understood as part of the biophysical processes of global change; global environmental change and economic globalization are effectively two ways of looking at the same process of change (Dalby, 2006). The Sahel region is the area of Africa lying between 12°N and 20°N. This area shares two climatic characteristics: one rainy season per year and August as the month of highest precipitation.

The area covers all or part of 12 countries from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti (Marie Trémolières, 2010). There is a causal relationship between climate variability and human security as evidenced in several parts of the international system. This variability has in different instances contributed to conflicts. This school of thought is based on the premise that, because of their source or their gravity, environmental problems can be a hazard to a state's national security. It would be affected to various degrees, depending on whether such problems trigger social unrest, political instability, economic difficulties, and threats to territorial integrity, diplomatic tension, or even open warfare. The studies are therefore interested in the conflict dimension of interstate relations as they crop up in political, economic, diplomatic, and military confrontations stemming from environmental antagonism, be it local, regional or global in nature (Frederick, 1993).

## Concept of Security

The concept of security is plethora in nature. Several attempts have been made by several scholars to conceptualise security from different perspectives. There has been a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of security. In the view of Gallie (1995:167), the term 'security' has become an 'essentially contested concept', in that there are no assumptions of agreement as to its meaning and that this lack of agreement constitutes a widely recognised ground for philosophical inquiry. Wolfer (1962) points out the importance of perceptions within the meaning of security: `. . . security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.

The two main notions of security in international relations have shaped scholarly discussions about this term: realist and idealist-inspired security ideas. The realist school sees security as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result. On the other hand, the idealist school sees security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all (Buzan, 1991). Lipmann (1943:32) defines it by stating that "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war. To Baldwin (1997), seven specific questions are important for the analysis of the security concept. The questions are: (1) Security for whom? (2) Security for which values? (3) How much security? (4) From what threats? (5) By what means? (6) At what cost? (7) In what time period?

## Concept of Environmental Security

The concept of environmental security falls within the purview of the modern understanding of security. It is an attempt to explain the nexus between environment, ecological variables, and national security. Environmental security has been described as a bundle of issues that involves the role that the environment and natural

resources can play in peace and security, including environmental causes and drivers of conflict, environmental impacts of conflict, environmental recovery, and post-conflict peacebuilding. The scope of security and insecurity is by no means limited to violent conflict or its absence but includes the roots of sustainable livelihoods, health, and well-being (GEF STAP, 2014). Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Report of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) posits that:

> Environmental security underpins the rationale for investment in global environmental benefits and is essential to maintain the earth's life-supporting ecosystems generating water, food, and clean air. Reducing environmental security risks also depends fundamentally on improving resource governance and social resilience to natural resource shocks and stresses. The environment is better protected in the absence of conflict and the presence of stable, effective governance (GEF STAP, 2014:3).

The Security Council of the Russian Federation (1996:55) sees environmental security as:

> Environmental security is the protectedness of the natural environment and vital interests of citizens, society, the state from internal and external impacts, adverse processes, and trends in development that threaten human health, biodiversity, and sustainable functioning of ecosystems, and survival of humankind. Environmental security is an integral part of Russia's national security.

United Nations Environment Programme describes environmental security as a "conceptual envelope" including a variety of issues involving the role that the environment and natural resources can play across the peace and security continuum, including environmental causes and drivers of conflict, environmental impacts of conflict, environmental recovery and post-conflict peacebuilding (UNEP, 2016). According to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (2014), there are four dimensions of environmental security and they are:

i.   Ecosystem goods and services fundamentally underpin human well-being and human security.
ii.  Conflict affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection and their outcomes, regardless of its source
iii. Ecosystem degradation, resource competition, or inequitable distribution of benefits increase vulnerability and conflict risk
iv.  Environmental cooperation can increase capacity for conflict management, prevention, and recovery.

To corroborate the above point, Jerome, Theodore, and Renat (1998) identified the following as key elements in environmental security:

i.   Public safety from environmental dangers caused by natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement, or design.
ii.  Amelioration of natural resource scarcity.
iii. Maintenance of a healthy environment.
iv.  Amelioration of environmental degradation.
v.   Prevention of social disorder and conflict (promotion of social stability)

## Theoretical Framework

Homer-Dixon's theory of environmental scarcity provides an analytical relationship between environmental factors and conflict in human society. Scarcity of renewable resources—or what I call environmental scarcity—can contribute to civil violence, including insurgencies and ethnic clashes" (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Homer-Dixon predicted that "in coming decades the incidence of such violence will probably increase as scarcities of cropland, fresh water, and forests worsen in many parts of the developing world." Homer-Dixon's theory integrates physical variables (the stocks of natural resources, population size and growth, and resource-consumption per capita) and social factors (market dynamics, and social and economic structures) in a single model that emphasizes the

importance of thresholds, interdependence, and interactivity within complex environmental systems (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Hartmann (2017) has also contributed to the discourse on the relationship between environment and conflict when he presents the idea of strategic scarcity and environmental conflict. The figure below is used to express diagrammatically the nexus between resource scarcity and conflict.

Figure 1: Environment, Strategic Scarcity, and Conflict



Source: Hartmann (2017).

Relating Homer-Dixon's theory of resource scarcity to the correlation between the environment and security in West Africa and the Sahel one would see an obvious nexus.  For instance, the major remote and immediate precipitators of the conflict between pastoralists and farmers in both West Africa and the Sahel hinges basically on the environment. Issues of draught, water/rain, inadequate pastures, population expansion, migration, deforestation, and land tenure system are all environmental factors. The scarcity of these environmental variables vis-à-vis the increasing demand for them by both farmers and pastoralist constitutes the triggers for pastoralist-farmers conflict. The insecurity in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria orchestrated by the militants is also precipitated by the impact of activities of oil multinationals in that region which have a negative impact on the environment. Oil spillage, environmental degradation, gas flaring, and water pollution have adverse effects on human,

aquatic, and other agricultural activities within the Niger Delta Region. Contestations of ownership of resources have accounted for series of conflicts.

## An analysis of the Nexus between Environment and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

The relationship between environment and security has been under consideration since the 1980s mainly by two groups: (1) the environmental policy community, addressing the security implications of environmental change and security, and (2) the security community, looking at new definitions of national security, particularly in the post-Cold War era (Andree,2012). There is much research focusing on the nexus between environmental change and security that argues over whether environmental issues should be considered as a type or source of threat to security (Gleditsch, 1998; Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998). The contention that environmental degradation would cause misery, and probably conflict, in many situations, was frequently taken as axiomatic. What was far from clear, however, was precisely how insecurity would manifest itself and who would be the victims (Dalby, 2006).

Since the start of the new millennium, the world has witnessed over 40 major conflicts and 2,500 disasters, killing millions and affecting over 2 billion more. Not only do these tragic events destroy infrastructure, cause displacement and undermine human security, but they also degrade or destroy natural resources such as water, land, and forests essential for communities to recover. Environmental degradation and the mismanagement of natural resources are themselves risk factors for sparking renewed cycles of conflict and can result in further environmental damage, thus undermining stability and opportunities for sustainable development (UNEP, 2013). The Sahel is seen as highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change as a result of its reliance on rainfed agriculture, decreasing land productivity, low levels of development, weak infrastructure, largely non-existent social safety nets, and high exposure to natural disasters and economic shocks. Periodic droughts caused great hardship in

the 1910s, the 1940s, and between 1968 and 1993 (Descroix and Lambert, 2018). Serious floods have also been a major problem, striking Dakar in 2012, Ouagadougou in 2009, Bamako in 2013, and Niamey repeatedly (in 2004, 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2016) (Descroix and Lambert, 2018).

Climate change and its impact have dominated international policy agendas and public attention in recent times. The focus on the security implications of climate change has helped to bring climate change to the realm of international policymaking by placing it as a key threat to the state and global stability. Recent events in the Sahel, drawing attention to its role in the development of international terrorism and illegal trafficking and its particular vulnerability, place this region of Africa at the centre of global security concerns (SWAC/OECD, 2010). Frederick (1993) highlights two types of links relevant to the discussion on the nexus between environment and security: The first deals with environmental problems as the main insecurity factor. The scenarios are based either on confrontations arising from local or regional ecological conflicts (trans-border pollution, overexploitation of a common resource, etc.) or on a transformation of power relationships within a region – or among several regions as a result of major environmental disturbances (climatic changes, desertification, ecological accidents and the like). The second deals with environmental problems as an ancillary insecurity factor. In such cases, environmental antagonisms threaten a state's national security indirectly, by exacerbating pre-existing political, economic, social, or military tensions or conflicts or by adding a new dimension to them (Holst, 1989).

Guinea, the Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal, as coastal countries, are also highly vulnerable to environmental changes in the form of coastal erosion, soil salinization, and land degradation. Senegal ranked as the world's eighth most at-risk country in terms of sea-level rise (Amara, et. al., 2019). Tensions between farmers and pastoralists in Burkina Faso's Comoé province (1986 and 1995) were driven by a combination of factors including demographic pressure on fertile lands (settlement and sedentarisation of pastoralists as a

result of the drought), co-existing economic modes, and changes in livelihoods, soil degradation caused by human activity, land policies and weak regulatory mechanisms. Environmental variables seem to be interwoven with other variables without any real way to establish a dominant role for one or the other (SWAC/OECD, 2010).

Historically the population of the Sahel was made up of semi-nomadic pastoralists, with some farmers practicing agriculture where the soil and rain conditions would permit. Farmers and herders have a history of mostly peaceful cooperation over resources; these interactions were shaped by customary rules about resource access and traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes (Scheffran et al., 2019). In parts of Sahelian West Africa, the severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s caused a southward shift of semi-nomadic herders who moved to find pasture during the droughts that, in some cases, caused them to settle in areas where they had previously only spent part of the year. In essence, these farmer-herder conflicts are a result of a seasonal incompatibility between the two livelihoods. Such differences become particularly acute when farmers are attempting to harvest their crops after the rainy season without damage from passing livestock (Brottem, 2016).

Abbass (2012) has argued that the exacerbation of vulnerability and conflict in Northern Nigeria is both a product of the impact of climate change and drought leading to competition between farmers and pastoralists. Fulani militants were responsible for about 1,229 deaths in 2014 in Nigeria. The first quarter of 2016 also witnessed about 488 deaths in the country which were attributed to Fulani herdsmen, compared to 330 by Boko Haram in the same period. The Fulani ethnic group has a great majority of its people as herders, and their attacks are either for gaining access to grazeable land for their cattle, or retaliation for the killing of their kinsmen (Burton, 2016). In the 1960s, as a result of deforestation and the resort to improper agricultural practices and population increase, there was widespread soil erosion in Ethiopia's Highlands. The result was a decline of farmland, the inefficiency of agriculture, food shortages,

and exploding prices leading to urban riots. Neighbouring Somalia had to face similar problems. Most of Somalia's rivers rise in Ethiopia, and Somalis worried that Ethiopian migrants might divert water for irrigation. In 1977 the two countries went to war until 1979. Supported by the late superpowers with the supply of arms, the region could not yet recover properly (Kirchner, 2010). The impacts of environmental damage can pose a threat to either global security or regional security.

At the regional level, security may be threatened as a result of the unsustainable use of shared natural resources, or because of transboundary pollution. In such instances, concerted preventive actions might be appropriate and adequate (Kirchner, 2010). Periodic droughts in the Sahel have had cascading impacts on the broader hydrology of the region. For example, the 'grande sécheresse' of 1968 to 1993 resulted in an average reduction in rainfall of 25%-30%, but the major river basins experienced a drop in flow that was twice as large, with a reduction of 55% of the flow in the Senegal river basin and 60% in the Niger river basin, and a 90% drop in the size of Lake Chad (Decroix and Lambert, 2018).

However, the main climate-induced risk relevant to Nigeria is due to the decreased economic opportunities. A total of 60 percent of Nigeria's population and three-quarters of its unemployed are under 30 years of age. Evidence suggests that disenfranchised young people who lack resources and economic opportunity are more likely to join violent non-State groups (Langer and Ukiwo, 2011) such as paramilitary forces. Nigeria has also witnessed how the climate-migration dynamics contribute to increasing violence and conflicts. The shrinking of Lake Chad has become a threat for over 15 million Nigerians living in the area and about 10 million others living outside Nigeria's shores (Akubor, 2017). The changes in the environment and the scarcity of resources worsened pastoralists' relationship with farmers as well as the intensity and magnitude of pastoralists' movement southwards. This exodus in search of pasture land caused widespread conflicts and violence (Akubor, 2017).

Within the context of geopolitical theory reflects the nature of trans-border and trans-human activities within the continent of Africa. Issues of trans-border crimes occasioned by porous borders and poor border management reaffirm the reason why borderlines are characterized by crimes. For instance, in the Lake Chad Basin, the porous nature of boundaries, the existence of smuggling networks, suspicion amongst countries of the region, etc have all conspired to bring about massive proliferation of SALWs to sustain Boko Haram insurgency in the region (Tar and Adejoh, 2021). Located in west-central Africa, Lake Chad's dynamic nature, as seen in its size, shape, and depth, is constantly changing in response to variations in temperatures and rainfall.  A variety of ecological zones surround the lake, including deserts, forests, wetlands, savannas, and mountains (Ovie and Emma, 2011). The receding of the lake has contributed to the dwindling fortune of the region. Before the current state, the lake waters supported massive agricultural production: fishing, animal husbandry, and growing of food crops (such as cotton, groundnut, cassava, millet, onions, rice, maize, and sorghum), which in turn supported the economy of the region (Odada, et. al., 2006).

The rate of hydrological changes in the basin is unprecedented. Between 1960 and 2000, the region where the lake is located experienced one of the most substantial and sustained reductions in rainfall events recorded anywhere in the world (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2001). In 2003, the lake region was classified among the ten most water-impoverished locations in the world (UNEP, 2003). Hydrological and biophysical changes resulting from natural climatic variability and various human activities threaten the entire Lake Chad basin, the lake itself, and the natural resources and ecosystem services used by communities to pursue their livelihoods (UNEP, 2004).

Over the past half-century, Sudan's Darfur region has experienced rapid population growth, periodic drought, and, since 2003, a devastating conflict that has forced over two million people to flee. The concentration of displaced people in nearby camps, coupled with the region's rapid population growth, has put further pressure

on vital natural resources such as land, water, and forest resources As this fragility and scarcity of resources contributed to conflict in the first place, worsening the natural environment that so many depend on is neither sustainable nor supportive of economic recovery and peace (UNEP, 2013:22).

The crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is another evidence of resource-based violence with the impact of human activities on the environment. The major activities of the oil industry that negatively impact the Niger Delta area are gas flaring and oil spillages. These unchecked environmentally unfriendly activities of the oil industry make the utilization of the environment for the livelihood of the local people unsustainable (Obi 1997). The Niger Delta region is the soul of the oil industry in Nigeria. It is the place where most of the production occurs. Thus, the physical environment of the Niger Delta is intricately linked to oil production. The exploration and production of crude oil by multinational companies has been unfriendly to the Niger Delta natural environment (Opukri and Ibaba 2008). According to Nigeria's Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), approximately 2,369,470 barrels of oil were spilled in 4,647 incidents between 1976 and 1996 (Nwilo and Badejo 2008: 1221). The spills endanger the livelihood of the local communities. These environmental problems have led to the incessant violent confrontations that characterize the oil companies' relations with host communities. Another major oil exploration and production activity that endangers the environment is the flaring of natural gas, which also harms humans and animals.

While analysing the trends and conditions in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using Ogoni as a case in point, Okonta (2005: 10) posited thus:

> Oil exploration has turned Ogoni into a wasteland: lands, streams, and creeks are totally and continually polluted; the atmosphere has been poisoned, charged as it is with hydrocarbon vapours, methane, carbon monoxide, carbon-dioxide and soot emitted by gas which has been flared twenty-four hours a day for thirty-three years in very close proximity

to human habitation. Acid rain, oil spillages, and oil blowouts have devastated Ogoni territory. High-pressure oil pipelines crisscross the surface of Ogoni farmlands and villages dangerously.

Though a border crisis, the Bakassi Peninsular crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon has an environmental dimension to it. The peninsular is richly blessed with resources that can be converted for economic prosperity. It was not until it became clear after the discovery of large deposits of crude oil in adjoining offshore waters around the Rio del Rey area in the late 70s and early 80s that both countries realized that the Bakassi peninsula may indeed be a treasure of immeasurable economic value. Besides oil, the Bakassi Peninsula and its surrounding waters are located where two great ocean currents meet making conditions very favorable for a large variety of fish and other forms of maritime wildlife to grow and reproduce.

In an attempt to further diagnose the responses of both Nigeria and Cameroon vis-a-vis their national interest Che (2007:15) claims that:

> The reason both countries did not pay attention to Bakassi is in part because it was a remote area inhabited by people considered to be non-consequential. When oil and other natural resource and minerals were discovered in the peninsula, attention from both countries and also from their colonial connections was ignited thus creating tension, argument, and in some cases death. This is sad and really hypocritical because if oil was never discovered in this region, both regimes would have cared less about the region with its poor, remote, marshy, and non-consequential inhabitants

It is pertinent to note that in the realization of the impact of the environment on security, several international, regional and national efforts and programs have been put in place in an attempt to ameliorate these situations. The table below identifies some regional efforts at minimising the threats posed by environmental induced conflicts.

Table 1. **National and Regional Efforts/Strategies for addressing Environmental Induced Conflict**

| S/N | Organizations/Initiatives | Member Countries | Objectives |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | The Lake Chad Basin Commission | Established in 1964 by Chad, Cameron, Niger, and Nigeria | An intergovernmental organisation to oversee water and natural resource use in the Lake Chad Basin. Its mandate is to promote regional integration, peace, and security |
| 2. | G5 Sahel | Established In December 2014, by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger | An institutional framework for regional cooperation on development policies and security matters. |
| 3. | The Sustainability, Stability, and Security (3S) Initiative | Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe | Established in November 2016 to address the underlying causes of instability in Africa, especially migration and conflict related to the degradation of natural resources. |
| 4. | Alliance du Sahel | Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Denmark and Netherlands, and other partners | Established in 2017 to enhance the stability and development of the Sahel region |

Source: Compiled by the author

## Conclusion and the Way Forward

The correlation between environment and security in the Sahel and West African regions cannot be overemphasized. The modern perspectives of security have broadened its scope to capture how environment, weather and other ecological factors can precipitate security threats and challenges. This is not just peculiar to Africa. Ecological and environmental variations have accounted for different forms of insecurities either by serving as springboards for insecurity or as security threats in themselves. Pastoralist-farmers conflict is a form of rural violence that is manifested in different parts of Africa particularly in the Sahel region and sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental and ecological variables are at the heart of the Pastoralist-farmers conflict. Climate change, drought, desertification, population growth, land ownership systems, etc., are key precipitators of the conflict. The crisis in the lack Chad Basin, the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria, and the Bakassi Peninsular crisis between Nigeria and Cameron as cases in point of environmentally induced conflicts. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following recommendations:

i.   There is the need for an early warning system born out of relevant climate-fragility risk assessments needs
ii.  National and regional frameworks and policies put in place to address environmental induced conflicts need to be strengthened.
iii. The effective and efficient use/application of modern technology is encouraged to cushion the effects of climate change on the ecology of the region in focus.

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# BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY, MULTILATERALISM AND SECURITY APPARATUS?

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## Abstract

International terrorism became a major concern to Nigeria with the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamist group from around 2009, and the escalation of attacks on the country by the sect. The group has bases in neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This made the governments of Presidents Goodluck Jonathan and Mohammadu Buhari to be involved in negotiations, dialogues, shuttle diplomacy, and the usage of other tools of foreign relations with these contiguous countries. The Multinational Task Force (MNTF) was established in 1993 by Lake Chad Basin Commission and had to be resuscitated and invigorated by the governments of Jonathan and Buhari. However, the insurgency lingered despite these concerted efforts. This paper attempts to investigate why several foreign and security policy initiatives of the Nigerian government have failed to find lasting solutions to the insurgency. Secondary data, qualitative research methods, and content analysis were used as a methodology in this research. Findings showed that inefficiencies of government, poverty, and porous borders made it easier for Boko Haram terrorists to recruit members from these neighbouring countries. It was also revealed that this insurgency has made Nigeria lose foreign direct investment (FDI) because some Multinational Corporations (MNCs) relocated from the country. Therefore, the study advocates a wider approach that incorporates economic programs that would reduce poverty among the local populace and stronger border controls, among others.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Nigeria's foreign policy, international terrorism, diplomacy, security

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## Introduction

The State Department of the United States of America (U.S.A), in November 2013, officially labelled Boko Haram and, a splinter group, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) as they announced to have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group also demonstrated an international capability by carrying out attacks in Cameroun, Chad, and Niger republics (Ploch, 2013; Campbell, 2014, p.3). It is remarkable to note that the Jonathan presidency worked closely with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTTITF), the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and other similar organizations, coupled with the fact that the government at that time equally signed the Terrorism (Prevention) Bill 2011 into law and the Anti-Money Laundering (Prohibition) Amendment Act in June 2012 (Ashiru, 2013). All these developments put together necessitated strategic foreign policy initiatives and responses from the Nigerian government.

The major objective of foreign policy goals is the promotion and protection of a country's national interest which determines its relations with other nations to a very large extent. The credible direction of foreign policy intentions is built on broadly established principles that help shape a country's profile in the international system. National interest covers three major components of national security, protection, and the maintenance of the prosperity of the state and national reputation (Udeala, 2016, pp. 126- 127). The fundamental component of citizen diplomacy embraced from 2007 during the government of Umaru Yar'Adua was to safeguard the welfare of Nigerians at home and in diaspora and this should be a major concern regulating Nigeria's foreign policy. It is a failure of governance if a state cannot look after its citizens. It became obvious that Nigeria is not exempted from conflicts that seem to bedevil African societies as it is presently confronted by Boko Haram insurgency and others (Dickson, 2010, pp. 2-3).

Foreign policy is defined by the realities of increasing interdependence among countries in the international system. No nation can survive without having interactions with others and the era of isolationism has been greatly diminished. The aspect of public policy that is connected with the relationship with other countries, international organizations, and global actors is regarded as foreign policy. Nigeria made Africa the centre-piece of her foreign policy since independence in 1960. It would be recalled that the country has intervened politically, diplomatically and, sometimes, militarily in the conflicts of some African countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, the Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso and the Gambia. Ade-Ibijola (2013, p.565) observed that the inconsistencies of Nigeria's foreign policy towards her neighbours in the past five decades have allowed religious extremism and law-breaking, particularly arms smuggling and borderless lopsided movement in the northern parts of the country, has made the stressed country susceptible to the activities of extremists and negatively affected the economy.

The Boko Haram group became radicalized in 2009 and assumed an international outlook from 2013 onwards. Nigerian authorities consequently had to devise counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures which required collaborations with her neighbouring countries and foreign powers such as the United States of America and France, among others. But there were accusations of human rights violations against the Nigerian military, particularly by Amnesty International (AI) and this prevented the U.S. from rendering some essential military support to Nigeria. The American Leaby Law proscribes support to the government of countries whose military is responsible for human rights abuses (Thompson et al, 2016). However, the Nigerian military authorities refuted these allegations and decried the overbearing propensities of the global human rights watchdog- AI. It expressed uneasiness that AI's uncontrolled and unfounded accusations could reduce the spirit and morale of troops (Daily Post, 2015). Yet, a U.S. intelligence report said an operation designed to release the Chibok girls, which was a

clandestine mission that would have consisted of the use of gas, was leaked and disclosed soon after Nigerian security chiefs were told about it in secrecy (News Wire NGR, 2015).

Numerous issues are capable of having adversarial effects on Nigeria's external relations. Nigeria was at a time respected for its role in restoring peace to some countries that were prone to conflicts in Africa such as the role it played as a mediator in Congo in 1960, Chad in 1979, and Liberia in 1989, among others. It is an irony that Nigeria now needs the international community's aid to restore peace, security, and sovereignty over its territory. The interests and objectives of Boko Haram later became political which was to form an Islamic state, with the establishment of the Sharia Law system in Nigeria. To accomplish its goals, the sect fought with the Nigerian Police on numerous occasions in 2009. Increasingly, the group has developed to become a national, regional, and global concern (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016, pp. 56-58).

Against this background, the issues of Nigeria's foreign policy, with regards to the efforts to combat the threats of Boko Haram, assumes greater significance. The necessity to provide solutions to the security threats posed by the insurgency of Boko Haram, which has assumed international dimensions, motivates this study. Consequently, the study undertakes to examine some salient issues such as: how has Boko Haram insurgency affected Nigeria's foreign policy? What are the recurring factors hindering the capabilities of concerted foreign policy efforts in the fight against the prolonged insurgency? Has diplomacy, multilateralism, and security fail to curtail the menace of this insurgency? Which strategies can Nigeria's foreign policy actors muster in the campaign against Boko Haram? These are the pivotal questions that will be answered in this study.

## Conceptualizing Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism

Foreign policy has been termed as the sequences of action implemented by a nation in the interest of the wellbeing of its people. It is the policy of a state that is pursued in an attempt to promote the values,

ideologies, and benefits of its citizens in the course of interactions at the international level. Legg and Morrison (1971) explain foreign policy to represent a set of unambiguous objectives that concerns the domain outside the borders of a particular social entity, and a set of approaches and strategies intended to attain these goals. Similarly, Frankel (1967) describes foreign policy as comprising of critical actions which consist of some noticeable relationships between one state and the others. The foreign policy of a country is made up of self-interest approaches preferred by the state to protect its national interests and to accomplish its objectives within the international relations environment. It is the cumulative of a country's national interest which are the outcomes from the dealings of internal and external powers as supposed by the architects of foreign policy. The methods that are applied are used deliberately to work together with other countries.

However, the dynamism of the contemporary era, which is characterized by globalization and an increase in transnational activities, has to do with the emergence of non-state actors in the international political system. These actors also interact with state actors willingly and unwillingly and have influenced more than a few foreign policies. The foreign policy of several nations is the external projections of some of the internal policies of that country that may have significance in such an arena. Because both the domestic and foreign policies of a country are interconnected (Wogu et al, 2015, pp.137, 141). Nigeria's foreign policy was "Afrocentric" in the past, making "Africa the centre-piece of the country's foreign policy". The country's dominance in the African region may not be as noticeable as before, but its sub-regional manifestations in West Africa under President Buhari are incontrovertible. The government of Buhari outlined the international facet of his three-point agenda of handling insecurity and the pursuit for international joint efforts to fight it, campaigns against corruption, and the search for the repatriation of Nigeria's plundered assets, and efforts to recuperate the economy with the backing of trading partners. Buhari's courageous steps disallowed Morocco from being accepted as the 17th member state of ECOWAS. After all, Morocco does not by geographical stretch

belong to the West African sub-region but has its place in the Maghreb and Arab North African sub-region (Lewu, 2021). Buhari was also involved in shuttle diplomacy to West African states in the search for regional assistance targeted at tackling Boko Haram terrorism. The president also used a façade of shuttle diplomacy while acting as chief mediator in resolving the constitutional stalemate in the Gambia (Bello et al, 2017, p. 49).

General (rtd) Muhammadu Buhari and his Presidential campaign team, in 2015, had planned a foreign policy vision of a 'concentric circle' that had Nigeria's immediate neighbors as the main emphasis and other West African neighbours next, followed by the African continent and lastly the rest of the world. He visited seven countries comprising of Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, the United States, Germany (G-7 meeting), and South Africa (African Union summit) in the first two months of his government in 2015, where he rallied for global action against terrorism, through multilateral efforts. It was discovered after the extrajudicial murder of Mohammed Yusuf (founder of Boko Haram sect) in 2009 that the group has members numbering up to 40,000 and comprising of citizens of Nigeria, Chad, Mali Sudan, and Libya, around 2010 to 2015 (Forest, 2012, pp.62-63; Odo, 2015, p.50).

Diplomacy is the art and process of winning over the interests and conduct of foreign governments or organizations through negotiation, dialogue, cooperation, and other peaceful methods. It generally entails how international relations is carried out through the mediation of professional diplomats with respect to a multiplicity of matters and issue areas. Moreover, diplomacy is the foremost instrument of foreign policy, which characterizes the wide-ranging objectives and approaches that guide a state's interfaces with the rest of the world. International agreements, pacts, alliances, and other indices of foreign policy are commonly the outcome of diplomatic consultations and practices. Diplomats are also involved in formulating and implementing a state's foreign policy by advising government bureaucrats (Barston, 2006, p.1). Winter (2014) made it clear that contemporary diplomatic approaches, practices, and main

beliefs were initiated mainly from 17th-century European tradition. Diplomacy became professionalized from the commencement of the early 20th century. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, was approved by most of the world's independent states and it provides a background for diplomatic processes, techniques, and conduct. Much of diplomacy is now conducted by qualified bureaucrats, such as diplomats and emissaries, through a steadfast foreign affairs bureau (p.68). Diplomats work through diplomatic offices such as consulates and embassies and depend on many support staff.

The term diplomat is thus at times used generally to refer to diplomatic and consular staff and foreign ministry officials. In the context of this study, counterinsurgency diplomacy, also known as 'Expeditionary Diplomacy,' was established by ambassadors positioned to civil-military steadying programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. It made use of diplomats at strategic and operational levels, besides traditional embassy environments, and regularly together with armed or peacekeeping forces. Counterinsurgency diplomacy may deliver political environment information to local commanders, cooperate with local leaders and expedite the governance exertions, roles, and influence of a host government (Green, 2007). Multilateralism, on the other hand, is an interaction of more than three states within the international system and necessitates them to follow international standards and give more deference to international institutions. This is compared with unilateralism, where one state can determine how international issues are addressed and relations are conducted.

To fully comprehend multilateralism in foreign policy, it is important to understand how international society has established institutions, standards, and regimes. Tago (2017), argued that disparity made studies of unilateralism and bilateralism place emphasis on how a dominant state practices its foreign policy by ignoring international institutions and legal restrictions (pp.1-2). Moreover, Ruggie (1993) and Ikenberry (2000) put multilateralism forward as the fundamental issue in the contemporary international order, planned by the United States after the Second World War.

Nevertheless, by the actual character of international relations, bilateralism and unilateralism are what states regularly implement as a tool of foreign policy. Multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism are three interconnected, but time and again multifaceted concepts in international relations. Some scholars isolate these in simple terms of measurement: unilateralism is grounded on one state, bilateralism is constructed on two, and multilateralism has three or more (Keohane, 1990, p.731). The United Nations Organization (UNO) is by this description, unmistakably a multilateral global institution. This unpretentious arithmetical explanation founded on a "three-state minimum" benchmark for multilateralism is seen by some as realistic and pragmatic. Even though this is a marginal position in the field, however, the mainstream IR scholars engage in a quality-based classification. This approach suggests that multilateralism requires the subsequent three features: indivisibility, widespread organizing ethics, and diffuse mutuality. Indivisibility requires multilateralism to be built around communally created public good, general organizing principles and diffuse reciprocity necessitate that multilateralism would be different from discrimination and privileged bilateralism (Ruggie, 1993, p. 11).

## Boko Haram Insurgency and Nigeria's Security

Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that is against all forms of western education, which renders part of its name to mean that "Western" or "non-Islamic" education is a sin. The group is mainly located in the northern area of Nigeria and wants to make Islamic law the sole regulation in Nigeria, in adherence to Sunni Islam. Its ideology rejects not only western education but its ideas and institutions. It is imperative to remember that the group has a preference to be known as its original name, which is Jamaatu Alisunnah Liddaa awatil wal jihad, connoting people devoted to the spread of the prophet's instructions and jihad. Its fundamental objective is to eliminate the secular Nigerian state with a government that sticks firmly to Islamic Sharia law. Boko Haram has not only affected the lives and properties of Nigerians but has also had lots of negative effects on the foreign policy of the country (Gilbert, 2014, p.150). Aduloju et

al (2014) give a very good breakdown of the progression of Boko Haram and explanations of various assaults they have carried out within Nigeria. It is reasoned that there is a possible connection between the group and other terrorist groups in the region and the international community at large. This was manifested in access the sect had to modern and sophisticated weapons which empowered it to proceed from its previous guerrilla tactics to a full confrontation against the Nigerian Armed Forces and its subsequent declaration of loyalty to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (pp. 102-107).

According to Rapoport (2001), there are four waves of contemporary terrorism, namely the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the leftist wave, and the religious wave. Each wave had a triggering event, last for a generation before withdrawing but regularly with an intersection into the next wave that becomes prevalent. He writes that most terrorist groups will wane, with few showing to be long-lasting. Revolution is the dominant objective in each wave. In his interpretation, Islam is at the centre of the fourth wave and revolution in the fourth wave is contrary to the secularisation of the state which Boko Haram teachings emphasize (pp. 419-421). Agbiboa (2019) avers that the predicament and insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria are an outcome of the enclosure of religion into a long agitation that brews protests about corruption and discriminating distribution of power. He suggests that religious terrorist groups have anti-modern goals of returning the society to an unrealistic variety of the past and that they are against democracy and progressive society. He further states that they have the aptitude to summon total assurance and that they make use of diverse kinds of forcefulness in making their grievances known (p.135).

Boko Haram is well-known for being offensive against Christians, government targets, shelling churches, attacking schools, police stations, army barracks, abducting western education students, and also members of other Islamic sects or establishments that condemned them. They have also included the northern borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger among areas where they unleash terror and create fear in the minds of the residents of the areas where they

operate. Their threat has also changed the urban setting by making the government intensify military checkpoints and ban motorbike taxis (Okada), which is so often used by Boko Haram militants to carry out their dastardly operations. These security arrangements lead to overcrowding and traffic constraints as experienced daily in most parts of northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012).

## Factors in Boko Haram's Assumed International Dimensions

The fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, in 2011, the growth of the Tuareg rebels in northern Mali, and the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) among other factors further made the campaigns of Boko Haram assume international dimensions. The threat of Boko Haram's operational spread has also extended across the West Africa subregion. Boko Haram has taken advantage of the collective language in Niger (the Hausa linguistic relationship) and common Kanuri customs in Chad and Cameroon to increase its operations in the region. Moreover, common economic circumstances, such as joblessness and porous borders, have also negatively affected and compromised security in the region, empowering Boko Haram to search for new members from other states and spread across the region (Mazrui 1994; Suleiman, 2015, p.23).

The group deepened its activity in August 2011 when it blasted the United Nations building in Abuja, which killed at least 23 persons. It has sustained its insurgency in Nigeria and has even amplified its ferocious attacks and actions in the Northeastern States of Nigeria in 2014. In April 2014, for example, the group also kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls in the community of Chibok. The group has continued to kill, carrying out kidnappings and bombing of different places mainly in towns and villages in Northeastern Nigeria (Aduloju et al, 2014, pp. 102-104). Gilbert (2014) affirms that the outreach of Boko Haram insurgency outside the borderline of Nigeria consists that of Nigeria's neighbours, has degenerated and affected the current bitter relations among them. This is believed to be the case if one considers the circumstance that the activities of Boko Haram have gone past the northeastern part of Nigeria. Beyond its ferocious

attacks on the Nigerian soil, to the greater economic predicament in the Niger Republic, abduction of citizens of Cameroon and alien nationals for redemption purposes, and its use of Chad as a haven. Remarkably, but disadvantageously, the Boko Haram insurgency has upset Nigeria's influence in its neighbourhood, and has compelled the country to focus more on its internal issues (pp. 152-154).

## Nigeria's Foreign Relations and Efforts to Curtail Insurgency

President Buhari has since assumption of office, in 2015, been faced with innumerable domestic challenges that embarrassed foreign policy outputs. Odubajo (2017) states that the foreign policy agenda of this administration is directed at wooing regional cooperation in the fight against the Boko Haram hazard. It involves appealing for Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and associating with states, particularly with Western nations, in the fight against corruption. The Nigerian government had to make exertions through bilateral and multilateral approaches to seek the backing, trust, and support of its neighbours such as Chad, Niger Republic, Cameroon. Other countries include France, the United States of America, China, Israel, Great Britain, among others, in fighting the dangers of international terrorism reinforced by the activities of Boko Haram. Some countries within the international community will not be eager to have bilateral relations with a country that is extremely faced with terrorist operations. As an alternative to relishing multinational organizations venturing into Nigeria to boost the nation's economy, the country however is facing the departure of numerous foreign companies and industries from the country to other countries even in Africa, as a result of the unguaranteed security and uncontrollable actions of the Boko Haram sect.

Buhari's shuttle diplomacy led to the resuscitation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which consists largely of troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroun. It all intended to defeat Boko Haram terrorists and restoring peace and advancement to the Lake Chad area. However, there seemed to be a lack of cooperation among the member countries of MNJTF when a Chadian attack, led by the

Chadian President, on Boko Haram in 2020 was not sustained. Yet, the Chadians had massive success as regards chasing Boko Haram out of their territory into Nigeria. Perhaps, if the expected collaboration had existed within MNJTF, the troops from other states would have combined with the Chadian towards total freedom of the Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram have their control centre in the theatre of war. Likewise, if President Buhari had similar ideas and motivations with the Chadian President, the Nigerian troops would have been mobilised on a state of alertness to boost the efforts of the Chadian. Without hesitation, when institutions are created for the joint benefits of countries concerned, such institutions should be sustained effectively by member states (Lewu, 2021). This lack of concerted effort has perpetuated the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Resulting from this lack of coordination, bilateral and multilateral relations of the countries in the international arena with Nigeria have continued to decline amidst issues of Boko Haram over the years. Boko Haram in Nigeria has been attributed to violent agitations, lack of patriotism, and religious intolerance. Nigeria needs to do more to restore its marred image; combating Boko Haram needs to be done with utmost sincerity and commitment on the part of the government (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016, pp.62-64).

## Conclusion

This study revealed that the major objective of foreign policy goals is the accomplishment of a country's national interest which regulates its relationship with other countries. This informed the reason why successive governments in Nigeria had to pay greater attention to relations with their contiguous neighbours. The activities of the Boko Haram sect made Nigeria urgently pursue inclusive diplomacy, using bilateral and multilateral approaches. The insurgent group launched attacks from these neighbouring countries and recruits their nationals as fighters. Moreover, the Nigerian government had to employ counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures which required partnerships with her neighbouring countries and foreign powers such as the United States of America and France, among others.

Yet, the insurgency has not abated and this had led to concerns among the government, stakeholders, and the international community. The sect took advantage of the Hausa linguistic relationship and common Kanuri customs in Chad and Cameroon to increase its operations in the region. Added to these are prevalent poverty, joblessness, and porous borders, which have destructively affected and sabotaged security in the region. Nevertheless, the present government of Buhari continued to court regional cooperation in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist operations and appealing for Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and loans from advanced countries. The government must make efforts to reduce poverty in the northeast and strengthen border controls as well. We also noted that there was insufficient cooperation among countries that made up the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Therefore, Nigeria needs to show more commitment and make efforts to regain the confidence of other countries whose support is crucial in the coalition, to defeat the insurgency in Nigeria and the region as a whole.

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# THE GULF WAR REVISITED: ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ART OF WAR

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## Abstract

This paper examines the 1991 Gulf War and how it contributed to the development of the art of war since the dawn of the post-Cold War realities. The 1991 Gulf War was a war waged by a coalition force of 40 nations led by the United States of America (USA) against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait, arising from oil pricing and production disputes. This article seeks an explanation for how the Gulf War has contributed to the art of war by explaining how the Napoleonic strategy of quick and decisive victory was used in the operation. This strategy contrast sharply with the intention of Iraq for a sustained all-drawn-out war, which is meant to wear out their opponents. The article analyses the further consequences of this conceptual clash in military doctrine. It explains that the contrast between both concepts and especially the western military culture for fighting wars was the decisive element in the Gulf War. In carrying out this research, secondary sources were consulted and used accordingly. The research findings show the contribution of the 1991 Gulf War to the increasing complexities of war. The war further demonstrated the validity of the collective security system as the coalition forces were able to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. In addition, the study is relevant as it exposed the challenges posed by warfare and the vulnerabilities it poses in inter-state relations and on the international system.

**Key Words:** Gulf War, Art of War, Kuwait Sovereignty, Coalition Forces, Collective Security.

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## Introduction

In warfare, according to the British Military genius Lord Montgomery, 'the first principle is to identify your enemy accurately' (Prins and Stamp: 1991). War is about identifying both your enemy and fundamentally what objective to attain, especially because the international system is a system perpetually ridden in the divergence of interests and states articulate their interests overwhelming through diplomacy and war, and sometimes it is difficult for states to escape legitimate interest through either of the dual methods of war and or diplomacy. As such the state is expected to 'in principle' to actualize its interests without necessary recourse to destabilization of the international system, however, in the face of a multiplicity of interests, it is not unlikely that there would be a 'clash of civilization' with a tangible threat to both national, regional, sub-regional, global security and stability that Montgomery's dictum remains valid and relevant.

The contemporary international system has witnessed numerous conflicts and wars and the prospectus for more abound. Conventionally, armies are deployed to defeat their enemy and attain certain objectives in battles. Military historian, Martijn Kitzen (2012) wrote that the culmination in the 20th-century paradigm of inter-state industrial warfare and technological inventions and the idea of "nation-in-arms" led to large scale battles with massive use of force as were the cases in both world wars, (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) but has not waned but for the strategic stalemate which the nuclear weapons birthed during the Cold War.

During the Cold War era bi-polar international system, which was characterized by competing military alliances and interests by the dual dominant powers of the United States and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the central organizing principle of America's foreign policy was to contain and deter the Soviet Union and its allies (Njostad, 2005). In military terms, the principle translated into a fairly specific objective, namely to deter Soviet military attack on America's European allies and the United States

itself. But all of that receded in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War rivalries. At the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the post-war dynamics, expectations for cooperation and collaboration were anticipated to hold sway in the international system but turned into a mirage with numerous flare-ups of tensions, conflicts, and wars.

Battles have continued to rage in the international system as state-interest remain incompatible and ever increasingly divergent. After the end of the cold war, a shift occurred in international security. The contemporary situation is characterized by the emergence of non-state adversaries being deployed for combat operations and in some instances, states use such elements to complement national armies for offensive purposes. These civilians fulfill a dominant role in the new architecture with Rupert Smith (2005) referring to the new paradigm as "war amongst the people: civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force." The nuclear revolution, the end of the Cold War, the rise of ethnonational conflicts, and the spread of global capitalism and democracy have led to sustained speculation about a turning point in the history of warfare. Some have even argued an "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) and gradual obsolescence of war, or at least of great power war (Mueller, 1989). Whereas others see an explosion of low-intensity warfare and a "clash of civilization" (Huntington, 1996). All of these assumptions are predicated on some critically acclaimed assumptions and theoretical propositions about the causes of war and it should be conducted.

Every war in the annals of human history was either fought for economic, political, social, military or strategic reasons. Humans have witnessed immense number of wars since the dawn of time and the prospects for its re-occurrences remains ever-present, given the combustible nature of international politics and the international structure itself. In the century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the First World War, international relations in Europe were largely dominated by five powers: (after 1867 Australia-Hungary), France, Great Britain, Prussia (after 1871

Germany), and Russia. There was always a clear distinction between what contemporaries called 'first-rate powers' and 'secondary states', and there was rarely any doubt into which category any state should be placed (Bridge and Bullen: 2005). Discernibly, while there are established shifting dynamics of power realities and relations in the international system, state interests and the pursuits and attainments of such interests have never remained constant given validity to the Hobbesian assertion that the international system is 'short, brutish, nasty. The brutishness and nastiness seem to characterize state relations being witnessed on regular basis.

The military consequence of the paradigm shift in warfare at the immediate end of the cold war era was well pronounced in Iraq and has grown in leaps and bounds afterward. While inter-state wars are still fitted for large-scale offensive operations vis-à-vis similar opponents, it is misleading to think that's all that is to such warfare. According to global renowned military historian John Keegan, western military culture comprises three elements: moral, intellectual and technological. These three factors were dominant in the American-led onslaught against Iraq in the war under review. The 1991 Gulf War was no exception, that wars are triggered by a combination of factors such as the desire for conquest, the divergence of interest, and realist inclination for use of power as a currency of international politics.

The 1991 Gulf War code named-Operation Desert Storm witnessed the use of shrewd strategy and tactics by the coalition of 40 nations led by the USA and some of its allies such as Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and so on, on one hand, and Iraq on the other hand. With the collapse of the former USSR, the resulting global dominance of the United States gave rise to a shift from the policy of containment to the use of coercive diplomacy in its foreign policy architecture. Author and leading Political Scientist, Shah Tarzi, alludes that, 'the American

government had been strongly predisposed to the use of coercive diplomacy because, for one reason, the strategy offers the potential to prevent or undue acts of military aggression or aggressive challenge to the status quo or core American interests and values at low cost'.

The preoccupation of this paper is to show how the 1991 Gulf War contributed to the development of the art of war during the period under investigation. To do this, it is imperative to establish the fact that warfare is historically part and parcel of human society because no human society ever lived without one form of conflict or the other. For instance, as a global phenomenon, warfare threatened world peace and the socio-economic and political well-being of human societies. In particular, Europe experienced the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic wars in the 19th century, whereas from the second decade of the 20th century, warfare became a global phenomenon with the First and Second World Wars fought between 1914-1919 and 1939-1945 respectively. The end of WW II in 1945 ushered in the Cold War, following the emergence of USA and USSR as world powers until the 1990s when USA emerged as the unipolar global hegemonic power after the collapse of the USSR between 1990 and 1991. Thus, it is appropriate to incline that the 1991 Gulf was a manifestation of the Cold War aimed at securing the capitalist interest of the West as against the Eastern ideology of communism. The emphasis of this paper is on how the 1991 Gulf War affected the development of the Art of War. In doing this, the paper starts by conceptualizing the key concepts. This is followed by examining the 1991 Gulf War and how it contributed to the development of the Art of War.

## Conceptual Framework

Conceptually, scholars have been animated about the causes of war for a long time now and there is no unanimity or consensus as to what are the causes of war or how best to study such occurrences. This widening gulf is not agreeing with the causes of wars that have been further attenuated by a growing diversity in academic disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, theology, literature,

political science, history, and even international relations/politics to mention a few. The differences in perspectives from these avalanches of academic disciplines are essentially driven by not only substantial differences within disciplines as well, but also by different ontological and epistemological perspectives, theoretical preconceptions, and methodological preferences, (Barbieri, 2002). The undercurrents that cut the ground from a universally accepted definition or a precise causative factor responsible for a flareup of war do not obviate observers from agreeing to the complexities of war, (Levy, 2011). Leading scholars of peace studies, political science and international relations, and politics define war as 'large-scale organized violence between political organizations (Malinowski 1941; Vasquez, 2009). Many other choose Clausewitz's classical definition of war as the "continuation of politics by other means". Then if war is an instrument of policy to advance state interests of political organization, an explanation of war requires an understanding of why the authorized decision-makers of political organizations choose to resort to military force rather than adopt another strategy for advancing their interests and resolving differences with their adversaries.

Waltz (1959) suggested three "images of war---the individual, the nation-state, and the international system and used these to categorize the causes of war. Singer (1961) referred to these as "levels of analysis." The individual-level focuses primarily on human nature and individual political leaders and their belief systems, psychological processes, emotional states, and personalities. The nation-state (or national) level includes factors such as the type of political system (authoritarian) or democratic and variations of each, the structure of the economy, the nature of the policymaking process, the role of public opinion and interest groups, ethnicity, and nationalism, and political culture and ideology. The system-level includes the anarchic structure of the international system, the distribution of military and economic power among the leading states in the system, patterns of military alliances and international trade, and other factors that constitute the external environment common to all states. Although the levels of analysis framework are commonly used to categorized the causal variables contributing to war (or to other foreign policy

outcomes), it is sometimes used differently, to refer to the level of the dependent variable rather to the level of an independent variable (Bennett and Stam, 2004).

The differences among the different levels of the dependent variable are important, because war-related patterns validated at one level may not necessarily hold for other levels. Some have argued that "a more conciliatory foreign policy at the nation-state level does not necessarily result in a lower probability of war at the dyadic level, as Britain and France discovered in the aftermath of the 1938 Munich Conference" (Levy, 2011). Similarly, a strong preponderance of power at the dyadic level may contribute to peace because the strong do not need to fight and the weak are unable to fight (Tammen et al, 2000). The Gulf War was the war fought by a coalition of 40 nations led by the US against Iraq's forces between 2nd August 1990 and 28th February 1991.

The war is also known as the Persian Gulf War, First Gulf War, Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War, or Iraq War. The start date of the war can be seen as either August 1990 when Iraq's Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait or as of January 1991, the start of Operation Desert Storm, when the US-led coalition forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The war is also often called the 1991 Gulf War, the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and the 1990s Gulf War. This dating is also used to distinguish it from the other two Gulf Wars (Miller, 1991). A consistent narrative in many major theories is the emphasis on the basic need for security. Perhaps that is why Lippman (2017) argued that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core valves if it wished to avoid war, and can maintain them by victory in such a war", just like Tzu, (1910) argues that "the art of war is of vital importance to the State…it is a matter of life and death, a road to either to safety or ruin."

The term war is a means of pressing an agenda over the will of other people, mostly from unresolved differences. War is an act of violence aimed at compelling the opponents to obey and fulfill the whims and caprices of the aggressor (Amiara, Jacob & Okoye, 2018). Just like

leading war theorists, Clausewitz stated: "war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale…war, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" (Clausewitz et all, 2008).

At this juncture, the meaning of strategy and tactics is necessary. Strategy is the planning, coordination, and general direction of military operations to meet overall political and military objectives. During the 1991 Gulf War, both the coalition of 40 nations and Iraq employed necessary tactics and strategies as short and long terms decisions to win the war. The contending forces employed tactical strategy on the movement of troops and employment of weapons and weaponry to the battlefield to win the war. Battlefield strategy and tactics are the art and science of employing forces to achieve security objectives. Therefore, while a tactic is an art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war. Tactics can be categorized into location, unit, and individual. However, some tactics can be undertaken both by individuals and units. Tactics are concerned with doing the job right, and higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the right job (Nwamagyi, 2019). Given the size, training, and morale of forces, type and number of weapons available, terrain, weather, and quality and location of enemy forces, the tactics to be used are dependent on strategic considerations.

## Antecedents to the 1991 Gulf War

Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between it and the United States which calmed during the Iraq-Iran war. This alliance is a reflection of the use of collaborative strategy in warfare. The US has always been concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for many Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on 29 December 1979. The US remained officially neutral after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some non-military aircraft to Iraq (Pike, 2016). In March 1982, Iran began a successful counter-

offensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about the Iraqis' continued involvement in terrorism. The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran" (Borer, 2003).

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising (Cleveland, 2016). Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused (Ibrahim, 1990).

## Iraq-Kuwait Dispute and Build-Up to Annexation

The Iraq–Kuwait dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwait as Iraqi territory (Gordon, 1990). Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made it rightful Iraqi territory (Childs, 1994). Its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between the two countries in 1922, making Iraq virtually landlocked (Knights,2005). Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region (BBC News, 2007). All this precipitated Saddam Hussain's annexation threats of Kuwait, rightly or wrongly.

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas for oil production. For the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 a barrel, discipline was

required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing, the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as $10 a barrel – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit (Royce, 1990). Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success (Royce, 1991). The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare (Tyler, 1991), which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait's slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field (Friedman, 1991). At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence (Lewis), 1991.

In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected (Kranish et al., 1991). Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls mounted (Nimmons, 1991).

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border preparatory to an imminent military assault, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert to deter and possibly prevent such an eventuality. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt (Bush, 2011). On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government

laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, that loans made by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers" (Heller, 2012). He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American. They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security (Rowse, 2001). The US sent aerial refueling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats (MacArthur, 1992). Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July 1990 and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established (Lee, 2012). Earlier, on the 25th July 1990, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad, without success in the dialogue. The result of the Jeddah talks was an Iraqi demand for $10 billion to cover the lost revenues from Rumaila (Freedman & Karsh, 1993); Kuwait offered $500 million (Fetter, Lewis & Gronlund, 1993), grossly unsatisfactory to Iraq. The Iraqi response was to immediately order an invasion (Kifner, 1991), which started on 2 August 1990, with the bombing of Kuwait's capital, Kuwait City. At the time of the invasion, the Kuwaiti military was believed to have numbered 16,000 men, arranged into three armored, one mechanized infantry, and one under-strength artillery brigade (Atkinson & Balz, 1991).

Despite Iraqi saber-rattling, Kuwait did not mobilize its force; the army had been stood down on 19 July, and at the time of the Iraqi invasion many Kuwaiti military personnel was on leave. Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units, which began the attack at midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with the primary attack force driving south straight for Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting attack force entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving east, cutting off Kuwait City from the country's southern half. The commander of a Kuwaiti armored battalion, 35th Armored Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqi attack and was able to conduct a robust defense at the Battle of the Bridges near Al Jahra, west of

Kuwait City (Fisk, 2007). Kuwaiti aircraft scrambled to meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were lost or captured. A few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces (Crocker III, 2006).

The main Iraqi thrust into Kuwait City was conducted by commandos deployed by helicopters and boats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seized the airports and two airbases. The Iraqis attacked the Dasman Palace, the Royal Residence of Kuwait's Emir, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, which was defended by the Emiri Guard supported with M-84 tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir's youngest brother. Within 12 hours, most resistance had ended within Kuwait, and the royal family had fled, leaving Iraq in control of most of Kuwait (Morin & Gimblett, 1997). After two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti military were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard or had escaped to Saudi Arabia. The Emir and key ministers were able to get out and head south along the highway for refuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated their control of Kuwait City, then headed south and redeployed along the Saudi border. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam initially installed a puppet regime known as the "Provisional Government of Free Kuwait" before installing his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as Kuwait's governor on 8 August 1990.

After the invasion, the Iraqi military looted over $1,000,000,000 in banknotes from Kuwait's Central Bank (Peterson, 2002). At the same time, Saddam Hussein made the Kuwaiti dinar equal to the Iraqi dinar, thereby lowering the Kuwaiti currency to one-twelfth of its original value. In response, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah ruled the banknotes as invalid and refused to reimburse stolen notes, which became worthless because of a UN embargo. After the conflict ended, many of the stolen banknotes made their way back into circulation. Today, the stolen banknotes are a collectible for numismatists (Fisk, 2005). Kuwaitis founded a local armed resistance movement following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (Ford, 2003). The Kuwaiti resistance's casualty rate far exceeded

that of the coalition military forces and Western hostages (Keaney & Cohen, 1993). The resistance predominantly consisted of ordinary citizens who lacked any form of training and supervision (Ranter, 2016).

## The 1991 Gulf War

Following the 2nd August 1990, Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, Iraqi's action galvanized action at the United Nations Security Council and mustered a force of coalition of willing nations at the behest of the United States. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 678, calling for the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if it has not done so by January 15, 1991 (www.britannica.com). As of January 15 deadline passed, in the early morning of January 17. the U.S. and its coalition of 40 allied nations launched a campaign of air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The ensuing war became known as The Gulf War, or The Persian Gulf War, or The First Gulf War,1991.  The war was fought by a coalition of 40 nations led by the US against Iraq's forces from 17th January 1991 to 28th February 1991, code-named Operation Desert Shield (of 2nd August 1990 and 17th January 1991).

Before the military assaults, the international condemnation of the invasion had brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. Together with the UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who had resisted the invasion by Argentina of the Falkland Islands a decade earlier, American President George H. W. Bush deployed US forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their forces to the scene (Hersh, 2005).  An array of nations joined the coalition, forming the largest military alliance since World War II. The great majority of the coalition's military forces were from the US, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia paid around US$32 billion of the US$60 billion costs (Robert, 1994).

The War marked the introduction of live news broadcasts from the front lines of the battle, principally by the US cable network news (CNN) (Atkinson, Rick & Crusade, 1993). The live news broadcasts were a strategy and tactical propaganda employed by the coalition of 40 nations to win the war against Iraq. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of images from cameras onboard US bombers during Operation Desert Storm (Malory, 2016). As a viable strategy and tactic also, the initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval bombardment on 17 January 1991, continuing for five weeks. This was followed by a ground assault strategy on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces that liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased its advance and declared a ceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. On its part, Iraq launched Scud missiles as a strategy and tactic against the coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel, even though the latter had no part in the coalition of forces.

The Gulf War began with an extensive aerial bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. For 42 consecutive days and nights, the coalition forces subjected Iraq to one of the most intensive air bombardments in military history. The coalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons clarification needed] of bombs, and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure (Ranter, 2016). The air campaign was commanded by USAF Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, who briefly served as US Central Command's Commander-in-Chief – Forward while General Schwarzkopf was still in the US. A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678; the coalition launched a massive air campaign, which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert Storm. The priority was the destruction of Iraq's Air Force and anti-aircraft facilities. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six carrier battle groups (CVBG) in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The next targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely micromanaged Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative at lower levels was

discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

The air campaign's third and largest phase targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons research facilities, and naval forces. About a third of the coalition's air power was devoted to attacking Scuds, some of which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. The US and British special operations forces had been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search for and destruction of Scuds. Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses, including manned-portable air-defense systems, were surprisingly ineffective against enemy aircraft, and the coalition suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 due to Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding with the ground while evading Iraqi ground fired weapons.

**Military Consequences of the War**
The consequences of the 1991 Gulf war include the effective use of airpower, naval blockade, and ground assault.

(i) **Airpower:** The United States-led coalition assembled impressive airpower that was used in degrading and incapacitating the Iraqi military arsenal within the opening days of the war. The strength of the coalition airpower was put at 2, 790 fixed-wing combat and support aircraft and the introduction of stealth F-117 and Tomahawk cruise missile strikes. The introduction of the Tomahawk cruise missiles reduced pilot exposure as well as the fact that the F-117 flew virtually undetected by air radar which increased the tempo for sustained air assault with 100% accuracy on targets and delivery of heavy causalities. By the end of the first day, the coalition had flown 2,107 combat sorties, fired 196 Tomahawk missiles, and lost a US Navy F/A-18A, two US Navy A-6Es and a US Air Force F-15E, a US Marine Corps OV-IOA, an Italian and two Britain Tornados, a Kuwait A-4and a US Air Force F-4G crashed with mechanical problems. Iraq's losses were unprecedented (Ideh, 2008). The United States allied forces effectively destroyed the Iraqi integrated air defense system and

effectively controlled the airspace for its air supremacy. It was almost suicidal for the Iraqi air force to dare any form of resistance during the military campaigns. By the end of the war, 18, 117 sorties had been flown from six carriers of which 16, 899 were combat or direct combat support missions (Alonso et all, 1993). Before the war, Iraq had 6th world's largest Air Force with about 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft, including about 750 combat aircraft with about 17, 000 surface to air missiles and between 9,000 to 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles which were annihilated by the US-led alliance.

**(ii) Naval blockade:** the naval operations sank 46 Iraqi Naval vessels and 74 Iraqi naval personnel taken as prisoners of war and ensured that the naval enforcement against Iraq was sustained, kept the Gulf free of mines, and protected the Seaborne delivery of supplies; conducted shore gunfire support and surface to surface missiles strikes against land targets, defeated Iraq's Navy and provided close air support for ground troops with its sea-based airpower.

**(iii)   Ground assault:**
The ground offensive tilted the scale of balance effectively on the side of the United States-led coalition within the first few hours of the war. The first blow was struck by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Joint Forces Command East (JFC-East). The United States alone committed 500,000 troops and about 2,000 tanks while Britain sent about 25,000 troops and 210 tanks. The coalition's Electronic Warfare (EW) completely disrupted Iraq's command and control, communications, and intelligence (CI) system. The Gulf War was a space-age war in is an unprecedented use of satellites for communication, navigation, and intelligence, (Ideh, 2008).

**Contribution to the Development of the Art of War**

The 1991 Gulf War saw the use of coercive diplomacy as a necessary strategy in the art of war. This was a key element of US political,

military, and energy economic planning during the Gulf War. As a diplomatic strategy, a National Security Planning Group meeting was formed, chaired by the then-Vice President George Bush, to review US options. It was determined that there was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region. Furthermore, it was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices and threaten the fragile recovery of the world economy, which was just beginning to gain momentum (Blanford, 2001). The conclusions were threefold: First, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the International Energy Agency and, if necessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption. Second, the United States needed to beef up the security of friendly Arab states in the region. And third, an embargo should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by President Reagan and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and implemented and became the basis for US preparedness to respond to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991.

The use of the military during the war was another means through which the 1991 Gulf War contributed to the art of war. One of the West's main concerns was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia. Following Kuwait's conquest, the Iraqi Army was within easy striking distance of Saudi oil fields. Acting on the Carter Doctrine, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, US President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission as a strategy and tactics to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, under the codename Operation Desert Shield, which began on 7 August 1990, when US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to the request of its monarch, King Fahd, who had earlier called for US military assistance. This "wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, as its military governor.

This strategy was compatible with Napoleon's doctrine of a decisive victory in battles, a military culture hinged on moral, intellectual, and technological. Such battles are sustained "by massive size on country-smashing campaigns of conquest through decisive maneuvers, and usually, battles" (Gray, 2002). This manner of warfare aims at the destruction of the enemy's main force in a decisive battle between mass armies and was made possible by the concept of levee en masse. By this, warfare was sustained by the ideological element of total warfare by using mass armies and thus mobilizing the society for the conduct of war. Just like Napoleonic wars predicated by the use of mobile firepower and other new technologies, including balloons and the semaphore telegraph (Tugwell, 1989). This doctrine canonized by Carl Von Clausewitz continues to echo and shaped military operations even in the 20th century with prospects into the foreseeable future, "provided the theoretical guidance for large scale warfare: the trinity of the state, the army and the people (Clausewitz, 1989).

The Clausewitzian trinity was a consequence of the massive character of the Napoleonic war; to mobilize the full resources of the State. The three equal components of the trinity needed to be kept in balance. The primacy of policy comprehends the fact that war stems from political objectives. This finds reasonable agreement with Martijn Kitzen in a well-published paper entitled, 'Western Military Culture and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality', where he inferred that war should only be waged in accordance with the political motivation which started it. He wrote:

> By defeating an opponent on the battlefield, the state could show its superior strength. This affects the will of the enemy state to continue the war. A defeat of the adversary's main force leads to the collapse of the enemy's will, resulting in victory. Thus, decisive battles between massive armies were essential to enforce an outcome to the war. To wage these kinds of war, the state needed the people and the military. Therefore, the political decision to go to war could only be taken when the relation between the state, people and the military is balanced, (Kitze, 2012).

The United States-led coalition and the gruesome outcome of the war fitted well with the face-to-face battle, the concept of total war, and the role of technology complementing the role of the state, people, and army in vanquishing an enemy-state. The war availed the coalition forces to test better and new firepower and the flow was a logical outcome of this process. If the Cold War saw the attainment of nuclear weapons by the USA and USSR ensured mutual assured destruction and deterrence, the end of the Cold War and the Gulf war only validated the assumption of the United States as the pre-eminent power in the post-cold war dynamics. The immediate end of the Cold War and the US-led coalition battle against Iraq has only solidified this 'reality.

At any rate, the war has not made the international system any safer just like previous wars such as the European, African pre-and-post-colonial wars, including the two world wars. Rather, states have remained entangled and entrenched in their quest to attain, further, and express their interests through military means. Thus, it punched the United States President's claim that the war was waged to make the international system safe from wars. However, that the war helped to restore Kuwait's sovereignty is incontrovertible. The development of industrial total warfare has remained largely rigid by western armies and the US is not immune, even as low-intensity conflicts have continued to erupt with rapidity and on a scale not foreseen at the end of the Cold War. Modern technology and mass firepower remain decisive elements in warfare.

Thus, a major consequence of the Iraqi war forced the United States-led coalition to retain and maintain its fighting culture predicated on state, people, and technology. But the second Iraq war compelled a shift, here where insurgence was launched against the United States troops and battles were waged in the streets. The preference for large-scale decisive battles with technologically advanced equipment remains the dominant feature of western military thinking and culture. However, the nascent wars, where insurgencies are growing have commanded some changes in strategy. To understand this, we have to look again at the reason which belies warfare: the political

objectives. Traditionally, the United States and western powers, and even non-western powers wage wars in advance of national interests. Once threatened states especially powerful ones will act potentially using every instrument including resort to war. Technology and firepower continue to determine the outcome of wars.

## Conclusion

The significance of the 1991 Gulf War was not essentially in the causalities or scope of the war but mainly in its contribution to the art and strategy of modern warfare.  The overwhelming impact was the possibility of war on a global scale since the end of the Cold War. The Gulf War brought to the fore sustained discussion about modern warfare and its implication for the human race. During the 1991 Gulf war, several tank battles took place, while the coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine US aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab states advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few casualties.

Despite the successes of coalition forces, it was feared that the Iraqi Republican Guard would escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into Kuwait 15 hours ahead of schedule, and to send US forces after the Republican Guard. Despite the intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and continued to advance towards Kuwait City. Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only light resistance. The Kuwaitis quickly liberated the city despite losing one soldier and having one plane shot down. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and President Bush declared it liberated. In coalition-occupied Iraqi territory, a peace conference was held where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides.

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# TEXTILES IN WEST AFRICA TRADE RELATIONS: THE POLITICS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

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## Abstract

Attempts to improve regional ties and economic development prompted the economic integration in West Africa, but not without its challenges. This study interrogates the extent to which textiles trade has operated within the sub-region despite a rich history in textiles and the potential for a buoyant trade. The study is set in the interaction between economic liberalism and economic nationalism. It employs data from secondary sources that were content analysed. The study finds that West African states respond with protectionism in the face of economic challenges despite the existence of ECOWAS. Thus, the study calls for a review of the regional agreement to afford greater cohesion and an accessible regional market.

**Keywords:** Textiles, Trade relations, Economic integration, West Africa, Development

## Introduction

The prominence of textiles goes beyond the physical and cultural to the socio-psychological existence of man, with implications for the economy of a state and the society in general. This makes textiles veritable articles of trade among nations as well as having an intimate relationship with humans. Being one of the first manufactured items of the industrial economy, textiles played an important role in the

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emergence of trade, trade routes such as the Silk Road, as well as trade relations on the different continents of the world. It is considered the first step into industrialisation (Gereffi, 1999; Kemau, 2010). It was North England's first phase of the industrial revolution that began (Hobson, 2004). And the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in East Asia also sparked an industrialising process with the industry. The West African sub-region accounts for about thirty-two percent of the African Population. Though balkanised into different states, once pooled, this population presents a large market for economic exchanges. However, there are questions about the sub–region's robustness as a market, given the level of poverty, informalisation of work, low levels of agro-processing and manufacturing as well as periodic food shortage (UNDP, 2009).

Although its geography and economic structure are largely the results of colonial policies (Ellis & Morgan, 1984), the sub-region has the potential for economic integration if the states consider a shared colonial experience and a long history of pre-colonial intra-regional trade in the sub-region. Also, the diversity of the ecosystem – humid coastal zones, northern drylands, arid Sahel and deserts, central Sudan semi-humid regions- makes it possible to trade products based on ecological complementariness. Also, West Africa is one of the world's great textile-producing regions before it was colonised. Thus, textiles trade can help achieve this integration because it has been traded in the sub-region for centuries, with moral, spiritual, and cultural values attached to it. Besides, the textile industry seems a viable channel to industrialisation, possessing the potential to improve intra- regional trade by creating decent work and reducing poverty, since it spills out to agriculture (cotton growing). This paper, therefore, seeks to interrogate the textile link informal trade relations within West Africa; and how the quest for development by member-states impacts the economic integration experiment in the sub-region. The framework of the paper is rooted in the interaction between Economic liberalism and Economic Nationalism.

## Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The literature on economic integration in West Africa is vast. Ekpo (2020) showed how the vulnerability of West African economies is a challenge to economic integration in the sub-region. Earlier studies on intra-West African trade relations such as Amoah (2014), Golub (2012), and Brunelin and Portugal- Perez (2013) have explored the need for policy harmonisation, while others focused on the adverse effects of inadequate infrastructure (Ekra, 2010; Brunelin &Portugal- Perez, 2013, Acclassato, 2013) and how the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) has not improved the level of intra-regional trade in the sub-region (Akims, 2014; Aribasala, 2014; Muhammed, 2010; Acclassato,  2013). To Muhammed (2010), the non-operational ETLS is a result of the fact that many ECOWAS members possess as a major source of state income, the revenue accrued from tariffs and customs duties, leading to a resurgence of protectionism, one of the elements the scheme is meant to eliminate.

This study adopts the theory of international integration which refers to the process of replacing national bodies with supranational institutions. This is explained by functionalism – "the growth of specialised technical organisations that cross national borders" (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008).  Economic integration as a process begins with the creation of a free trade area in which tariffs among the member-states are eliminated. A free trade area is supposed to increase trade among member- states but free trade areas can be easily infiltrated. A state outside the organization could simply export goods into the member-state with the lowest tariffs. Once that is done, the goods could be exported from the infiltrated member-state to the other members of the organization thereby escaping the tariffs of the other states as if they had come from within the free trade area. An obvious solution to this problem involves the adoption of a common tariff by the states in the organization, to be applied to all imports coming from outside. If this is accomplished, the organization reaches the status of a customs union. The next

step up the ladder of economic integration is to establish a common market that allows the free flow of capital and labour across national boundaries. If the member-states jointly plan monetary, fiscal, and social policies, they form an economic union. When the planning of these policies is turned over to a unified, supranational body such as the European Commission, total economic integration is accomplished. According to neo-functionalism, once economic integration reaches this advanced stage, the emergence of a "new state-like entity" is a possibility (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2008; Karbo & Ray 2011).

## Intra-West African Trade Relations in Historical Perspective

Trade relations in West Africa had originally emerged along with other relations- ethnic, cultural, political, amongst others, between villages, kingdoms, and empires at various levels. The variation in geographical settings and stages of economic development necessitated trade relations. In essence, pre-colonial trade relations transcended geographical, territorial, and economic zones. The absence of distinct state boundaries encouraged trade networks across the sub-region (Ogunremi, 1996) because the boundaries were still fluid and state formation was ongoing (Olukoshi & Obi, 1996). Yet, there was some sort of restriction such as payment of tolls, levied to consolidate kingdoms' fiscal base. As the number and scale of the tolls increased, so did their impact on the content and direction of the trade (Olukoshi &Obi, 1996).

Trade relations took a different turn during the colonial period, following a vertical line, that is, between the colony and the metropolis for the economic advantage of the latter; in place of horizontal relations as had previously existed (Olukoshi & Obi, 1996). The sub-region had been carved up by Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal with artificial boundaries set up restricting people who had hitherto established socio-economic relations. Trade between neighbours under different colonial administrations had to go through the colonial authorities first. However, some form of trade connections grew between countries under the same colonial power-

French West Africa and British West Africa (Adejugbe, 1996). Trade in cloth between the different areas within Africa was one major fact of the pre-colonial period (Ajayi & Alagoa, 1999). Cloth-producing areas such as Benin and Ijebu Kingdoms imported cloth from one another. Ijebuclothes were relatively cheap and durable and thus well sought for (Isichei, 1983). By the 17th century, European merchants carried Ijebuclothes to Benin, the Gold Coast, Gabon, and Angola. Hausa towns namely Kano and Kura, in the 19th Century, were producing and exporting to Borno and Tuareg markets a Black cloth known as Turkey or Yankura (Candotti, 2008). Cloth from Kano and Jenne could be bought in Timbuktu, which was a commercial centre – the southern terminus of the Trans–Saharan trade (Ogunremi, 1996).

By the late 18th century, Oyo and Ijebu Ode were both singled out as prominent suppliers of the Alladah's market. In the Rio Grande and Sierra Leone, cotton clothing and raw cotton were exported from the Cape Verde Islands. These clothes called "quaqua" clothes were also found along Ivory Coast. These textiles were significant in regional trade and remembered in the oral traditions of the Jula trading families. The ports of Arbo and Lagos shipped textiles from the hinterlands to ready markets on the Gold Coast, the Gabon estuary, Angola, the Island of Sao Tome, and as far as the West Indies and Brazil (Kriger, 2005). From 1880 to 1930, most of the indigenous West African textile industry was lost. The presence of steamships reduced transport costs and brought an influx of small traders who moved inland to sell European textiles and other industrial goods in exchange for agricultural raw materials. European powers also began to connect West African markets to the needs of their national industries, and later annex them as colonies (Traub-Merz & Jauch 2006; Candotti, 2009).

**Textiles and West African Trade Relations Since 1975**

In 1975, the Economic Community of West Afr ican States (ECOWAS) was established to coordinate and promote trade, cooperation, and sustainable development throughout West Africa.

Trade development programs were adopted and these included the various protocols relating to products, trade, and the movement of people within the sub-region (Akims, 2014). These states began to develop their clothing and textile industries, especially through import substitution, which lasted till the 1980s. This entailed dictating cotton prices and imposing licensing and/or high tariffs on imported textiles (Baden& Baber, 2005). The strategy was successful: in the early 1980s, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries had 41 textile companies in total (Centre for Development of Enterprise [CDE], 2004). By the1960s, Nigeria had become West Africa's largest industrial producer of textile under import substitution. In the 1970s, the growth rate in the textile industry in the WAEMU was higher than in South-East Asia and in the early 1980s, some forty textile companies controlled most of the sizeable regional market for fancy and wax cloth (pagne). They also produced spun yarns and woven cloth, made synthetic fabrics, ready-to-wear garments, and textile articles for both the domestic and the export market (CDE, 2004).

However, by the mid-1980s, most West African countries changed their trade policies, despite the growth of their domestic industries under import substitution. This policy shift was due to worsening balances of payments, inability to service their foreign debt, and protected firms becoming less efficient than expected. For example, capacity utilization in Ghana fell from 60 percent in 1970 to just 10 percent for textile and 20 percent for garment factories by the early 1980s (Association for Ghanaian Industries (AGI), 2008). Furthermore, these states had to withdraw from the industry and open their borders to meet the requirements of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program. Structural Adjustment Programmes were based on the principle that exposure to global competition would expose firms that were unable to compete. By 2004, only 6 companies were operating at full capacity in the WAEMU countries, and only 3 of these with satisfactory levels of performance (CDE, 2004)

As of 2011, reports showed that most West African states had no textile policy vision and little or no enabling infrastructure or support measures. What most depended on was the duty-free export to EU and US and the Advantageous or Negotiable status of Least Developed countries with China. Thus, most countries produced textiles for the other countries beyond the sub-region and domestic consumption with little regard for the sub-regional market despite the existence of the ECOWAS protocols, with multilateral trade frameworks such as AGOA, the EU's GSP, and the Cotonou preference programs (Gherzi, 2011). Nigeria limited the items of trade with ECOWAS members to those that are produced by member-states without foreign content, hence fabrics could only be imported from Cote d'Ivoire or Senegal (Clark, 2014). As a result, smuggling tends to be concentrated in textiles, which are highly protected and/or subsidized in Nigeria and Senegal as both countries have protected firms. Counterfeit made-in-Nigeria textiles from China are smuggled in through a town, Maradi in Benin. These textiles are then repackaged and sent to Nigeria (Daily Champion, 24th January 2006). However, smuggling textiles through Togo was more successful due to its historical role as a regional centre for the textile industry (Golub, n.d). Hence, imports of cloth in Benin, Togo, and The Gambia far exceed those in Nigeria and Senegal, and the ECOWAS average levels of fabric imports of about $7 per person in the late 2000s.

In 1973 Benin and Togo both explicitly adopted policies to spur re-exports, with the goal of maintaining lower import barriers than those in Nigeria. With the implementation of the WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET) in 2000, Togo and Benin lost some of their competitive advantages vis-a-vis other WAEMU countries (Golub, 2012). Togo allegedly seeks to undercut Benin by lowering applied duties of imported goods below WAEMU levels to compensate for its geographical disadvantage in access to the Nigerian market. To contend with rising competition from Togo, Benin is said to permit under-invoicing of imports and flexible application of import duty rates (Golub, 2012).

Senegal followed highly restrictive trade and pricing policies during the first decades of independence in the 1960s, with very high tariffs and opaque non-tariff barriers. It later moved towards more market-oriented economic policies as part of its structural adjustment policies in the late 1980s and 1990s, following serious fiscal and financial crises, culminating in the implementation of the CET in WAEMU countries in 1998-2000, which greatly reduced the infamous complexity and lack of transparency of Senegal's tariff structure. On the other hand, the Gambian government has sought to maintain a more liberal trade regime than Senegal to facilitate its role as a trading hub.  The import tax differential in the 1970s through the early 1990s between Senegal and The Gambia was very large; with Senegalese import duties alone as high as 100 percent for goods such as textiles, while Gambian duties averaged around 30 percent. In 2000 and subsequently, in response to the implementation of the WAEMU CET, The Gambia simplified and reduced its customs duties (Golub, n.d).

Thus, while some states try to protect their textile industry, others seek revenue through the importation of textiles into the sub-region. The protectionist policy then becomes a cause of tension in trade relations (NewswatchTimes, 2015). According to Haruna Idrisu, Ghana's Minister for Trade, Ghanaian textiles are not allowed into the Nigerian market even when Ghana opened up to Nigerian products. In response, the then Nigerian Ambassador to Ghana, Ademola Oluwaseyi Onafowokan pointed out that Nigeria did not close its doors but that perceived malpractices from businessmen outside the West African region has hampered trade relations. He complained that some companies outside Ghana send their products to be registered in Ghana and re-exported into Nigeria (Anudu, 2014). On the other hand, the President of the National Association of Non-Metallic Products Employers Federation (ANMPEF), Mr. Devakumer Edwin stated that there is an anti-Nigeria disposition among neighbouring countries and this puts local manufacturers at disadvantage with the provisions of the ECOWAS treaty being frequently abused. He noted that goods from member-states flow into Nigeria with relative ease yet Nigerian exporters find it difficult

to penetrate the markets in other West African countries through the imposition of high taxes and other fiscal measures. Consequently, Nigerian goods are stuck in the country and left to compete with other goods (Sotunde, 2014).

## Politics of State Development and Trade Relations: Effects on West African Economic Integration Experiment

While the concept of development defies a single definition, it is generally perceived as progress or improvement of a current situation or condition. State development aims at improving the standard of living of its citizens, coordinating and harnessing all resources available, human and material alike. Trade and development are inseparable; trade providing for the exchange of 'specialised' goods of nations, hence increasing wealth accumulation, production, and therefore development. Thus, ECOWAS has concerned itself with intra-regional trade, harmonizing and strengthening the common market of its member states based on liberal economic development strategies. Though trade relations between ECOWAS countries have improved over the years, it is below optimum expectation. There are several factors responsible for this. First, West Africa has three official languages: English, French, and Portuguese. This multilingualism constrains communication among most traders who are likely to be proficient in only one of the languages especially taking into cognizance the sub-region's high level of illiteracy. Also, it has been noted that the level of education of the traders corresponds with the scale on which they operate and the majority of them especially women are not well-grounded in reading nor do they understand regional agreements, market information, and many transactions (Acclassato, 2013).

There is also the fact that West African countries are not each other's principal customers since most states operate mono economies with a high dependence on one or a few primary exports. Besides the fact that these products are hardly manufactured goods (Adewoye, 1986), they are also not for the community market and this structure tends to affect trade relations. Furthermore, the region's multiple

currencies and pricing regimes raise challenges for managing exchange rates which in return affects the profitability of trade within the sub-region. Economic nationalism thus becomes prevalent in a bid to develop their state economy, despite the existence of the ECOWAS protocol. This also shows the impatience and the lack of trust in the existing economic integration experiment to provide economic prosperity for member-states. States began to fall back on protectionism, seeking to reduce dependence on imports and promote local manufacturing. For instance, Nigeria's trade policies became restrictive. Also, the completion of the Senegambia Bridge had only gradually opened up trade relations between Gambia and Senegal.

The inconsistency of trade policies and the implementation of instruments from the trade agreements, at national and regional levels, particularly due to the low volume of intra-Community exchanges remains a challenge, and these cuts across most sectors- agriculture, industry, energy, fiscal and monetary policies leaving the potential for trade integration and joint infrastructure projects unexploited, at least on the formal market (Clark, 2014). This inadequacy contributes to the decline in textile production in various West African countries despite the availability of raw materials- cotton and labour. For instance, while the Nigerian textile industry grapples with internal inadequacies, resulting in low-capacity utilization, most of the Ghanaian textile manufacturers refuse to produce for the West African market as "full economic integration in the sub-region has not been achieved" (Baden and Beber, 2005), making passage of goods across borders very cumbersome and difficult; particularly at the frontiers of Francophone countries". Ghanaian exporters complain mostly about the difficulties in accessing the Nigerian goods market due to unfavourable product registration process, trouble in transporting their goods across the borders of Benin and Togo, and also corruption in the Nigerian customs. These complaints run contrary to the existing ECOWAS treaties and protocols (Obaremi, 2014).

The ETLS launched in 1990 included the encouragement of entrepreneurial development by providing easily assessed markets (Akims, 2014). This was to create a business to business linkages such as private sector joint ventures, an enabling, environment to promote small and medium scale enterprise, a business-friendly legal environment, and the harmonization of standards and measures. The ETLS was going to affect a number of states' income especially revenues from tariffs and customs duties (Muhammed, 2010), though there was a compensation plan - affected governments would submit applications to a central fund which would be financed by members' contributions. This hampered its implementation. The ETLS equally suffers due to the neglect of the migration policies. While trade has been liberalized extensively, and resources poured into trade policy reform, migration remains an area of numerous restrictions and policy neglect. Movement particularly in pursuit of trade is highly problematic because treaties and protocols on free movement are honoured more in the breach (ARIA (IV), 2010). Mohammed Ibn Chambas, former president of ECOWAS Commission admits that the free movement of people and goods remains a big challenge (Okom and Udoka, 2012).

Free movement protocol - of goods and people– is hindered due to fear of irredentism and invasion or unemployment and other forms of socio-economic problems.  In April 1984, Nigeria closed all its land borders. This was justified in terms of the exercise of changing the national currency which was ongoing- an anti-smuggling policy and response to other criminal practices that were sabotaging the Nigerian economy (Nwoke, 2010). Nigeria also banned food export to ECOWAS counties, the impact of which was painful particularly for Benin, Togo, and Ghana because Nigeria's trade with these countries which was vital to their economies was virtually brought to a halt. Barely a year later, in May 1985, there was a mass expulsion of about 1 million "illegal" aliens, mostly Ghanaians. This took place about 2 months before the crucial ECOWAS summit at which arrangements for the second stage of ECOWAS free movements were to be finalized. These acts were setbacks in the trade relations among

West African countries. It looked like Nigeria was retaliating for the Ghana Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 which gave immigrants in Ghana, (many of whom were Nigerians), fourteen days to leave the country (Okom and Udoka, 2012).

In 1999, many ECOWAS citizens were expelled from Cote d'Ivoire. That year, there were about four million immigrants in that country. There was a groundswell of anti-immigrant sentiment which manifested in violence. Anti-immigrant sentiment also simmered in Ghana leading the government in March 1999, to request all aliens in the country to get registered and obtain identity cards. The sentiments did not abate until 2010, when Globacom a Nigerian company, threatened to close its Ghana office because of hostile economic policies aimed at "alien" businesses. Many aliens, (including ECOWAS citizens), were forced by the harsh development, to leave the country (Okom and Udoka, 2012). In August 2019, Nigeria also closed its land borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with the objective of curbing the smuggling of rice. Since then, various meetings have been held with Nigeria to change its stance.

The West African Economic Integration experiment is still ongoing. The hope is that by integrating the markets of several countries, their collective economic systems will benefit from economies of scale and firm access to the enlarged market that may help the members develop economically to deal better with what they see as unfair competition from industrialized countries. However, ECOWAS, like many of the regional cooperation efforts in the developing world is only functional, in that collective state action on certain issues is determined by the state governments as national governments serve as the gatekeepers between the national and regional level. Therefore, each state is suspicious of interdependence, with the fears that this may compromise its sovereignty and security. Thus, the necessary initiative to achieve greater cohesion is unavailable. This is because, as Karbo and Ray (2011) noted when developing countries get together in an integrating way, they create the same kind of market pressures and advantages for the relatively developed states inside these organizations that exist in the outside world. For

instance, industries attracted by commercial opportunities inside a new customs union tend to gravitate towards the most economically advanced state.

## Conclusion

With centuries of traditional trade relations within the sub-region disrupted by the colonial experience, West African countries have gone beyond just trading with one another to creating a common market. However, there remain the challenges of inherited colonial laws, artificial boundaries of colonial origin, and instituted colonial commercial relations which had resulted in a distorted political economy of the sub-region. Besides these internal challenges, there is a global trend to contend with especially in the textile sector that pits relatively weak national industries of the sub-region against those of the developed states.

This study finds that states turn inwards in the face of challenges to formulate policies without consideration for other ECOWAS states. Most governments resort to protectionism to preserve the textile industry, one of the largest employers of labour after the government and agriculture against the influx of foreign textiles especially since some studies show an inverse relationship between increases in imports of textiles and decreases in average manufacturing capacity in the textile industry (Nmadu, 2006). However, these protectionist policies only amplify re-exports and smuggling of textiles in the sub-region. Thus, textile production in West Africa is geared towards the Global North and for domestic consumption, with little regard for the sub-regional market despite the existence of the ECOWAS protocols. Multilateral trade frameworks take precedence over the sub-regional platform, for instance, the high demand for apparel inputs such as yarn and fabric is due to the AGOA, the EU's GSP, and Cotonou preference programs.

However, these multilateral frameworks and the individual State's efforts to address the decline in textile industry and trade hinder West African trade and cooperative initiatives as both compete

for loyalty. A strong political will of states needs to be invoked to surmount these challenges. Until then, West African states continue to sabotage any sub-regional policy perceived at the slightest turn to be adversarial. This study recommends that a textile policy - production and trade- be implemented in the sub-region since textiles can be produced and traded within and without the sub-region, unlike primary commodities such as cocoa, groundnuts, etc. Experimenting with textiles will open up intra West African trade to other indigenous items that are locally produced.

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# NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS: A CHALLENGE TO NATION-STATES?

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## Abstract

In international politics, the discussion has always essentially focused on the sovereignty of nation-states. Nation-states are widely viewed as the only important actors in world politics. However, nation-states are by no means the only politically and economically significant actors in world politics. In the post-World War II era, non-state actors were recognized as having an important impact on world politics. This paper critically examines the ways in which and the extent to which the emergence of non-state actors such as Multinational Corporations, Transnational Advocacy Networks, Transnational Diaspora Communities, and Violent Non-State Actors in world politics affects the relevance of nation-states who were initially regarded as the sole actor in world politics from the realist perspective. The complex interdependence theory is adopted as the framework of analysis. This study uses qualitative research method of analysis, and lean only on secondary data. The findings show that the state-centric image of world politics is both inaccurate and potentially damaging for the analysis of world politics. A state-centric focus, no matter its level of sophistication, can limit the ability of both academics and policymakers to describe, explain, and manage the complexity of the world arena. Non-state actors are making their contributions, both positively and negatively, to the state system.

**Keywords:** Non-State Actors, World Politics, State-Centric, Complex Interdependence.

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## Introduction

How the activities of non-state actors are undermining the continued relevance of nation-states in world politics cannot be glossed over. World politics has to do with 'who gets what, when, and how in the international arena. The 'who' can encompass individuals, groups, large organizations, and nation-states, but it cannot be confined to any one type of political force. The 'what' can include the dramatic episodes of war and peace, territorial conquest, and national security. But it also extends equally to vital areas of economic activity, and other social processes with inescapably international content. The 'how' may imply violence, destruction, and terror, but can also extend to processes of negotiation, collaboration, and technical or routine administration (Hocking and Smith, 1995: 2). On the other hand, non-State actors are organizations and individuals that participate in world politics even though they are not affiliated with, directed by, or funded through the government of states. Some examples of non-State actors are Multinational Corporations, Transnational Advocacy Networks, Transnational Diaspora Communities, and Violent Non-State Actors.

Moreover, such a perspective on world politics reflects a further conviction that in the contemporary era, it makes little sense to talk of world politics as a process that is carried on solely by specialized elites or experts, acting on behalf of nation-states. World politics is an essential area of study for those who are interested in finding out how their world works. Nowadays, it is increasingly difficult to escape the influence of the broader international arena. The essence of world politics as an academic field of study is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding which can provide insights into real-world problems. However, when world politics is discussed by politicians, lawyers, diplomats, journalists, and academics, it is usually in terms of the diplomatic interactions between states. The activities of non-state actors in world politics are not seen as relevant and worthy of emphasis. This view of world politics is termed a state-centric view. A state-centric view of world politics emphasizes

the ability of governments both to represent the broad interests of their citizens and equally to control the actions of groups within the nation-state (Nau, 2016: 45). In other words, state action according to the state-centric view is an action taken by those acting in the name of the state. This assertion reflects the idea that governments can in some way bring together and control the needs and actions of their citizens.

Moreover, one of the most prominent features of world politics in the second half of the twentieth century is the significant increase in numbers and importance of non-state actors. Traditionally in world politics, power and authority are considered to rest with nation-states (Bieler, Higgott, and Underhill, 2011: 2-3). Nation-states are embedded in an interdependent world where non-state actors are consequential. Principal actors in world politics are nation-states, but they are not the only actors. Non-state actors have managed to break through the barrier of invisibility. As a result, the impact of non-state actors on world politics cannot be overemphasized. Non-state actors are changing the face of world politics today as they seek to reshape the global agenda. Non-state actors are involved in almost every important issue in the world. Nation-states cannot insulate their population from the flow of ideas that shape human tastes and values.

Meanwhile, processes of globalization are transforming world politics from activity primarily involving nation-states to one characterized by transnational relations between different types of politically significant actors which are connected by potentially global communications (Keohane, and Nye, 2011: 5-8). The revolution in the means of communications has brought the world closer, and it is easier and cheaper to reach faraway places. People, money, news, and consumption patterns, among others, move faster than ever across the globe. This context has also contributed to an increase in the participation of non-state actors in issues of global governance, and they have been able to exercise influence in the elaboration and implementation of state foreign policies. Moreover, the globalized presence of non-state actors makes a mockery of sovereignty as

exclusive territorial control. Nation-states find it increasingly difficult to channel or control the impact of developments in the international arena on their national societies as claimed by the realist scholars. In these conditions, it becomes very difficult to maintain the idea of an 'impermeable' state possessing sovereignty and being able to act as a 'gatekeeper' between the national and international domains. It would be equally mistaken to exaggerate the state's power as a determinant of the world's fate and dismiss the expanding role of non-state actors in shaping world politics.

The rise of non-state actors raises the question of whether the nature of world politics is fundamentally changing. Non-state actors are actors which are at least in principle autonomous from the structure and machinery of the state. Some of these actors are primarily transnational in organizations, with global objectives. That is to say, they operate on a cross-border basis, pursue the same set of goals everywhere, and address a global audience (Wallace, and Josselin, 2001: 3). This does not mean that their national affiliates, subsidiaries or chapters, have no autonomy, but they possess a clear overall image. Some non-state actors merely participate in transnational coalitions or networks while retaining their primarily domestic outlook. Yet their influence on world politics may nevertheless be considerable. The American Trade Union Federation, for example, was the single largest source of finance behind the mass demonstration organized against the launch of a millennium round of trade talks in December 1999 (Wallace, and Josselin, 2001: 20). Non-state actors work to influence policy outcomes through regular cross-border activities.

Furthermore, the rise of these trans-nationally organized non-state actors and their growing involvement in world politics challenges the assumptions of traditional approaches to world politics, which assume that nation-states are the only important actors in world politics (Waltz, 2010: 6). The proliferation of non-state actors has recently led some observers of world politics to conclude that nation-states are declining in importance and that non-state actors are gaining status and influence. The communications revolution has transformed the ability of non-state actors to develop and maintain

transnational contacts at lower costs. Moreover, the erosion of the power of nation-states by non-state actors has recently called into question the primacy of nation-states in world politics. Non-state actors have succeeded in shaping and re-shaping world politics beyond what one could easily imagine. Therefore, any meaningful interpretation of world politics must take the significance of non-state actors, operating trans-nationally into account.

## Theoretical Framework

Theoretically, given the growing relevance of the non-state actors, the complex interdependence theory is here adopted for critical analysis of the issue. Complex interdependence theory emerged in response to realist theory, and it rejects realist narrow focus on the State. This theory was pioneered by the work of two erudite scholars, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. In their famous book titled Power and Interdependence, published in 1977, they argued that world politics is not necessarily a competitive arena that is exclusively dominated by nation-states. These scholars were of the view that the role of the nation-state in world politics is being undermined by the emergence of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks, violent non-state actors, religious groups, transnational diaspora communities, and so on.

To realists, world politics is a struggle for power that is dominated by organized violence. Second, nation-states are dominant actors and coherent units. Third, force is an effective instrument in states policy and it is usable. Realists also believe that there is a hierarchy of issues in world politics and that security issues are the topmost. According to complex interdependence theory, world politics is more complex than the one presented by realists. Hence, this theory believes that world politics encompasses a wide array of actors. This focus on multiple actors is sometimes referred to as pluralism. Pluralism is a focus on a multiplicity of actors within the international system. In addition, while realists see a single important actor (the state), a single goal (security), and a single driving force (power), complex interdependence theory on the other hand sees multiple

actors, diverse goals, and a variety of driving forces. Complex interdependence theory does not see security dominating all other goals as claimed by the realists. As a result of this, this theory argued that clear hierarchy does not exist and what is topmost is situational, for example, the conflict between America and China is economic (trade disputes). This theory does not see force as an instrument of foreign policy that is always effective, for example, America and Vietnam. Sometimes, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and even negotiations can prove more effective. In line with this analysis, complex interdependence theory presents a picture of the world that is at variance with the one painted by realists.

## Multinational Corporations and World Politics

Before the second half of the nineteenth century, world politics has largely been a chronicle of interactions among sovereign, territorial states. Today, however, world politics is also being shaped by non-state actors that transcend national boundaries. Diverse in scope and purpose, these non-state actors push their agendas and increasingly exert international influence. One of the first non-state actors to gain widespread notice was multinational corporations (D'Anieri, 2010:49-50). Multinational corporations have grown dramatically in scope and influence since World War II (Kegley, and Raymond, 2010:164). One of the aims of this paper is to explore the implications of change in world politics with particular reference to the example of multinational corporations, a phenomenon whose growth and activity have received great attention in recent years from both academic commentators and policymakers. Multinational corporations are companies based in one state with affiliate branches or subsidiaries operating in other states (Goldstein, and Pevehouse, 2012:341).

In other words, multinational corporations could be described as 'oligopolistic corporations in which ownership, management, production, and sales activities extend over several national jurisdictions' (Gilpin, R., 2001:45). Multinational corporations deserve special treatment because they are different from other non-

state actors and organizations in their nature, size, and degree of impact on world politics. The proliferation and the changing nature of multinational corporations have had important effects on the 'landscape' of world politics because of their growing importance in economic and political affairs, and also because of the complex pattern of interactions between them and other actors, especially nation-states and international organizations (Bennett, and Oliver, 2002:277).

One simple measure of the impact of multinational corporations is the enormity of the resources controlled by them. Due to their financial strength and global reach, multinational corporations are considered to be a threat to the power of nation-states. The term 'resources' here implies not merely the raw financial strength which multinational corporations can muster, which in itself considered, but it also refers to the mobility and flexibility with which multinational corporations can operate across national boundaries as a result of their non-territorial nature. Their ability to make decisions on many issues over which national political leaders have little control appears to be eroding state sovereignty, the international system's major organizing principle (Kegley, and Raymond, 2010:166). Moreover, as independent actors in the international arena, multinational corporations are increasingly powerful. The annual earnings of some of the companies rival the economic output of midsize states and dwarf most of the smaller ones (Rourke, 2008:2). Dozens of industrial multinational corporations have annual sales of tens of billions of dollars each (hundreds of billions of dollars for the top corporations such as Exxon Mobil, and Wal-Mart).

Typically, Exxon Mobil was the world's largest multinational corporation in 2005, with revenues of $377 billion. It had $208 billion in assets and 84,000 employees. These numbers give Exxon Mobil an 'economy' the size of Sweden's. Indeed, Exxon Mobil's Gross Corporate Product (GCP) is larger than the Gross National Product (GNP) of all but sixteen of the world's countries. The immense wealth of the largest multinational corporations gives them considerable influence in world politics (Navaretti, and Venables,

2006:18). As a key player in the world's energy supply, Exxon Mobil wields considerable influence on policy in that area. For example, critics charge that Exxon Mobil has been a leader in the campaign to block or limit restrictions on the use of fossil fuels as part of the effort to slow or reverse global warming. Two prominent critics of such practice, US Senators Olympia Snowe and Jay Rockefeller wrote to the head of Exxon Mobil, accusing the corporation of supporting supposedly scientific groups who 'are producing very questionable data' that denies the reality of global warming (Rourke, 2008:383).

Furthermore, examples of interference by multinational corporations in the internal politics of Third World countries were available and widely publicized. For decades, the United Fruit Company was able to extract from several Central American governments legislations and policies that were extremely favourable to its profitability. With the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the helm, the United Fruit Company played a role in the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954, just as British Petroleum and CIA were implicated in the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 (Viotti, and Kauppi, 2008:12). In the early 1970s, the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) first tried to prevent the election of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as president of Chile, and later was instrumental in his overthrow. Also, in November 1995, Shell Oil, which produced almost half of Nigeria's crude oil, refused to speak out against a brutal Nigerian military government when it arrested and executed human rights and environmental activists who protested Shell's activities in their homeland. Shell has been accused of complicity with the Nigerian government in the death of activists protesting environmental abuses of the company (Kaarbo, and Ray, 2011:408).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that multinational corporations constitute a challenge to the fabric of the state system and the political primacy of the state. The significance of the evolution of multinational corporations in relation to the powers and jurisdictions of nation-states is potentially far-reaching since it rests on a series of challenges to precisely those qualities which lie

at the centre of statehood, that is, control of territory, control of the economy, and control of the affiliations of the citizens.

## Transnational Diaspora Communities and World Politics

One of the non-state actors that exert considerable influence on world politics is diasporas. The role of the media and modern means of communications in mobilizing and facilitating diaspora politics cannot be underestimated. The time-space compression, the World Wide Web, and direct access to the homeland's newspapers and television reduce the efforts required to keep up with events elsewhere in the diaspora or the homeland. Indeed, one of the striking features of an area with a high concentration of Turkish immigrants in Germany or the Netherland is the availability of the main Turkish newspapers in every newsagent and the parabolic reflectors on every roof, which beam the news and perspectives of the homeland right into the living room of the immigrants (Wallace, and Josselin, 2001:222).

Diasporas are transnational per definition. Their emotive, social, economic, and not least political cross-border networks with their homeland or with other segments of the diaspora, constitute one of their main resources for political influence. Diasporas draw considerable strength and viability from the increase in trans-state economic, social, and political links, and themselves contribute to the intensification of these processes by their activities. Diasporas enter the international scene as actors in their own right as they seek to intervene in the political affairs of their homeland, or when the homeland seeks to gain economic and political support from its citizens abroad or to provide them with economic or political support in their adopted countries. In these instances, the diaspora becomes a linkage group between its host country and its homeland. The various forms of diaspora politics introduce the politics of their homeland into their host country and provide an external dimension to the politics of their homeland acting as a resource for political counterparts (Smith, 1991:8).

However, situations revolving around the active political agency of diaspora are as complex as the multitude of interests of the political actors involved. The diaspora may attempt to influence events in the homeland directly, by economic and political means. Here, the effects of trans-state links on intrastate conflict are essential. For instance, the 1911 revolution in China was primarily financed by overseas Chinese (Esman, 1986:132). Croats in Germany were known to have smuggled weapons to support Croat dissidents in former Yugoslavia. Factions of the Irish diaspora in the United States supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) financially. Economic assistance from the diaspora Jewish community to Zionist settlements in Palestine and later Israel also illustrates this dimension. Some of these examples are closely linked to instances in which diasporas act as state-initiators. The history of the re-establishment of the state of Israel may be the classic of its kind, but it is not the only such example. It was the Czech diaspora that initiated the establishment of Czechoslovakia after the First World War (Akzim, 1964:248). The diaspora may draw upon its resources to influence the host-country government to pursue a particular policy towards its homeland. To that end, most diasporas employ multilevel strategies drawing upon both confrontational and institutional means (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2000:17). On the other hand, there are confrontational strategies such as demonstrations, mass meetings, fly posting, slogan writing in public places, hunger strikes, and even violent and terrorist activities.

Furthermore, there are forms of institutional participation where diaspora organizes panel discussions and information campaigns or try to gain good contacts and position within a political institution, such as a trade union, a political party, or a national or international nongovernmental organization (NGO), to lobby on homeland political issues (Languerre, 2006:15). However, examples of this sort of domestic influence on foreign policy are numerous. For instance, they include the successful attempt by the Greek diaspora in the United States to induce Congress to place an embargo on military assistance to Turkey, in protest against Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus (Constas, and Platians, 1993:11), the attempt of the African diaspora in the United States to take effective measure

against South Africa due to its racists' policies (Leanne, 1995:25-26), and not least, the success of the Jewish diaspora in the United States in committing its government to extensive military, diplomatic and economic support for Israel.

State institutions are by no means the only target for diaspora political ideology. In particular, diasporas who oppose a state which has strong allies in their host states, or simply is too powerful for other states to meddle with, may turn to international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Council and the like. The continuous lobbying by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the recognition of Palestine as a member of the United Nations is a classic example. Another example is the Tibetans, who have advanced their story of persecution and discrimination by the Chinese in international forums rather than their host state, India. Only more resourceful diaspora organizations manage to lobby international organizations at a more professional level on their own. Therefore, the so-called trans-state advocacy networks of NGOs are very valuable (Keck, and Sikkink, 1998:45). Co-opting of NGOs at both the national and international level is a much sought-after strategy for the diaspora since such organizations facilitate contact with levels of policy-making which are otherwise difficult to gain access to, for a diaspora organization.

Homeland governments often display an interest in retaining and evoking loyalty among their nationals living abroad, to mobilize their diaspora in support of their own goals. The incentive to do so may be economic. For instance, to secure hard currency in the form of remittances, or as in the case of Turkey by requesting donations for the Army via satellite-transmitted television (Ostergaard-Nielson, 1995:391). It may also be political, as in the case of the Imperial Germany government's attempt to mobilize the large and influential German community in the United States to prevent the United States from entering the First World War on the side of the Allies (Wallace, and Josselin, 2001:226). The case of Israel's mobilizations of the United States Jewish community today includes both dimensions.

## Transnational Advocacy Networks and World Politics

Among the many different non-state actors, transnational advocacy networks have begun to play a role of growing importance in world politics, and in particular countries (D'Anieri, 2010:357). Transnational advocacy networks are significant transnationally and domestically. By building new links among actors in civil societies, and international organizations, they multiply the channels of access to the international system. In such issue areas as the environment and human rights, they also make international resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles. A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and service (Boissevain, and Mitchel, 1973:23). Such networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high-value content and informational uncertainty.

At the core of the relationship is information exchange. What is novel in these networks is the ability of non-traditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes but to transform the terms and nature of the debate. Transnational advocacy networks that span state borders are not traditionally powerful players in world politics. However, by mobilizing information in support of a cause, they can change the nature of international policy and practice (Rosenau, 1990:12). Advocates of principled causes, ideas, and values like human rights or the environment do not work alone. Nor are they limited by national boundaries. The last several decades have witnessed significant growth in the number of loose coalitions or networks of advocates building bridges across borders to bring about social change. These advocacy networks have changed the face of international policy-making and practice.

Transnational advocacy networks do not rely on traditional bases of power like a military or economic muscle. In the traditional sense of 'power' within the international arena, advocacy networks are relatively 'weak' players. However, these groups have become increasingly influential. They have become major players in the field of world politics. The larger approach of a transnational advocacy group has not been to simply force their way into world politics as usual. Rather, they have sought to change the way the game is played in world politics. They reshape the terms of international debate. They redefine and sometimes create the issues that gain international attention (Florini, 2000:118). Before the involvement of transnational advocacy networks, the game of world politics was one where the field was well defined, the terms were known and where the rules were set, all favouring the largest and most muscular players. The bulk of what transnational advocacy networks do might be termed persuasion or socialization, but neither process is devoid of conflict. Persuasion and socialization often involve not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing pressure, arm-twisting, and sanctions. Audie Klotz's work on norms and apartheid discusses coercion, incentive, and legitimation effects that are often part of a socialization process (Klotz, 1999:152-164).

Tactics that networks use in their efforts at persuasion, socialization, and pressure include information, politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically useable information and move it to where it will have the most impact. Symbolic politics, or the ability to propagate symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away. Leveraging politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence. And accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles (Cott, 1995:29-51). However, a single campaign may contain many of these elements simultaneously. For example, Human Rights Watch, through its network of monitors, often gathers more reliable reporting on human rights practices than either governments or the private news media can provide. Therefore, both governments and the news

media rely on Human Rights Watch reports (D'Anieri, 2010:357).

The human rights network disseminated information about human rights abuses in Argentina in the period 1976-1983. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo marched in circles in the central square in Buenos Aires wearing white handkerchiefs to draw symbolic attention to the plight of their missing children. The network also tried to use both material and moral leverage against the Argentine regime, by pressuring the United States and other governments to cut off military and economic aid, and by efforts to get the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to condemn Argentina's human rights abuses. Transnational advocacy networks play a crucial role in setting international agenda, as emphasized particularly by constructivist international politics theory (Mingst, and Toft, 2013:12-13). It is very difficult, of course, for transnational advocacy networks to compel reluctant governments. But many times, transnational advocacy networks raise an issue before it becomes one of importance to governments. Network's members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways and by seeking hospitable venues.

Thus, by raising issues first and defining agendas, norms, and standards, transnational advocacy networks can influence the behaviour of international organizations and States. In the 1970s and 1980s, many states decided for the first time that the promotion of human rights in other countries was a legitimate foreign policy goal and an authentic expression of national interest. The decision came in part from interaction with an emerging global human rights network (Becker, 2012:45). Moreover, many transnational advocacy networks do not merely advocate, they equally act. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders provide many kinds of aid directly to people around the world. Especially in poor countries where governments are incapable of providing for certain needs, these organizations play a role complementary to that of governments and help millions of people.  In the delivery of aid around the world, transnational aid organizations can often accomplish tasks that even the most

powerful government cannot. For example, in conflict-prone areas, where the presence of foreign government personnel might provoke violence, governments rely heavily on transnational aid organizations to deliver all sorts of aid. Aid organizations are often perceived as more neutral, and thus less threatening than states or international organizations.

## Violent Non-State Actors and World Politics

Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) are another non-state actor that impacts significantly world politics. Violent non-state actors are non-state armed groups that resort to organized violence as a tool to achieve their goals (Mulaj, 2010:3). Despite being small groups and inferior to their adversaries in terms of equipment, training, and often doctrine, violent non-state actors are likely to continue and even increase their asymmetric operations to achieve political objectives and influence. Also, because the security environment of the twenty-first century is set to be characterized by the influence and power of non-state armed groups, and because the latter is central to the understanding of regional and world politics, analysis of the nature of these actors ought to be taken more seriously. Violent non-state actors are not a new phenomenon in world politics. The operations of some such actors already pose a threat to Western interests before the fateful day of September 11, 2001. Given that our era is being defined by a US-led war on terrorism, understanding violent non-state actors is crucial to ensure that sound policy responses are devised and implemented.

Although non-state actors primarily in socioeconomic stances have received extensive coverage in political science literature, violent non-state actors have only recently received sustained interest among academic and policy circles (Thomas, and Kiser, 2013:3). The increasing operations of violent non-state actors challenge the concept of the legitimate use of force vested so far solely in sovereign nation-states. Whereas in principle, violent non-state actors may operate in the context of interstate conflict, in recent times they have

been more often than not a central feature of civil war and intrastate conflict which reflect the non-Westphalian features of contemporary armed conflict. While wars between states are characterized as formal wars, violent non-state actors are involved in 'informal wars where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity (Metz, 2000:48). Violent non-state actors' involvement in informal wars is also an example of what K.J. Holsti has termed wars of the third kind, characterized by the absence of fixed territorial boundaries, elaborate institutionalized military rituals, major fronts, and open military campaigns (Holsti, 1996:36). Violent non-state actors' relations to the state are crucial in comprehending their actions. Violent non-state actors' operations can be understood as a response to state policies or as a reflection of a state's efforts to co-opt these actors in its policies. Violent non-state actors often seek a state of their own while opposing a given state. Even when they operate in a context of state failure, fragmentation, and/or collapse, violent non-state actors' political power is closely linked to their ability to use, or threaten the use of violence.

Violent non-state actors frequently operate in states confronting a crisis, which are incapable of providing services and delivering public goods, including security in all their territory. In Afghanistan, Colombia, Sudan, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka, although the government provides basic services and delivers public goods in the main cities, it is ineffective in the periphery of the country. In the latter areas, the government shares its sovereignty with violent non-state actors, a condition known also as 'fragmented sovereignty' that is complemented by a 'system of violence' in which state and non-state actors interact, coexist, cooperate, or conflict tacitly and implicitly. When such a system of violence is consolidated, it acquires its dynamic and political economy which allows its prolongation. The latter impairs the state's distributive and coercive capabilities as well as the performance of state institutions, enabling violent non-state actors to penetrate such institutions and find safe havens and launching grounds (Mulaj, 2010:7).

Furthermore, violent non-state actors such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Hezbollah are organized distinct from the state and in opposition to it, and they often demand a state of their own. They are actively engaged in a process of state-building through setting up parallel civil administrations within the territory under their control, and/ or through military means, that is, armed struggles. It deserves emphasizing, nonetheless, that violence used by violent non-state actors to oppose the state and win legitimacy for their political cause imposes costs on the state. Indeed, violent non-state actors seek to impose as large a cost as possible on the state to break its resistance threshold. The repercussions of violent non-state actors' violence on the state are not only physical but also economic, political, and psychological. The more protracted the violence, the larger the cost it imposes on the state.

Violent non-state actors - state relations, nevertheless are not uniform. Just as some violent non-state actors exist as distinct from and in violent opposition to the state, others exist in a dynamic relationship with the state. In Afghanistan, for instance, a weak state exists in juxtaposition to powerful sub-national actors of which the Taliban are one of the most prominent. While the state in Afghanistan may have a central authority, that authority, and the functioning of the state, can be at the mercy of numerous internal sub-actors, and external actors that can manipulate various sub-actors (tribes) for their purposes. Some violent non-state actors not only coexist with the state but are co-opted by it. They are integral to the existence of state power in so far as they form part of state efforts to exercise power at a distance, a strategy which, of course, reflects the state's administrative weakness. This is the present picture in many countries in Africa, most notably Sudan. The central government in Khartoum cannot control distant parts of the country directly through security services or local administrative apparatuses, not only because it lacks the financial means but also because government control is controversial among local people who resent external interference in their local communities. In these circumstances, the government uses non-state actors as proxies to exercise control over the periphery

of the country. It is in this respect that violent non-state actors in Sudan have become central to the exercise of state power.

The relocation of authority from the state to non-state actors is also acute in Somalia. Here, the prolonged collapse of the central government has resulted in a context where non-state actors have been the most significant form of political organization, with violence, or the threat of violence, the main currency of power. A wide gamut of violent non-state actors has acquired significant importance in contemporary world politics, in so far as such actors contest the legitimacy of state monopolization of organized violence more than ever before (Mandel, 2013:47).

## Conclusion

It has been demonstrated that states are not the only preponderant actors in world politics in the contemporary period. The intensification of globalization and the empowerment of non-state actors have broadened the range of actors which impact daily on the events of international and national politics. Non-state actors are now as important as the state. Whether they are multinational corporations, diaspora communities, transnational advocacy networks, violent non-state actors, they play an increasingly important role in world politics. Transnational advocacy networks pressure government to change human rights practices, multinational corporations compel states to adopt a law that suits their businesses. Others like diaspora communities influence events in the homeland directly by economic and political means and at the same time influence the host-country government to pursue a particular policy towards its homeland. Lastly, violent non-state actors are undermining state security and sovereignty. To reduce or eliminate their violent influence on the state, both the stick and carrot measures must be applied and seek after the general good of the people.

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